

**ASSESSING THE ROLE OF SUB-DISTRICT STRUCTURES IN  
DECENTRALISED LOCAL GOVERNANCE:  
A CASE STUDY OF EJISU-JUABEN MUNICIPAL AND SEKYERE EAST  
DISTRICT  
ASSEMBLIES**

**By**

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of the requirements for the degree of  
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**DECLARATION**

I hereby declare that this submission is my own work towards the MSc and that, to the best of my knowledge, it contains no material previously published by another person nor material which has been accepted for the award of any other of the university, except where due acknowledgement has been made in the text.

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## ABSTRACT

The institutional superstructure of the post-1988 Ghana's Decentralised Local Government system was built on the Sub-Metropolitan, Urban, Town, Zonal, Area Councils and Unit Committees. In order to operate effectively as the link between the Metropolitan, Municipal, District Assemblies (MMDAs) and the people, the Local Government Act (Act 462) and other relevant legislations made a case for these Sub-District Structures (SDSs) to be well- resourced in terms of finance, manpower and logistics. These resources would facilitate their operations towards the achievement of the goals of promoting active participation of the citizenry, good governance and improved local economic development.

Over the period, participatory democracy and good governance have been deepened through the holding of the District Assembly and Unit Committees elections. Further, the increase of the number of MMDAs to 216, Sub-Metropolitan District Councils to 33, Urban, Zonal Town and Area Councils to 1,306 and 5,000 Unit Committees have enhanced participatory democracy. Again, sustainable sources of funding from District Assembly Common Fund (DACF) and the District Development Facility (DDF) to the MMDAs for development activities have improved. The DACF transfers to MMDAs increased from GH¢2, 600,002 in 1994 to GH¢ 340, 000,040 in 2010 while a total of GH¢ 135,564,800 DDF grant was transferred to qualified MMDAs in 2010.

These successes notwithstanding, a number of challenges have made the Sub-Districts a weaker link between the MMDAs and the communities. The challenges are the SDSs inability to generate adequate internal funds, the failure of the MMDAs to transfer financial resources to the SDSs, the weak manpower base, poor staff motivation and inadequate infrastructure and logistics.

On the basis of the present state of the SDSs as captured above, the study assessed the contributions of Ejisu-Juaben Municipal Assembly (EJMA) and the Sekyere East District Assembly (SEDA) Sub-Districts to local governance in terms of their structures and roles, institutional and functional linkages with the assemblies and the communities, logistical and staffing capacities, and their collaboration with the Private Sector,

Traditional Authorities, and the Civil Society Organisations (CSOs). Finally, policy recommendations were made to improve their performances.

Purposive and Simple Random sampling were employed to obtain the required sample and out of that, the relevant data was gathered from both primary and secondary sources using Case study, Focus Group Discussions, Observations, Interviews, and Questionnaire administration. The data was analysed and presented using a good mix of tables and graphs.

The following findings were made. First, by- elections are not held to replace vacant assembly and SDSs positions. Second, Internally Generated Fund though inadequate, is the only source of funding to the Sub-Districts because the EJMA and the SEDA failed to transfer the Sub-Districts' two percent share of the DACF. Third, only 50 percent of the required staff of the EJMA Town Councils and 25 percent for the Area Councils were at post. In the SEDA, only 12.5 percent of the Town Council and 8.3 percent of the Area Councils staff were at post. Fourth, the monthly remuneration of the Sub-District's staff was poor and ranged between GH¢35 and GH¢50. Fifth, only five out of the nine Town /Area councils in the EJMA and one out of the five in the SEDA, have permanent office accommodation. Sixth, there is poor downward accountability by the SDSs in terms of annual accounts presentation, keeping of minutes of meetings and value books.

Finally, for SDSs to be effective in order to enhance decentralised local governance, the study recommends that, the Ministry of Local Government and Rural Development should sponsor a bill to review existing legislations on local government elections to capture District Assembly and Unit Committee by-elections, the operational Sub-Districts should be made a performance measure under the DDF and as a DACF indicator, the members of SDSs should be paid a monthly stipend of at least GH¢ 100 by the MMDAs, the MMDAs should regularly build the capacities of the SDSs staff through training and the CSOs operating within the local governance sphere should form a coalition to advocate for the operationalisation of Sub-Districts in particular and local governance in general.

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## **LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS**

AC	Area Council
CAP	Community Action Plan
CBO	Community Base Organization
CDD	Centre for Democracy and Development
CDR	Committees for the Defence of the Revolution
CI	Constitutional Instrument
DACF	District Assembly Common Fund
DDF	District Development Facility
EI	Executive Instrument
EJMA	Ejisu-Juaben Municipal Assembly
EU	European Union
FOAT	Functional Operational Assessment Tool
IGF	Internally Generated Funds
ILGS	Institute of Local Government Studies
LI	Legislative Instrument
MDA	Ministries, Departments and Agencies
MDGs	Millennium Development Goals
MLGRD	Ministry of Local Government and Rural Development
MMDA	Metropolitan Municipal and District Assembly
MTDP	Medium Term Development Plan
NALAD	National Association of Local Authorities in Denmark
NDPS	National Development Planning Systems

NGO	Non Governmental Organization
NRM	National Resistance Movement
PNDC	Provisional National Defence Council
PPLGP	Public Participation in Local Governance Programme
PUFMARP	Public Financial Management Reform Programme
RCC	Regional Coordinating Council
SDS	Sub-District Structure
SEDA	Sekyere East District Assembly
SMDC	Sub-Metropolitan District Council
TC	Town Council
UC	Unit Committee
UC	Urban Council
UNCDF	United Nations Capital Development Fund
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNECA	United Nations Economic Commission for Africa
UNICEF	United Nations Children Emergency Fund
ZC	Zonal Council

## CHAPTER ONE

### GENERAL INTRODUCTION

#### 1.1 Background to the Study

Decentralisation in different forms has been part and parcel of Ghana's public administration system since the colonial era. The British colonial indirect rule in the Gold Coast from 1878 until 1951 was a form of decentralisation (Aye, 2000). During this period, the colonial administration governed indirectly through the native traditional political institutions by constituting the chief and elders in a given district as the local authority. The institutional and legal arrangements of Ghana's public administration system after independence had gone through a number of reforms. The new local government system was launched on July 1, 2007 and in 1988; the major overhaul of the system took place to respond to the demands of the changing global administrative, socio-economic, political, administrative and financial matters of the state (Local Government Information Digest, 1991, World Bank, 1991; World Bank, 1997).

The reforms, the Ministry of Local Government and Rural Development (2005) observed, was aimed at establishing efficient decentralised government machinery as a means of building a strong foundation for grassroots participatory development, promote popular participation in the decision making process and good governance at the local level. Most scholars including (Ahwoi, 2006 and Aye, 2008). The promotion of grassroots and popular participation in the sense that development is a shared responsibility of the following stakeholders: the Government, District Assemblies (DAs), Civil Society Organisations (CSOs), the Private Sector, the Traditional Authorities and the beneficiary communities.

Ghana's 1988 public administration reforms was legally backed by the Local Government Law, 1988 (PNDC Law 207) which on the return to constitutional rule in 1992, was replaced with the Local Governments Act, 1993 (Act 462) as well as the Chapter Twenty of the 1992 Fourth Republican Constitution (Crawford, 2004).



The institutional structure of the Local Government system consists of the Regional Coordinating Council, a four-tier Metropolitan and three-tier Municipal/District Assemblies with their Sub-district Councils of the Urban/Town/Area/Zonal Councils and Unit Committees (Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 2010).

The Legon Observer (2008) noted that the implementation of the Local Government system so far had involved the transfer of responsibility (authority), resources (human and financial), accountability, and rules (institutions) from central government to the following local government units or sub-district: the Metropolitan, Municipal, and District Assemblies (MMDAs), Urban/Town/Area/Zonal Councils and the Unit Committees. These sub-district structures (SDSs) according to the Local Government Act (Act 462) and the LI 1589 (1994), were to serve as the vehicle of facilitation and promotion of participatory development to the grassroots and rallying points of local enthusiasm (Ayee, 1996). Most especially, the rural communities which make up about 56.2 percent of the total population of Ghana (Ghana Statistical Service, 2000); but are relatively deprived in terms of the provision of basic social and economic infrastructure (Ghana Human Development Report, 2007).

The reforms process so far has produced a mix of successes and challenges. The increase in the number of MMDAs and the SDSs between 1988 and 2012 has been encouraging. Currently, there are 216 MMDAs (Table 1.1) , 34 Sub-Metropolitan District Councils (SMDC), 934 Town and Area councils, 250 Town Councils, and 626 Area Councils and 108 Zonal councils and 5,000 Unit Committees (Ministry of Local Government and Rural Development, 2012) .

The increase in the number of MMDAs and the SDSs have brought participatory governance closer to the doorsteps of the people with a representation ratio of at least one unit committee member to about 50 persons (Ministry of Local Government and Rural Development, 2003).

**1.1: The Regional Breakdown of MMDAs in Ghana**

<b>Region</b>	<b>Metropolitan</b>	<b>Municipal</b>	<b>District</b>	<b>Total</b>
Ashanti	1	7	22	<b>30</b>
Brong Ahafo	0	8	19	<b>27</b>
Central	1	6	13	<b>20</b>
Eastern	0	8	18	<b>26</b>
Greater Accra	2	9	5	<b>16</b>
Northern	1	1	24	<b>26</b>
Upper East	0	2	11	<b>13</b>
Upper West	0	1	10	<b>11</b>
Volta	0	5	20	<b>25</b>
Western	1	2	19	<b>22</b>
<b>Total</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>49</b>	<b>161</b>	<b>216</b>

Source: Ministry of Local Government and Rural Development, 2012

Again, financing gaps of development initiatives of MMDAs in the past have been greatly bridged with the creation of the District Assembly Common Fund (DACF) Act 1994 (Act 455) and lately, the introduction of the performance - based grant, the District Development Facility (DDF). The total DACF transfers to all MMDAs shown by Table 1.2, increased from Two Million, Six Hundred and Twenty Thousand cedis (GH¢2,620,000) in 1994 to Three Hundred and Fourty Million, and Four Hundred Thousand cedis (GH¢ 340,400,000) 2010, a 12,892 percent increase over the period (Fynn, 2011).

The total DDF transfer to qualified MMDAs was One Hundred and Thirty Five Million, five Hundred and Sixty Four Thousand, Eight Hundred cedis (GH¢ 135,564,800) in 2010 ([www.mlgrdghanagov.com](http://www.mlgrdghanagov.com)).

A greater proportion of these transfer grants from the DACF and the DDF are expended on local governance and administration (NDPC, 2006) reinforcing the stated fact that funds to MMDAs have increased over the years.

**Table 1.2: District Assembly Common Fund Allocations to MMDAs, 1994-2010**

<b>Year</b>	<b>Allocations in (GH¢Million)</b>
1994	2.62
1995	5.41
1996	7.80
1997	7.90
1998	15.53
1999	11.24
2000	18.87
2001	18.87
2002	26.54
2003	64.86
2004	85.72
2005	70.19
2006	139.16
2007	173.34
2008	217.01
2009	188.57
2010	340.40
<b>Total</b>	<b>1,365.16</b>

Source: Fynn, 2011

The successes listed above notwithstanding, the local government system has some challenges which the USAID (2010, p.5) summed as “at the sub-district level, the 16,000 unit committees and the area, town and urban and zonal councils have been ineffective and are still incomplete due to large numbers and lack of public interest”

This background to the state of the SDSs greatly informed the decision to start the whole research process. In addition, with a thought to take a cursory look at the local government system with emphasis on the workings of the Unit Committee (UCs) and the Town Council (TCs) in my locality more than two-decades into the implementation of the revised local government system. Interest in the problem was founded on the fact that an effective local government system built on an operational sub-district structures tend to promote participation and good governance (Ministry of Local Government and Rural Development, 2005).

This study therefore, is an attempt to research into the actual state and contributions of Sub-District structures of MMDAs to decentralised local governance using the Ejisu – Juaben Municipal and the Sekyere East District Assemblies as case study.

## **1.2 Problem Statement**

A well-resourced sub-district structure is necessary for an effective decentralised local governance system. The Ministry of Local Government and Rural Development (2005) has emphasised that the sub-district structures are crucial for the sustenance of local governance because they serve as the main link between the districts and the grassroots. Any Local Government system that aims at putting the sub-districts at the centre of local governance should meet the following necessary conditions among others:

- A well defined structures and roles of the sub-district institutions;
- Strengthening the logistical and staffing capacities of sub-districts;
- Creating functional working relationship in terms of roles and resources allocation between the sub-districts, the MMDAs and the communities;
- Creation of the desired space for local governance stakeholders such as the Private Sector, Traditional Authorities and Non-Governmental Organizations to contribute to the improvement of the effectiveness of the sub-districts.

The Decentralisation Policy Review (2007) identified the following obstacles to the effective and efficient performance of the sub-district structures:

- Conflicts between the MMDAs and the sub-district structures over roles, functions and resources;
- Polarization of the sub-district structures around local disputes especially chieftaincy and partisan disputes;

- Lack of required number of membership or quorum at the unit committee and for that matter the other sub-structures because people are reluctant to file their nominations for the ten elected unit committee positions; and
- General apathy towards the activities of the sub-district structures because members are not paid any sitting or transport allowance.

The Decentralisation Policy Review Final Report (2007) agreed with the Dege Consult (2007) and the USAID (2010) on the weak state of sub-district structures more than two decades into the implementation of the local government system. The sub-district structures of the Zonal Councils (ZCs), the Town/Area Councils (T/ACs) and the Unit Committees (UCs) which form the foundation of the local government system have serious challenges. The Dege Consult (2007, p.iii) summed up the state of the sub-district structures as “The sub district local government structures are not viable; there are too many, they are too small, they have too many members and they are not fully elected. The functions of sub-district structures are unclear and they have virtually no personnel or financial resources to perform”.

The findings on the state of the SDSs by the Decentralisation Policy Review Final Report (2007), USAID (2010), and the Dege Consult (2007) revealed the following gaps in the operation of the sub-districts: poor human and financial resources base, incomplete T/ACs and UCs, and poor staff motivation among others. In sum, have these challenges in anyway inhibited the sub- district structures in the performance of their mandated roles as captured in The Local Government (Urban, Zonal, Area and Town Councils and Unit Committees) Establishment Instrument; 1994 (L.I. 1589)? Providing an answer to the question posed above, subsequently calls for the examination of these issues with reference to the SDSs. These issues are the contributions of the SDSs to local level development and community participation, the resource constraints and potentials, and institutional and legislation gaps in local governance more than two decades into the implementation of the new local government system in the Ejisu Juaben Municipal Assembly and Sekyere East District Assembly.

### **1.3 Research Questions**

The discussions so far on the background to the study as well as the problem statement raised the following questions which the study seeks to find answers to:

- What are the logistical and staffing capacities of sub-districts institutions?
- What have been the efforts of the local governance stakeholders towards improving the performance of the sub-districts?
- What are the institutional and legislative policy gaps impacting negatively on the smooth operations of sub-district structures?
- What are the contributions of the sub-district structures to local level development?
- What are the policy interventions necessary to strengthen the sub-district structures to play their mandated roles to promote local governance?

### **1.4 Research Objectives**

The broad objective of the study is to assess how sub-district structures contribute to decentralised local governance. The specific objectives that drive the research are as follows:

- To assess the logistical and staffing capacities of the sub-districts institutions.
- To assess the institutional and legislative policy gaps affecting the smooth operations of sub-district structures.
- To examine the complementary roles of the local governance stakeholders towards improving the performance of the sub-districts.
- To assess the contributions of sub-district structures to local level development.
- To make institutional-specific policy recommendations to strengthen the sub-district structures.

### **1.5 Scope of the Study**

Geographically, the study covered the Ejisu-Juaben Municipal and Sekyere East District Assemblies in the Ashanti Region, one town council (Ejisu) and four area councils ((Kwabere-Mponua, Mponua, Onwe and Bonwire-Besease) in the EJMA. In the SEDA, it

also covered one town council (Asokore) and two area councils (Seniagya- Mponua and Senchi-Nyanfa).

The study was limited largely to the sub-districts that operated between 2006-2010 because they had run their full term in office. The study further reviewed literature on the following concepts on decentralisation, forms of decentralisation, decentralised local governance, and key Actors in local governance, basic characteristics of decentralised local governance, community participation, institutional and legal framework for local governance.

### **1.6 Justification of the Study**

The building of the capacities of the SDSs is basic to the growth and sustenance of their potentials to partner central government to enhance the welfare of the people through local level economic development. However, in the view of Bitarabeho (2008), in developing countries, the potentials of these local authorities which are the drivers of local-level development are underutilised. In order to utilise their potentials, there is the need to identify their challenges through empirical studies and the recommendations from such studies implemented to the letter.

This research is one of such studies and on that basis, the study is relevant to the extent that, it would contribute to shaping government policy on decentralised planning and development. In addition, it would generate additional data to add up to the existing stock for further research on local governance in Ghana. The study would further enrich the debate towards strengthening local involvement in the development process. Finally, the study is a contribution to the evaluation of over two decades of Ghana's decentralisation process.

### **1.7 Organisation of the Study**

The whole study is organised into five chapters. The first chapter covers the introduction to the research, the major problems under investigation and the relevant research questions. These are followed by the objectives for the research, the scope, the justification for the study, and the organisation of the study.

Chapter two provides the theoretical basis for the study by reviewing relevant literature on decentralisation and the sub-structures and concepts of local governance, participation, and accountability.

Chapter three contains the research design adopted, the data requirement and the source of the data, the data collection tools employed, the sampling technique, the key data variables and the framework for data analysis and reporting.

The fourth chapter profiles the study districts, Ejisu- Juaben Municipal Assembly (EJMA) and the Sekyere East District Assembly (SEDA), as well as the presentation of the analysis of the data collected from the field. The chapter four further provided answers to the research questions and the main source from where the policy recommendations were made. The fifth and final chapter captured the key findings of the study, institution-specific policy recommendations and conclusion.



## **CHAPTER TWO**

### **SUB-DISTRICT STRUCTURES IN DECENTRALISED LOCAL GOVERNANCE**

#### **2.1 Introduction**

This chapter presents discussions on issues related to Sub-District Structures in Decentralised Local Governance such as the Forms and Components of Decentralisation, Local Governance, Participation, Social Accountability, the History and Structure of Sub-District Structures in Ghana. Also, the Ugandan experience in local governance was discussed and lessons learnt from that case study spelt out. The concluding part highlighted the contextual view of the position of sub-structures in decentralised local governance.

#### **2.2 Background to the Global Decentralisation Process**

The global shift to decentralise governments was to enhance national development (Conyers, 1984). The wave of democratic and local government reforms that swept across the globe in the late 20<sup>th</sup> century was propelled by a number of interrelated factors. In the view of Faquet (2000), decentralisation was the answer to the shortcomings of centralised government such as corruption, clientelism and political alienation. Improvement in service delivery in the opinion of Shah and Theresa (2004) informed the reforms in Uganda, Chile and Cote D'Ivoire .In South Africa, Hutchinson (1991) held the view that it was employed to redress past inequities created by the apartheid regime.

Contributing to the debate, United Nations Capital Development Fund (2006) identified crisis in state's public finance whereby states no longer had the capacity to manage everything centrally and had to find new ways to share the management and delivery of public services as a reason behind the reforms (Local Government Information Digest, 1996). From these observations, the paradigm shift then towards more participatory modes of governance was inevitable.

Subsequently, from the 1980s, decentralisation became a household concept in development literature and analysis and was perceived by many development institutions

and authorities as the vehicle for the delivery of grassroots participation, accountable governance and sustainable development to a greater percentage of the world population (World Bank, 1997).

### **2.3 Meaning, Conditions and Forms of Decentralization**

Rondinelli et al. (1983) and Rondinelli and Cheema (1986) defined decentralisation as the transfer of planning, decision making, or administrative authority from the central government to its field organizations, local administrative units, semi-autonomous and parastatal organisations, local governments or Non Governmental Organisations). This definition is very broad and therefore captures the four main forms/types of decentralisation: deconcentration, delegation, devolution and privatisation. It again emphasises the fact that the degree of autonomy ceded to the sub-national institutions increases with the implementation of any of the four types. As the level of implementation of the types of decentralisation increases between deconcentration through to delegation, devolution and privatization, the degree of autonomy granted the sub-district structures at each stage also increases.

In addition, three major global development institutions have looked at the concept from different perspectives. The World Bank (2003) sees decentralisation as the transfer of authority and responsibility for public functions from the central government to intermediate and local governments or quasi independent government organizations and/or the private sector. Finally, the UNDP (2004) , defined decentralisation as restructuring of authority so that there is a system of co-responsibility between institutions of governance at the central, regional and local levels according to the principle of subsidiarity. Based on this principle, functions are transferred to the lowest institutional or social level that is capable of completing them. Decentralisation relates to the role of and the relationship between central and sub-national institutions, whether they are public, private or civic. The World Bank and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) have over the years actualised the concept of decentralisation through their respective programmes

A specific case is the World Bank's policy of promoting economic liberalisation from the late 1970s in the developing countries which made democratisation and privatisation conditionality for the granting of development assistance (Handley, 2008; World Bank, 1997).

The fact that all these development institutions have looked at decentralisation from different points of view give credence to the fact that the concept does not lend itself to a common definition. On that basis the Ministry of Local Government and Rural Development (2005), the working definition under the Ghana's decentralisation policy framework is most appropriate.

In the policy, decentralisation is defined as the transfer of authority, functions, and means of competence from the central government Ministries, Departments and Agencies (MDAs) to the sub-national institutions such as the Regional Co-ordinating Councils and the District Assemblies to enhance the capacity of the public sector to plan, manage and monitor social, spatial and economic development. By this, the various SDSs are supposed to have been created and given the required legal and financial backing to operate. Is that the state of the SDSs below the MMDAs in Ghana? There is therefore the need to probe deeper into the current state of the SDSs emphasising the basic conditions necessary for decentralisation.

### 2.3.1 Conditions Necessary for Decentralisation

The UNDP (2000) identified the following factors as key to the success of decentralisation initiatives:

- It requires a central body's capacity to integrate and coordinate central and line-ministry interests, link and coordinate central and local interests, and assures working relationships with civil society and the private sector. In the case of Ghana, this condition has been fulfilled with the Ministry of Local Government and Rural Development and the Decentralisation Secretariat playing these roles (Ahwoi,2010)

- In addition, active participation of all stakeholders promotes decentralisation. The participation of the stakeholders is enhanced through the creation of flexible participation conditions and approaches that are adapted to suit the local conditions such as the local culture and tradition as well as resource considerations.
- All the necessary legislative frameworks should be enacted as a backbone to the decentralisation process.
- The UNDP further added that, decentralisation policy implementation should precede and be linked to larger public-sector reforms to facilitate the achievement of the desired goals. In Ghana, the decentralisation policy came with overall reforms in the public and civil service to bring it in line with best practices of administration. For example, the introduction of the Public Financial Management Reform Programme (PUFMARP) in 1995 in the areas of Medium Term Expenditure Framework (MTEF), Budget Preparation, Fiscal Decentralisation, Procurement reforms, Audit reforms, Legal and Regulatory framework reforms, and Revenue Management were all in line with the overall decentralisation policy (Ministry of Local Government and Rural Development, 2005).
- Lastly, decentralised government requires effective access to and control over sustainable financial resources to meet local responsibilities and accountability requirements. The funds should primarily come from local revenue-generation and to a lesser extent through fiscal transfers from the central government. In the case of Ghana, the reverse holds as central government transfers in the form of District Assembly Common Fund (DACF) since 1994 and lately, the District Development Facility (DDF) have been the major funding sources for local governments. The National Development Planning Commission (2006) confirmed that MMDAs internal-generated revenue collecting efforts are inadequate and not able to bring in sufficient revenue because of lack of transparency in accounting and full disclosure with respect to revenue collected.

### 2.3.2 Forms of Decentralisation

The contributions of Rondinelli et al (1983), Cheema and Rondenelli (1986), European Commission (2006), the World Bank (1997) and the United Nations Development Programme (2004) to the definition of decentralisation so far crystallize into four categories: Deconcentration, Delegation, Devolution and Privatisation. The World Bank (2006) supported the categorisation of decentralisation on the grounds that different types of decentralisation should be distinguished because they have different characteristics, policy implications, and conditions for success.

- Deconcentration

Deconcentration is the transfer of decision making powers from the national head offices of government Ministries, Departments and Agencies (MDAs) to their lower level offices and staff located in the regional and district capitals (Ahwoi,2010)

It is not accompanied by the necessary authority to the lower offices to carry through the decisions but it is retained at the top Ministry of Local Government and Rural Development (2005) and they are responsible to the central government (Manor, 1999).

In deconcentration, the local administration has no powers to raise revenues or make and enforce local by-laws (UNDP, 1997).

A case in point in the Ghanaian context is where decisions taken at the Ghana Education Service headquarters in Accra are relayed to the Regional and District Education offices for onward transmission to teachers throughout the country. Deconcentration according to the World Bank (2006) is the weakest form of decentralisation.

- Devolution

Devolution involves the transfer of authority and responsibility for decision making, finance and management to semi-autonomous institutions or units of local government outside the direct control of the central government. These local government SDSs are deliberately created and strengthened with sound legal and financial backing and are therefore accountable directly to their constituencies for their performance.

Examples of these semi-autonomous units of local government under the Ghanaian Local Government system include the Metropolitan, Municipal, and District Assemblies (MMDAs) with their sub-structures such as the Town/Area, Urban councils and the Unit Committees. Devolution in the view of the UNDP (1997), is the most genuine form of decentralisation as compared to delegation,deconcentration and privatisation.

The UNDP (1997) identifies the following fundamental features associated with devolution. First, local units of government are autonomous over which central authorities exercise little or no direct control. Second, the local governments have clear and legally recognized geographical boundaries within which they exercise authority and perform public functions. Third, local governments have corporate status and the power to secure resources to perform their functions. Fourth, local government institutions that are seen by local citizens as organizations providing services that satisfy their needs should be created. Finally, there should be a symbiotic relationship between central and local governments. The European Commission (2006) concluded that for devolution to be seen to be working, the local government structures should have substantial authority to hire, fire, tax, contract, expend, invest, plan, set priorities and deliver services.

- Delegation

Delegation refers to the transfer of government decision-making and administrative authority and/or responsibility for carefully spelt out tasks to institutions and organizations that are either under government indirect control or semi-independent (UNDP, 1997).

Ahwoi (2010, p.1) termed delegation as “...permissive legislation or activity under which the body actually vested with the power to take decisions asks another person or body to do it on its behalf”. In the view of Olsen (2007), delegation is relatively extensive form of decentralisation through which central governments transfer responsibility for decision-making and administration of public functions to semi-autonomous organisations not wholly state-owned, but ultimately accountable to it. Effective delegation calls for Governments to create wide range of institutions in all sectors including, housing, transportation, education and health among others.

Usually, these organisations have a great deal of discretion in decision-making and are exempted from the rigid civil service bureaucracy.

- Privatisation

Privatisation ranges in scope from leaving the provision of goods and services entirely to the free operation of the market to Public-Private Partnerships (PPP) in which government and the private sector cooperate to provide services or infrastructure. Privatization takes the following forms: allowing private enterprises to perform functions that had previously been monopolised by government; financing public sector programmes through the capital market; and transferring responsibility for providing services from the public to the private sector through the divestiture of state-owned enterprises. The divestiture of state-owned enterprises that came with economic liberalisation regime in the early 1980s was the highest point of privatisation in Ghana's history. Again, the floating of shares of public enterprises for private individuals and institutions to be shareholders is another approach to privatisation. An example is the listing of the Ghana Commercial Bank (GCB) on the Ghana Stock Exchange (GSE) in 1996 when part of the government's 100 percent ownership was divested. Currently, the government ownership stands at 21.3 percent while private institutions and individual hold the majority share of 78.7 percent share (GCB, 2007).

## **2.4 Components of Decentralisation**

The strategies for the implementation of the decentralisation policy in Ghana in particular have been focused on the following main components: Political, Administrative, and Fiscal decentralisation.

In the opinion of Binder, J.K. et al. (2006, p.30), the three components are complementary and interdependent and therefore to achieve effective decentralisation, “the division of power across different levels of government and society needs to match with fiscal responsibilities; administrative systems and procedures need to be in line with the execution of political power and fiscal tasks; and fiscal arrangements need to prevent a clashing of political and administrative powers”.

#### 2.4.1 Political Decentralisation

Political decentralisation involves the transfer of political power and authority to elected sub-national bodies that are autonomous and fully independent from the devolving authority (Agrawal and Ribot, 1999). In the view of the Uganda's Decentralisation Policy Strategy Framework (2006), Political decentralisation allows citizens to elect their own regional and local governments and participate in their governance by determining their own development priorities, and making and approving their own development plans. In Ghana's case, political decentralization has focused on the establishment and empowerment of the Metropolitan, Municipal, and District Assemblies (MMDAs) and their sub-district structures, demarcation of administrative boundaries and the promotion of advocacy and popular participation of the people at various levels of decision making.

In Ghana, by the close of 2012, and in line with political decentralization , 216 MMDAs, 13 Sub-Metropolitan District Councils (SMDCs), 34 Urban Councils (UCs), and 828 Town/Area Councils (T/ACs) are in place. In 2010, a new legislative Instrument, LI 1967 (2010) was introduced and it reduced the number of UCs from 16,000 to 5,000. The LI also abolished the government appointees system at the Unit Committee level and reduced the number of elected members from 10 to five elected members.

More importantly, the District Assembly and Unit Committee elections had since been held every four years on the principle of universal adult suffrage (Public Agenda, 2009). In the MMDAs, 70 percent of the members are elected based on universal adult suffrage to blend with the other 30 percent of appointees of required technical capacity by the President after consulting with key interest groups within the MMDAs. The involvement of the people in the management of their affairs rekindles the self-help spirit in communities and the UNDP (2002) sums it up that, political decentralisation necessitates universal participation and new approaches to community institutions and social capital.

#### 2.4.2 Administrative Decentralisation

Administrative decentralisation involves the transfer of decision-making authority, resources and responsibilities for the delivery of selected public services from the central



government to other lower levels of government, agencies, and field offices of central government line agencies.

Administrative decentralisation allows regional and local governments to appoint approved statutory bodies; make ordinances and bye-laws; hire, manage and discipline personnel; manage their own payroll; and implement approved development plans (Olsen, 2007).

### 2.4.3 Fiscal Decentralisation

According to Boex and Serdar (2010), fiscal decentralisation covers the set of rules that defines roles and responsibilities among different levels of governments for functions such as planning and budget preparation, budget execution, revenue generation, the intergovernmental allocation of budgetary resources and public sector borrowing. In their view, fiscal decentralization lies at the centre of any decentralised local government system as its rules define the generation and distribution of financial resources that are utilised to respond to citizens' demands. Finally, the four main components of fiscal decentralisation of local governments are: the assignment of expenditure responsibilities, revenue assignments and local revenue administration, the design and provision of intergovernmental fiscal transfers, and local government borrowing and debt (Vo, 2008)

It is important now to find out which of the routes of decentralisation Ghana has embarked upon since 1988. Article 240 (1) of the 1992 constitution stipulates a system of local government and administration, which as far as practicable, be decentralised. Article 240(2.a.) further tasks Parliament to enact appropriate laws to ensure that functions, powers, responsibilities and resources are at all times transferred from the central government to the local government units in a co-ordinated manner. Subsequently, the Parliament of Ghana in 1993 passed the Local Government Act (Act 462) and other supporting legislations to give real meaning to the constitutional provisions. In all these legislations, however, no particular form of decentralisation - whether devolution or deconcentration has been mentioned as Ghana's chosen path towards decentralised local governance (Institute of Economic Affairs, 2010).

This lack of clarity informed Ahwoi (2010) a local governance expert, to conclude that the lack of consensus on the definition of decentralisation has led to different interpretations of the concept as governments come and go.

Decentralisation means different things to different people, and as such, each government pursues it by its own interpretations which might be different from what the previous administration did. The lack of clarity on the chosen path of decentralisation does not aid in the country's bid to consolidate the practice of the system since the major review in 1988. Ahwoi (2010, p.1) further emphasised that although the 1992 Constitution uses decentralization several times "...a closer analysis of the contexts and subsequent legislation reveals that it is used to mean different things in the different contexts where it occurs. This has been one of the greatest hindrances to the implementation of the decentralization policy as the two political parties which have formed the five Governments of the Fourth Republic have clearly approached decentralization with different understandings and from different perspectives, with the result that contradictory and inconsistent legislations have been enacted, all in pursuit of decentralization implementation". The Decentralisation Policy Framework (2010) corroborated Ahwoi's observation by drawing a conclusion that, decentralisation by deconcentration is limited to the Regional Coordination Councils (RCCs), decentralisation by devolution to the MMDAs and decentralisation by delegation at the Sub-district structures. In a sharp contrast, Uganda which introduced its decentralisation process about two decades after Ghana is now a shining example in Africa with respect to decentralised governance (Porter, 2000). This is largely because Uganda's Decentralisation Policy Strategy Framework (2006) identifies Devolution of Power, Good Governance, Subsidiarity, Popular Participation, Partnership, Non-Subordination and Vertical and Downward Accountability as the principles on which the policy is anchored.

## **2.5 Basic Enabling Conditions for Decentralised Local Governance**

Kauzya (2005) identified legal reforms as necessary for effective and participatory decentralised local governance. Legal reforms are very critical for the sustainability and legitimacy of the policy irrespective of which government is in power.

Prior to the local government reforms in 1988, it was a major challenge to Ghana as the various governments then implemented local governance policies their own ways (MLGRD, 2005).

However, for more than two decades after the reforms, the governments of the National Democratic Congress (NDC) and the New Patriotic Party (NPP) that have held power in two consecutive terms each have stuck to the national policy (MLGRD,2005)

In addition, the provision of adequate and quality resources (human, administrative and logistics, and finances) to sub-national institutions is equally necessary for the success of any local governance system. The resources empower the institutions to perform their legally-mandated roles effectively and efficiently. The creation of the 216 MMDAs since 1988 and their respective sub-districts have become growth centres which have facilitated local level development and governance (MLGRD, 2010)

In terms of funding as an enabler of local governance, NDPC (2010) lists the major sources of revenue to MMDAs as follows: District Assembly Common Fund (DACF), District Development Facility (DDF) and Internally-Generated Funds (IGF). The creation of the District Assembly Common Fund 1993 (Act 455) since 1994 has served as the single most important source of funding to the MMDAs. The introduction of the District Development Facility (DDF) in 2008 and awarded based on the functional performance of the MMDAs is another major stream of funding to performing MMDAs.

However, in the area of Internally-Generated Funds (IGF), the performance of the MMDAs has been very poor. Between 2004 and 2005, the share of IGF to the total revenue of all the MMDAs ranged between 16 to 18 percent (Decentralisation Policy Review Report, 2007).

The introduction of the Public Financial Management Reform Programme (PUFMARP) in 1995 in the view of the MLGRD (2005) was another enabling condition meant to enhance the capacities of MDAs in the area of weak budget formulation and preparation, poor expenditure monitoring and control, lack of proper auditing and accounting system, lack of quality and timely data on Government of Ghana (GoG) resources.

Broadly, the PUFMARP covered the thematic areas of Medium Term Expenditure Framework (MTEF) Budget Preparations and Implementation, Accounting and Reporting, Cash Management, Fiscal Decentralisation, Audit Reform, Procurement Reform, and Revenue Management.

Finally, local government accountability from the citizens to the central government and vice versa as well as the active participation of all stakeholders in the opinion of the Ministry of Local Government and Rural Development (2005) promotes transparency and responsiveness of all stakeholders to the system and is necessary for local governance.

The above conditions notwithstanding, the allegiance of the Ghana Health Service (GHS) and the Ghana Education Service (GES) to their respective MDAs rather than the MMDAs remains a major legislative challenge. This according to the Legon Observer (2008) is as a result of conflict between the Ghana Education Service Act of 1995 (Act 505) and the Ghana Health Service and Teaching Hospitals Act of 1996 (Act 525) which grant the two departments the right to manage education and health delivery in the MMDAs on one side and the Local Government Act 1993 (Act 462) which makes the MMDAs the sole agency for development on the other. Finally, the late disbursements of the DACF negatively affect planning and budgeting of the MMDAs.

#### 2.5.1 Key Actors in Decentralised Local Governance

Ghana's decentralisation policy framework according to the MLGRD (2005) views development as a shared responsibility of the Government, MMDAs, Civil Society Organisations and other actors. In Ghana, the State, the Private Sector, Traditional Authorities and Civil Society organisations are key actors that play complementary roles which promote decentralised local governance. The indispensable roles and potentials of these actors as captured below have to be identified and fully tapped by all MMDAs to enhance local governance.

- The State

The state creates the conducive political and legal environment through: Maintaining the rule of law, regulating socio economic standards, developing social and physical infrastructure and ensuring social safety nets and citizens protection. Local government including traditional authorities provide institutional and administrative framework for conducting community affairs, political decision and policy making, provide basic services, management of local development planning, land and land-use issues, mediation and resolving conflict (Boex and Serdar, 2010).

They however, counter argued that local governments in many countries are set up to fail, as powers that are given with the right hand by the government are taken back by the left hand. This setback manifests itself by way of the state not providing the local planning authority with the resources that needed to fund the plans, authority to procure and the ability to hire or fire staff (Steffensen and Trollegaard , 2000)

- Private Sector

Helling et al. (2005, p.25) tersely summed up the significant role of the private sector in local governance as “Unless the local private sector grows, local development will remain fragile and difficult to sustain”. In the Ghanaian context, the Private Enterprise Foundation (2000) defined private sector as institutions, organizations and entities outside the ownership, control and management of the central government, regional and local authorities.

The private sector forms the dominant component of the informal sector in Ghana. The importance of this sector to the economic development of the country according to the NDPC (2003) explains why the Ghana Poverty Reduction Strategy (GPRS I) set the objective to strengthen the private sector to act effectively as the engine of growth and in turn lead to the creation of wealth in order to reduce poverty in a sustained manner. One way to achieve and sustain the GPRS I objective is to create these conditions below for the private sector growth.

### ✓ Conditions for Private Sector Participation in Local Governance

Hilhorst et al. (2008) confirms the contributions of the private sector to MMDAs in Ghana in the sense that MMDAs are authorised to levy and collect taxes in the form of fees, fines, rates, licences and the main sources of these taxes are on the incomes of self-employed persons and firms. The relevance of the private sector in the development of the nation adequately emphasised in the GPRS I, was in part informed by the contribution of the private individuals and firms to the tax revenue of MMDAs (NDPC, 1993).

In order to increase and sustain the contributions of the private sector to MMDAs, the Commonwealth Secretariat (2009) identified the creation of the following two basic conditions. Firstly, local governments need to clarify the objectives of the various services they provide and decide whether the private sector participation is appropriate by considering their profit motive of the private entrepreneur and the interest of the people.

This condition covers financial feasibility analysis; a preliminary analysis of the political support for and against private sector participation; and assessment of which forms of private sector participation are likely to attract their involvement.

Secondly, local governments should do an in-depth analysis that explores the state of the existing areas of operations; the compatibility of the regulatory regime with private sector participation; the commitment or opposition of stakeholders to private sector participation. The Commonwealth Secretariat (2009) concluded that once the conditions stated earlier are created then the following options for public– private sector partnerships are available for the MMDAs and the private sector.

### ✓ Service Contracts

Service contracts are short-term agreements which secure private sector assistance for performing specific technical tasks. However, the responsibility for co-coordinating these tasks and for investment remains with the local government agent. Revenue collection is one area that service contracts could be entered into between the private sector and the local government.

### ✓ Management Contracts

Management contracts transfer responsibility for the operation and maintenance of local government-owned businesses to the private sector. Management contracts can be a good first step towards more private sector involvement. Because decisions about involving private companies can be politically costly, governments may be unwilling to move beyond a management contract. These contracts are generally for a time period of three to five years. Management contracts are possible in the areas of abattoirs and markets and public places of convenience.

### ✓ Joint Venture

A typical joint venture creates a new company with the local government entity having a shareholding arrangement with the private operator. In some countries it has become common for governments national, regional and local to establish joint ventures with the private sector to run leases and concessions.

- Civil Society

DANIDA (2008) described Civil Society as an umbrella term for a very broad and complex groups, organisations and networks positioned between the state and the market because their purpose and mandate is primarily to represent and express group interests. In the view of the UNDP (1997), Civil Society is that part of organisations that generally covers Industry Associations, Trade Unions, Commercial Associations, Employers' Organisations, Professional Associations, Credit Unions, Co-operatives, Academic and Research Institutions, the Media, Community-Based Organisations (CBOs), Non Governmental Organisations (NGOs), that connects individuals with the public realm and the state. They operate to influence public policy and gain access to public resources, especially for vulnerable and marginalised populations. The USAID (2010) emphasised the fact that CSOs contribute to the democratic content of local government units through negotiation and bargaining.

- Traditional Authorities

The revered positions of traditional authorities in the Ghanaian context call for the active participation of these authorities in political administration of the country.

The chiefs and Queenmothers complement the efforts of government in the provision of the needs of their people in the areas of conflict resolution, education, health, environment, and employment (Ayee, 2007 citing Arhin, 2003). In spite of these significant contributions, it is only on the Regional Coordinating Councils (RCCs) that the Local Government Act (Act 462), 1993, made a clear provision for an automatic representation of two chiefs from each of the 10 regions to serve on the RCCs. It is significant to note that at the MMDAs level, there is no provision for automatic representation of the traditional authorities. They can only serve at the MMDAs if they are appointed as part of the 30 percent by the President. Similarly, at the SDSs level, the Legislative Instrument (LI) 1589, 1994 made no provision for the automatic membership of chiefs in the sub-district structures such as the Urban, Zonal and Town Councils as well as Unit Committees. They are only to be consulted by the MMDCEs acting on behalf of the President in the appointment of not more than five persons ordinarily resident in the urban area, zone, town or unit. That provision has since been cancelled with the passage of LI 1967 section 24(1) of 2010 thereby reducing the total number of unit committees in Ghana from 16000 to 5000 (Ahwoi, 2010).

Ayee (2007) raised concerns over the lack of clarity on the consultation with traditional rulers and other interest groups on the appointment of the 30 percent non-elective members of DAs and their sub-districts. That the mode of consultation has been left at the mercy of partisan political actors who may make the appointments based on parochial political considerations.

It is instructive to note that in some cases, the traditional authorities were only informed about the government appointees only after nomination had been done (Yankson, 2000). Is this attributable to the provisions of Article 276 of the 1992 Constitution which bars chiefs from engaging in active partisan politics? Ayee (2007) however, sees the restriction placed on traditional authorities by Article 276 as necessary because of the 'father-for all' role they play in society.



To surmount these challenges, Ayee (2007), has suggested the implementation of the following measures: first, there should be regular meetings and consultations between the DAs and the traditional councils. Second, a District House of Chiefs consisting of various traditional councils should be created, third, chieftaincy disputes must not be transferred to the affairs of the DAs and their sub-district structures and finally, the traditional heads should as far as practicable be dispassionate, objective, fair, transparent, accountable, and tolerant.

## **2.6 Participation and Local Governance**

The participation of all stakeholders is a major ingredient that drives decentralised local governance. The European Union (2006) identifies with the strengthening of the processes of citizen participation with respect to how ordinary citizens exercise voice through new forms of inclusion, consultation, and mobilisation designed to inform and influence larger institutions and policies. In the view of the World Bank (2003) participation is a process through which stakeholders' influence and share control over development initiatives, decisions and resources which affect them. The extension of the concept of participation to the citizenship implies a right to participate and to be an active part of the process of participatory governance, participatory planning and budgeting, citizen engagement in committees or monitoring public services.

Community participation in the view of Reid (2000) is necessary in the sense that communities that engage their citizens and partners deeply in community development agenda raise more resources, achieve better results and develop in a more holistic and beneficial way. Viewing participation from another perspective, Abbot (1996) concluded that community participation is the key to sustainability, security, peace, social justice and democracy. The most effective means of sustaining decentralized local governance according is through the active participation of all stakeholders (European Commission, 2006)

### 2.6.1 Depth, Breadth and Timing of Participation

The Depth, Breadth and Timing dimensions of participation according to Fowler (2002), throw more light on the parameters and extent of participation of all stakeholders in local governance. The depth is a measure of stakeholders' influence in decision making. The depth dimension shows a continuum of stakeholders' involvement from information gathering/sharing to the highest stage of joint control. Fowler (2002) defines breadth in participation as a measure of the range of stakeholders involved in the participatory process. That is the range of interested parties that are involved or whose views and actions must be taken into account in local governance. The participation of the people is clearly the basic condition of the people forming part of the operational aspects of development in any human society.

Timing in participation relates to the stage of the process at which different stakeholders are engaged. Fowler (2002) emphasises that timing has both practical and symbolic importance.

In reality, the timing of who is involved influence the quality and soundness of participation. Involvement of stakeholders from the beginning is ideal since poor timing could lead to distractions and affect the pace of decision making process.

When timing is incorrect, people feel oppressed or disrespected. It is therefore necessary to design participatory processes that are time sensitive and do not create any imbalance between depth and breadth in the process of governance. The creation of opportunities for stakeholders' participation in local governance come with a number of challenges which need to identified along the participatory process.

### 2.6.2 Challenges to Participation in Decentralised Local Governance

The participation of the various stakeholders in Local Governance is challenged by a number of factors. Kauzya (2006) observed that under a decentralised governance system, participation does not automatically take place but has to be facilitated to overcome these challenges. The major barriers are first, the credibility of the political system including political parties and leadership both at national and local level.

When the leaders and the system are not credible, not accountable and trustworthy, individuals tend to recoil behind their individual needs rather than trust common political participation to address them. Second, the attitudes of the leadership towards the promotion of the fundamental human rights of the people.

Third, poor working relationship between the government and civil society organizations who occupy the space between the government and the people. Finally, economic difficulties which tend to shift the primary concern of the populace to solving problems such as finding employment and/or economic security.

### 2.6.3 Participation in Local Governance in Ghana.

In order to surmount the challenges that arise out of participation in the specific case of Ghana, the issues of depth, breadth and timing have been captured into local governance participation in a number of ways. The following legislations: the 1992 Constitution, the Local Government Act 462,(1993), the National Development Planning Systems Act 480,(1994 ) and the LI 1589 (1994) give full support to community participation in the local governance (Yankson,2000). Specifically, Article 240 (2,e) of the 1992 constitution further states that “to ensure the accountability of local government authorities, people in particular local government areas shall, as far as practicable, be afforded the opportunity to participate effectively in their governance”.

The National Development Planning Systems Act 480 (1994) in Section 3 (1 ,2) enjoins the District Planning Authority, Sub-Districts and for that matter communities to conduct a public hearing on any proposed District, Sub-district or local development or action plans before adoption. Since 1988, participation has been practicalised through the District Assemblies and Unit Committees elections where the people elect their representatives to the various MMDAs in every four years (Yankson, 2000)

In addition to the election, a third of the total membership of each MMDA is set aside for traditional authorities, women and people with specialised skills such as Law, Engineering, Accounting, Medicine and Architecture (Local Government Act 462, 1993).

However, this excellent idea over the years has been sacrificed as party loyalists who have no contributions to make are appointed into the MMDAs instead of the professionals. Tetey (2006) noted that a President can abuse the power to sack local officials who may be at loggerheads with the government. The abuse is common during the approval of MMDCEs nominated by a president. There are instances where all government appointees to one District Assembly (DA) or another are sacked based on the belief that they voted against a MMDCE nominee. Gyimah-Boadi (2009) confirmed that abuse with the fact that President Kufour summarily dismissed some DA officials across the country.

Mainstreaming gender into all levels of local governance is a major step towards enhancing the participation of all stakeholders in local governance. What is the state of gender mainstreaming in local governance in Ghana?

#### 2.6.4 Gender Mainstreaming and Participation in Local Governance in Ghana

The choice of the Promotion of Gender Equality and Women Empowerment by the United Nations as the goal three of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) emphasises the need for Ghana to make the participation of women an integral part of local governance. That would go a long way to reverse the underrepresentation of women who make up more than half of Ghana's population (Ghana Statistical Service, 2000) in both the legislature and the MMDAs which are critical for policy legislation formulation and implementation. Abantu for Development (2004, p. 32) captured this development challenge situation as "The ratio of female/male membership of both Parliament and District Assemblies, public/private sectors and in corporate organisations does not reflect a population composed of over 51 percent women".

The results of 2010 District Assembly and Unit Committee elections (Table 2.2) further highlight the underrepresentation of women in local governance in Ghana. Out of a total of 6,093 elected assembly members, only 412(7%) were women.

The women representation in the Unit Committees was worse for the fact that only an insignificant 344(6%) out of a total of 5,378 were women.

**Table 2.1: Elected District Assembly and Unit Committee Members, 2010**

Region	Elected Assembly Members			Elected Unit Committee Members			Total Turn Out
	Male	Female	Total	Male	Female	Total	
Western	515	28	<b>543</b>	2,433	209	<b>2642</b>	<b>34.11</b>
Central	533	39	<b>572</b>	2,350	321	<b>2,671</b>	<b>36.87</b>
Greater Accra	319	34	<b>353</b>	1,315	260	<b>1,575</b>	<b>18.55</b>
Volta	580	65	<b>645</b>	2291	327	<b>2,618</b>	<b>36.43</b>
Eastern	742	75	<b>817</b>	116	409	<b>3,525</b>	<b>35.4</b>
Ashanti	988	65	<b>1,053</b>	4,579	601	<b>5,180</b>	<b>36.08</b>
Brong Ahafo	712	49	<b>761</b>	3,201	420	<b>3,621</b>	<b>37.67</b>
Northern	684	19	<b>703</b>	2,545	135	<b>2,680</b>	<b>50.2</b>
Upper East	329	24	<b>353</b>	1,338	88	<b>1,426</b>	<b>56.86</b>
Upper West	279	14	<b>293</b>	1,151	121	<b>1,272</b>	<b>51.74</b>
<b>Total (%)</b>	<b>5,681</b> <b>(93%)</b>	<b>412</b> <b>(7%)</b>	<b>6,093</b> <b>(100%)</b>	<b>5,034</b> <b>(94%)</b>	<b>344</b> <b>(6%)</b>	<b>5,378</b> <b>(100%)</b>	<b>39.4%</b>

Source: Electoral Commission of Ghana, 2010

Table 2.2 indicates that females are underrepresented in the legislature with their membership in all the six parliaments of the fourth republic fluctuating between 8.6% and 29%. In the 1992 parliament, out of the 200 MPs only 10(10%) were women. The number increased insignificantly to 19(9.5%) in 1997 and reduced again in 2001 to 18(9%). In 2005, the number went up again to 25(10.9%) and to 29(10.5%) in 2013 as result of increase in the number of seats by 45. All of the above confirm the underrepresentation of women in the legislature and the MMDAs in Ghana

**Table 2.2: Sex Distribution of Ghana's Parliament, 1993-2013**

Year	Male (%)	Female (%)	Total (%)
2013	246(89.5%)	29(10.5%)	<b>275(100%)</b>
2009	210(91.3)	20(8.7%)	<b>230(100%)</b>
2005	205(89.1)	25(10.9%)	<b>230(100%)</b>
2001	182(91%)	18(9%)	<b>200(100%)</b>
1997	181(90.5%)	19(9.5%)	<b>200(100%)</b>
1993	190(90%)	10(10%)	<b>200(100%)</b>

Source: Electoral Commission of Ghana, 2012

Over the years a number of policy and legal interventions have been put in place to enhance gender representativeness in policy and politics. The NDPC (2010) noted that Ghana adopted an Affirmative Action Policy in 1998 which resulted in the mainstreaming of a number of women's issues into the nation's development process. The notable ones are the ratification of the UN Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), Establishment of the Ministry of Women and Children's Affairs, Passage of the Domestic Violence Act 2007, (Act 732), Establishment of the Domestic Violence and Women Support Unit (DOVWSU) in the Ghana Police Service, and the Establishment of gender focal points in a number of Ministries, Departments and Agencies (MDAs).

The Public Agenda (2010) sees the affirmative action policy of reserving 30 percent out of the 30 percent of the appointees to MMDAs for women by government as a positive move. The creation of avenues for gender as well as all stakeholders in participation opens the eyes of both right claimers and duty bearers to their rights and responsibilities. It is necessary at this point to probe the accountability mechanisms that strengthen local governance.

## **2.7 Local Governance and Social Accountability**

The World Bank (2006) observed that social accountability over the years had been confined to top-down mechanisms such as political checks and balances, administrative rules and procedures, auditing requirements, and formal law enforcement agencies like courts and the police.

This approach, the World Bank added, has achieved limited success in many countries – developed and developing alike. Public accountability in the view of Bovens (2006) shows a relationship between an actor and forum in which the actor has an obligation to explain and justify the conduct in which the forum can pose questions and pass judgment and the actor may face consequences. Public accountability process between the actor and forum has three stages. These are the supply of adequate and reliable information on procedures, tasks and outcomes, explanations and justifications by the actor. The forum interrogates the actor on the information supplied based on laid down standards of practices and finally may pass judgment on the performance of the actor.

The World Bank (2007) describes the forms of accountability within the Local Governance space as a system in which the relationships may be driven in different directions: upward and downward. Within their discretionary space, local governments are accountable to upper levels of government through Upward Accountability as well as to citizens through downward accountability (World Bank, *ibid*).

In Ghana, the Section 32(8) of the Local Government (Urban, Zonal and Unit Committees) (Establishment Instrument), 1994 (L.I. 1589) clearly captures an upward accountability relationship between the MMDAs and the Sub- District Structures (SDSs). The accountability relationship places on the Urban, Zonal or Town Councils and Unit Committees the responsibility to keep books of account in which all their financial transactions shall be recorded; and audited by the District Internal Auditor and the Auditor-General in his audit of the District Assembly accounts. The SDSs are in turn required to account to the people at least each year.

#### 2.7.1 Conditions for Promoting Local Governance Accountability

The World Bank (2006) identified the creation of the following conditions as necessary and facilitates social accountability in local governance.

- Democratic Political Culture

The parameters for social accountability are largely determined by the existing political context and culture. For example, likelihood of success of social accountability initiatives are highly dependent upon whether the political regime is democratic.

When a multi-party system is in place, basic political and civil rights are guaranteed and the culture of political transparency and probity is held in high esteem. The existence of these underlying factors, and the potential risks that their absence may pose, must be taken into account when planning social accountability initiatives.

- Access to Information

Easy access to public documents and data is essential to building social accountability. Such information is the basis for social accountability activities, and thus its quality and accessibility is a key determinant of the success of social accountability mechanisms.

In many cases, initial social accountability efforts may need to focus on securing freedom of information legislation to compel public officials to disclose demanded information (Wagle and Shah, 2003). In Ghana for example, the Right to Information Bill which would facilitate access to information by the people and to hold their leaders accountable is yet to be passed into law. (GNA, 2011).

- The Role of the Media

The media plays a critical role in promoting social accountability. In many countries, independent media is a leading force in informing/educating citizens, monitoring government performance and exposing misdeeds. Local-level media (in particular, private and community radio) provide an important means whereby ordinary citizens can voice their opinions and discuss public issues. Delli and Keeter (1996) confirmed that in both developed and less developed countries when the quality and freedom of the press is high, citizens are better informed, more civically engaged and likely to vote. The proliferation of Frequency Modulation (FM) and community radio stations across the country has created a platform where MMDCEs, Assembly, Town, Area, Unit and other local governance officials and the people regularly interact on issues of common interest. A good example is the Fox fm in Kumasi where each and every Saturday morning from 7am to 9am, there is a programme devoted solely to issues of local governance.

- Civil Society Capacity

The capacity of civil society actors is another key factor of successful social accountability. The level of organisation of CSOs, the breadth of their membership, their technical and advocacy skills, their capacity to mobilize and effectively use the media, their legitimacy and their level of responsiveness and accountability to their own members are all central to the success of social accountability activities. They serve as pressure group on the space between the people and local governments.



- State Capacity

The success of social accountability initiatives also depends upon the capacity and effectiveness of the state. A functioning public administration that has the capacity to respond to citizen demands is a basic prerequisite.

Equally necessary are the effective devolution of authority and resources, the willingness and capacity to build partnerships/coalitions, and, a political or administrative culture that accommodates public sector probity, accountability and equity. Blair (2000) confirmed that accountability is more likely to be successful where there is committed political will on the part of central government.

### 2.7.2 Benefits of Local Governance Accountability

Bovens (2006) identified improved governance, increased development effectiveness, and the empowerment of the citizenry as the benefits that result from social accountability. It empowers the citizenry in that it creates the space for the people to access information and demand accountability between elections. Again, increased development effectiveness is achieved through improved public service delivery and more informed policy design by removing service delivery challenges such as the misallocation of resources, corruption, weak incentives or a lack of articulated demand. Finally, social accountability initiatives can lead to empowerment, particularly of poor people as it can lead to the expansion of their frontiers of freedom of choice.

## 2.8 Historical Overview of Sub-District Structures in Local Governance

The sub-districts in Ghana are the Sub-Metropolitan District Councils, the Urban, Zonal Town and Area Councils and the Unit Committees (MLGRD, 2005). The Local Government (Urban, Zonal and Unit Committees) (Establishment Instrument), 1994 (L.I. 1589) describe the sub-district structures to consists of both elected and appointed members who perform specific duties delegated to them by the MMDAs, and are without budgets of their own. The delegated duties exclude the power to legislate, levy rates or borrow money (Yankson, 2000, Ayee, 1999).

The Sub-districts have been part and parcel of the decentralisation structure in both pre and post- independence Ghana. The number of tiers forming a local government system differs from country to country and ranges between two in South Africa, three in Ghana to four in Uganda (Ndegwa, 2000). In spite of the importance of the sub-districts in local governance, premium over the years has been placed on regional and district structures to the neglect of the sub-districts (USAID, 2010).

### 2.8.1 Democratic Governance and Sub-District Structures

The transition into democratic rule in 1993 increased and strengthened the sub-district structures with the coming into force of the 1992 Fourth Republican Constitution, Local Government Act 1993 (Act 462) and the Local Government (Urban, Zonal, Town Councils and Unit Committees) Establishment Instrument, Legislative Instrument (LI) 1589. The number of MMDAs (6 Metropolitan, 49 Municipal and 161 Districts Assemblies) has increased from 65 in 1988 to 216 in 2012. The sub-districts also consist of 34 Urban , 250 Town , 826 Area, and 108 Zonal Councils .The Unit Committees have been reduced from 16,000 to 5,000 in 2010 (Ayee, 2010, MLGRD, 2012).

The Decentralisation Policy Review Final Report (2007) identified the lower-tier sub-district institutions on the local government structure as an important component of political and administrative decentralisation in Ghana. The Sub-district structures are crucial for the sustenance of local governance because they serve as the main linkage between the districts and the grassroots (MLGRD, 2005). The Local Government (Urban, Zonal, Area and Town Councils and Unit Committees) Establishment Instrument; 1994 (LI 1589) gives legal basis to the sub-districts in Ghana and also spells out the types and composition.


The memberships of sub-districts are drawn from the MMDAs, unit committees, as well as appointees by the President through consultations with the Metropolitan, Municipal, District Chief Executives (MMDCEs) and the traditional authorities.

The Unit Committee (UCs) which forms the lowest tier is the only elective sub-structure through national elections. Hitherto, each unit was made up of 15 members out of which five were elected and 10 appointed.

This provision has been reviewed by making the UCs solely elective by doing away with the appointees (Ahwoi, 2010)

This review of the composition of the UCs was informed by the abuse of the appointment system by the various political parties, notably, governing parties (The Decentralisation Policy Review Final Report, 2007). The Figure 2.1 below shows the local government structure with the sub-district structures.

**Figure 2.1: Local Government Structure of Ghana**



Source: Adapted from the Ministry of Local Government and Rural Development (2005)

## 2.9 Institutional and Legal Framework for Local Governance in Ghana

Ghana’s decentralised local governance system is pivoted on the following legislative and institutional frameworks.

### 2.9.1 The Legislative Basis of District Assembly and Unit Committee Local Elections

The elections of representatives into any local government system through universal adult suffrage lend credibility and enhance participation to the system.

The major legislations regulating elections in Ghana are the Presidential and Parliamentary elections law and the District Assembly Elections Act, 1994 (Act 473). The section (1) of the District Assembly Elections Act, 1994 (Act 473) states that, “Elections to a District Assembly shall be held every four years except that District Assembly elections shall be held at least six months apart from parliamentary elections”.

On the more important issue of by-elections, section 12 (1) of The Presidential and Parliamentary elections law states that “whenever a vacancy occurs in the membership of Parliament, the Clerk to Parliament shall notify the Commission in writing within seven days after the vacancy occurred, and a by-election shall be held within thirty days after the vacancy occurred. On the contrary, it is significant to note that no section of District Assembly Elections Act, 1994 (Act 473) made provision for by-election as and when a vacancy is created in an Assembly or Unit Committee. It is pertinent to probe further into why this important legislation is silent on the replacement of an elected Assembly and Unit Committee members when vacancy occurs and its effects on the administration of the council and unit areas.

- Local Government and National Elections Voter Turnout

In Ghana, the declining voter turnout in District Assembly and Unit Committee elections (Table 2.3) as compared to the Presidential elections raises questions over the people’s dwindling interest and competitive nature of local governance. The average voter turnout for the six consecutive (1992, 1996, 2000, 2004, 2008, and 2012) national elections was 69.8%. The local government elections (1988, 1994, 1998, 2002, 2006 and 2010) on the other hand recorded an average turnout of 41.06%. The wide difference of 28.74% voter turnout between the national elections above the local government elections in the view of Steffensen et al (2007:19) are due to some of the following reasons: national elections are publicised more than the local government elections.

Again, elections fatigue of the electorate because the national elections have always been held after the District Assembly and Unit Committee elections.

**Table 2.3: National and Local Government Elections Turnout in Ghana**

Type of Elections	Year	1992	1996	2000	2004	2008	2012	Average Turnout (%)
<b>Presidential Elections</b>	<b>Turnout (%)</b>	50.2	78.2	60.4	81.5	69.52	79.23	<b>69.8%</b>
<b>Local Government Elections</b>	<b>Year</b>	<b>1988</b>	<b>1994</b>	<b>1998</b>	<b>2002</b>	<b>2006</b>	<b>2010</b>	
	<b>Turnout (%)</b>	59.3	29.3	41.6	32.8	44	39.4	<b>41.06%</b>

Source: Electoral Commission of Ghana, 2012

## 2.9.2 Composition, Membership and Tenure of Office of Sub-District Structures

The Local Government (Urban, Zonal, Area and Town Councils and Unit Committees) Establishment Instrument; 1994(L.I. 1589) in Sections 3(1), 10(1) and 17(1) spells out the Composition, Membership and Tenure of Office of Area and Town Councils and Unit Committees as follows : a Town Council shall consist of not less than fifteen or more than twenty members to be made up of not more than five persons elected from among the members of the relevant assembly, a maximum of two representatives from the Unit Committees in the area of authority of the Town Council, at most five members appointed by the DCE acting on behalf of the President in consultation with the Presiding Member, the traditional authorities and organised productive economic groupings in the town.

The Nordic Consulting Group Denmark and Dege Consult (2007) identified two major barriers to the operations of the sub-districts. First, the abuse of the nature of composition of the SDSs meant to ensure balance representation among persons representing traditional authorities, and people with unique technical skills and packed with political favourites. Second, the insufficient number of candidates who contest for the unit committee elections which make it difficult to get the required numbers to fully constitute the councils in such areas.

In the 2002 District Assembly and Unit committee elections for example, there were no elections in about 10,000 units due to insufficient number of candidates (Nordic Consulting Group Denmark and Dege Consult, 2007).

The Local Government (Urban, Zonal, Area and Town Councils and Unit Committees) Establishment Instrument 1994; (L.I. 1589) had been amended and replaced with The Local Government (Urban, Zonal and Town Councils and Unit Committees) Establishment Instruments 2010; LI 1967. The amendment has reduced the total membership of each unit committee from fifteen to five and abolishing the position of the five government appointees. This has subsequently reduced the national total of UCs from 16,000 to 5,000 (Ahwoi, 2010).

### 2.9.3 Tenure of Office of Members of Sub-Districts

Sections 4 (1), 13 (1), 20 (1 and 2) of the LI 1589 spells out the tenure of membership of the various sub-district structures as follows : a member of an Urban Council, Zonal Council Town /Area Council and a Unit Committee shall hold office for four years and shall be eligible for re-election or re-appointment, as the case may be.

### 2.9.4 Committees of Sub-Districts

In order to enhance the effective running of the Sub-districts, Sections 33(1) (a, b, c) of the LI.1589 spells out the standing committees of the Town and Urban Councils as follows :Development Services Committee; Finance and Administration Committee as well as any other ad-hoc committee as may be necessary to perform special functions assigned to it by the council.

### 2.9.5 Local Government Staff

The right caliber of staff and decent levels of remuneration are necessary ingredients to enhance smooth operations of the sub-district structures.

- Staffing and Remuneration of Sub-Districts

The sections 29(1)(2) and (3)( a, b and c) of the (L.I. 1589) enjoins each and every MMDA to recruit a full time secretary for their respective Urban, Zonal or Town

Councils and a part time secretary for the Unit Committees. The provision further placed the responsibility of fixing and paying the remuneration of the secretaries on the respective MMDAs.

The MLGRD (1998) published the requisite administrative staffs of Secretaries, Treasurers, Typists and Messengers and their respective salaries for the Sub-Districts. A Secretary to the Urban Council was to earn a salary of Three Hundred and Twenty Cedis per annum (GH¢320) and Two Hundred and Sixty Cedis per annum (GH¢260) for the secretary to the Zonal/Town/Area Council. On the other hand, the Urban and Zonal/Town/Area council treasurers were to attract Two Hundred and Fourty Cedis per annum (GH¢240) and Two Hundred and Twenty Cedis per annum (GH¢220) respectively.

Typist Grades I and II were to earn One Hundred and Fourty Cedis per annum (GH¢140) and One Hundred and Thirty Cedis per annum (GH¢130) respectively while a messenger was to earn an annual salary of Ninety Five Cedis (GH¢95). At the end of the recruitment, only few people were engaged to man the sub-districts and they were paid for only four months in 1999 by the respective MMDAs and it ceased (MLGRD, 2005). The Inadequate sub-districts staffing and high staff turnover was due largely to non-payment of salaries and low monthly allowances (Ghana Districts, n.d).

#### 2.9.6 Funding of Sub-District Structures

Regular and sustainable sources of funding are both necessary and sufficient conditions for efficient and effective decentralised local governance. The UNCDF (2007) gave credence to the fact that decentralisation requires local authorities to take more responsibility due to the competences transferred to them in different fields of development. As local development implies that the local authorities are provided with the necessary resources in order to provide the necessary basic services to improve the local populations living conditions.

The Local Government System provides for sources of funding for each and every development unit. The development units include the District with the Assembly as

governing authority and the Councils with the Urban, Zonal, Town or Area as its governing authorities.

Section 31 (1) (a, b) and (2) (i, ii) of Part v of the Miscellaneous Provisions of (L.I. 1589) identifies the main revenue sharing formula and sources of funding for Urban or Town Council. The provisions in this regard state that the councils shall retain:

- Fifty per cent of all revenues allocated to it by the MMDAs for collection to defray the cost of operation and maintenance of the administration and services within the area of the Urban or Town Council;
- Mutually agreed proportions of the MMDA's revenues the Urban or Town Council may undertake to collect under a contract stating the type of revenue, the targeted amount, and percentage to be retained by the Sub Districts and additional incentive percentage to be retained when the target is exceeded.

In addition to the revenue collection sub-letting and sharing, the sub-section (2) of the miscellaneous provisions enjoins Urban or Town Councils to raise funds from voluntary contributions, gifts, and grants.

Further, the Guidelines for the Utilization of the Common Fund states that, the Sub-Districts are entitled to two percent of the share of MMDAs Common Fund for the establishment and strengthening of sub-districts (NDPC, 2008). The section 32(2) of the provisions grants the Sub-Districts the option to apply to the relevant MMDAs to levy a special rate for a specific purpose.

## **2.10 Case Study of Local Governance in Uganda**

The Ugandan local governance system within the African context is ahead of Ghana and other Africa countries in terms of empowered local governments (Ndegwa, 2002, Wunsch and Ottemoeller, 2004). The success story of Uganda was confirmed by the World Bank Africa Region Working Series studies which according to Ndegwa (2000) ranked Uganda highest in the areas of decentralised local governance on the criteria of institutions and structures of governance, the number of elected sub- national tiers, and existence of direct elections for local governments, turnout and fairness of such elections,



clarity of roles for national and local governments provided by the law, and clear legal structures.

This case study takes a look at the factors behind the success story of Uganda local government system. The choice of Uganda for the case study was informed by the fact that genesis and characteristics of the local government system of both countries are common in many ways (Crawford, 2003 citing Ayee, 2000).

The giant strides made by Uganda are the results of a mix of bold, radical institutional and legal reforms supervised by the presidency (National Decentralisation Review Final Report, 2007). The case study specifically considered the policy objectives, legislative, institutional, funding and accountability frameworks for local governance and the lessons to be learnt.

#### 2.10.1 Policy Objectives of the Local Governance System in Uganda

The main objectives of the decentralisation policy and for that matter local governance in Uganda are to democratise society; bring about good governance; improve service delivery; reduce poverty and bring about sustainable development. Largely, it is also a framework for implementing other Government policies aimed at improving the quality of life and welfare of the people (Bitarabeho, 2008). On the form of decentralisation to pursue, Mugabi (2004) observed that the decentralisation policy deliberately adopted decentralisation by devolution in order to reserve power in the hands of the people.

Going by devolution obviously grants the local government greater autonomy by way of authority and funding as found in the principle of non-subordination that grants power to lower councils to make decisions on matters affecting them without resorting to higher levels of local government (Katirika et al, 2010 citing Steffensen et al, 2004). This realisation made Kwamena Ahwoi, a local government expert, to question why Ghana's decentralisation policy legislations are silent on the chosen paths of decentralization (Ahwoi, 2010).

## 2.10 .2 Institutional Structures of Local Governance System in Uganda

Uganda's 1995 constitution and 1997 Local Government Act specify the following five levels of local government: district, county, sub-county, parish and village.


The five levels are broadly grouped into the following three vertical lines : the districts and lower units for rural areas, the urban councils and lower units for urban areas and City Council in the Metropolitan area as shown by Figure 2.2 (Steffensen and Trollegaard, 2000). The local governance system has an institutional structure that captures all stakeholders from the District and City down to the Village level as a strategy to bring governance to the doorstep of the people.

The structure is broadly made up of the Local Governments (LGs) and Administrative Units (AUs). The LGs are corporate bodies with perpetual succession and a common seal. The chairpersons of all LGs are elected through universal adult suffrage. The LGs have the power to approve general administrative and financial plans. They extend their services by integrating plans at the lower level of the local council. Unlike the LGs, the AUs are not corporate bodies. Instead, the village chairperson is elected by the village adults, while the chairpersons of the county and parish/wards are elected by electoral colleges/councils at the respective levels (Steffensen et al, 2004).

The Ugandan system is structured in such a way that each local government council has a directly elected chairperson and councilors representing demarcated electoral areas, two councilors (a male and female) representing the youth, two councilors (a male and female) representing persons with disabilities and women councilors forming one third of the council. Additionally, every lower local government council has two elderly persons a male and female above the age of 55 years.

The unique feature about the representative structure adequately caters for gender, the physically challenged and the aged and therefore gives real meaning to all-inclusive participation.

**Figure 2.2: Local Government Structure of Uganda**



Source: Steffensen et al, 2007

**KEY**

- Local Governments
- Administrative Units

**2.10.3 Legal Framework of Local Governance System in Uganda**

The local government system in Uganda is given legal backing first by the 1995 constitution which entrenches the rights and functions of local governments in Uganda, the local Government Act of 1997, and the Local Government Finance Commission Act, 2003 and the, the Local Government Tendering and Procurement Regulations 2000 (Steffensen et al,2004).The Local Governments Act has since been amended four times to meet the exigencies of the time and in the view of Mugabi (2004) the amendments have fine-tuned the decentralisation policy.

#### 2.10.4 Local Government Accountability and Citizen's Participation

A number of provisions in the Local Government Act as well as policy interventions have been put in place to promote accountability.

The Local Government Act, 1997 requires all local governments to formulate, approve and execute their budgets and balance them. LGs are also required to keep proper books of accounts and to produce final accounts, at most, three months after the close of the financial year.

In order to improve the output of LG staffs so as to enhance accountability, the capacity of the staffs are built in areas relevant to their core duties for example computerised accounting systems training. In addition, information about financial transfers to the various sub-district structures are regularly publicised in the print media and posted on the Ministry of Local Government (MoLG) website so that the public is informed and can demand for accountability (Ssemakula, et.al., 2010)

These interventions according to the Decentralisation Policy Review (2006) made it possible for about 96 percent of local governments to post their annual statements of final accounts within the recommended time frame in the 2002/2004 financial year. However, many of the community members do not easily access this information because of lack of appreciation of its importance and the manner through which the information is shared (Ssemakula et.al, 2010)

#### 2.10.5 Local Governance Funding in Uganda

In Uganda, fiscal decentralisation mechanisms allow regional and local governments to develop, approve and execute their own budgets; raise and utilise resources according to their own priorities in line with legal provisions (Decentralisation Policy Review, 2006). The Local Government Act (1997), section 84 specifies these three major sources of funding for local governments in Uganda:

- The Consolidated Fund which disburses the following grants: conditional grants, unconditional grants and equalisation grants to the local governments units to undertake developmental activities.

- The Article 191 of the 1997 Constitution of Uganda empowers LGs to generate and utilise local revenue in accordance with the law. The local revenue is intended among others to make LGs independent and accountable to the constituents, contribute to service delivery.

Internally generated funds by the city and municipal councils come from various sources such as ground rent and market dues. However, over the years, the LGs have recorded declines in local revenues generation. The decline has been attributed to the increase in Central Government transfers reducing the incentive and the LGs capacity to generate own revenues; lack of adherence to regulations regarding local revenue generation; imbalance in tax assignments between central and local governments; generally poor fiscal collection performance; poor asset enumeration and assessment procedures; unwillingness to pay by taxpayers due to mistrust, weak link between tax paid and services delivered (UNCDF,2006).

- Finally, Article 195 of the Constitution of Republic of Uganda (1995) grants local government the powers to borrow money accept and use a grant provided by specific donors/lenders.

#### 2.10.6 The Private Sector and CSO in Local Governance

The Ugandan government policy supports Public-Private Partnerships (PPP) as a model of service delivery which over the years has been clearly manifested in health, education, water supply and sanitation sectors (Nuwagaba, 2008). Similarly, NGOs and CBOs partner with the government in provision of services. However, one main area that needs more emphasis is developing business partnerships between private entrepreneurs and local governments. The LGs have paid little or no attention to enterprise growth and development. Their main concern is collection of taxes instead of improving the taxable capacity of households and business enterprises (Nuwagaba, 2008)

### 2.10.7 Lessons from the Ugandan Decentralisation Policy

The case study of the Ugandan local government model revealed the following useful lessons that greatly shaped study.

- Decentralisation by Devolution

The 1997 Republican constitution as well as the Local Government Act of Uganda has adopted decentralisation by devolution as the way to go and the principles driving the local government system. This is positive in the sense that local government structures are more strengthened with powers and resources to operate.

- Enhanced Stakeholders Participation in Local Governance

The Ugandan local government system gives meaning to stakeholder participation through the promotion the representation of marginalised groups such as physically challenged and women in local government. There are provisions for reservation of places in the local councils for women, youth and the physically challenged.

- Overreliance on Central Government Transfers

The District and the City councils and by extension the sub-structures depend largely on the central government transfers of unconditional, conditional and equalization grants from the consolidated funds. The payment is regular and rarely in arrears and as such, provides the sub-structures with the needed funding for the day to day running of the councils.

- Weak Private sector

The private sector is not vibrant enough to serve as the engine of growth for the local level economic development. This situation invariably can limit the capacity of the local governance agencies to tax and generate enough IGF from the private sector which is the main source of revenue. The private sector is very key in boosting the IGF of the MMDAs and in particular the SDSs therefore, deliberate strategies should be put in place to grow the sector.

## **2.11 Conceptual Framework of Sub-Districts in Local Governance**

The discussions have highlighted the fact that a strong local government system needs to be built on sub-district structures ably supported by three major pillars as captured by figure 2.3 below. First, the sustainable transfer of financial, human and infrastructural and logistical resources.


Second, the state playing a lead role in creating the enabling environment for the beneficiary communities, the private sector, the traditional authorities and the civil society to play their respective meaningful roles to support the system.

Finally, the need for regular policy and institutional reviews in the areas of the creation of institutions, the formulation of policies and the enactment of laws, and the regular conduct of democratic local government elections to select people to the various elective local governance structures. This established relationship between the three pillars and the Sub-districts (Town Councils, Area Councils and Unit Committees) when sustained over time would be enhanced and ultimately, deepen checks and balances and accountability. Further, it would enhance capacities of SDSs and for that matter, the communities to exact accountability from the SDSs to influence participatory planning at local, district and national levels.

In addition, the capacities of the SDSs to plan and budget for the basic services and to draw Community Action Plans (CAPs) which are eventually synthesised into overall district wide MTDPs would be enhanced.

The long run outcome would strengthen upward and downward accountability, increased active participation of all stakeholders, enhanced capacity of all local governance stakeholders and all resulting in high Level Development.

**Figure 2.3: Conceptual Framework of Sub-Districts in Local Governance**



Source: Author’s Construct, November, 2011

Eventually, these would be translated into the attainment of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and eventually, sustainable spatial, social and economic development.

- Conclusion

The review of the context of Sub-District Structures in Local Governance focused on the policies, strategies and programmes of decentralised local governance.



In sum, the decision by countries to decentralise were influence by the following factors: conditionalities by the World, an answer to answer to the shortcomings of centralised government such as corruption and political alienation, improvement in service delivery and a means to redress past inequities created by the apartheid regime in South Africa.

Again, the review looked at decentralisation with respect to the meaning conditions and forms of, key stakeholders in decentralised local governance, and the Political, Administrative and the Fiscal components of decentralisation. Further, stakeholder participation in local governance with emphasis on gender was equally highlighted. In addition, the following institutional and legal framework for local governance in Ghana was dealt with: local government elections, composition, membership and tenure of office of sub-district structures, tenure of office of members of sub-districts, committees of sub-district, staffing and remuneration of sub-districts, funding of sub-district structures.

Finally, the case study of local governance in Uganda revealed a number of lessons worthy of emulation by Ghana in the areas of policy objectives, institutional structures, legal framework, accountability and citizen's participation, and funding.

## CHAPTER THREE

### RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY

#### 3.1 Introduction

The literature on the Conceptual Framework of Sub-District Structures in Decentralised Local Governance in the previous chapter has revealed a number of topics that are relevant to the study of the Role of Sub-Districts in Decentralised Local Governance. These are: decentralisation, local governance, stakeholder participation, and accountability, institutional and legal framework of local governance, sustainable funding, human and Logistical resource base and the Ugandan local governance system as a case study. This chapter emphasises on the research design approach used to collect relevant data on the topics listed above. Finally, the chapter covered the sampling procedure, methods of data collection, processing and analysis for the study.

#### 3.2 Research Design

According to Bryman (2008), a research design provides a framework for the collection and analysis of data. A choice of research design reflects decisions about priority being given to a range of dimensions of the research process. Kumar (1999, p.16) summed up the main function of research design as “to explain how you will find answers to your research questions”. Shedding light on research design, he identified the measurement procedures, sampling strategy, frame of analysis and time frame as some of the basic ingredients of a research design. In addition, the research design is critical because it aids the researcher to arrive at “valid findings, comparisons and conclusions” and that a faulty design results in “misleading findings” (Kumar, 1999, p.16).

##### 3.2.1 The Case Study Approach

The case study design investigates “a social phenomenon through a thorough analysis of an individual case” (Kumar, p.99). It as well involves the detailed analysis of a single or few cases where the complexity of the nature of the case is being studied (Bryman and Bell, 2007).

Specifically, the topic, the Role of Sub-District Structures in Decentralised Local Governance is a contemporary phenomenon in real life situation. A clearer understanding of this issue requires a careful examination in order to make decisions that take into consideration the peculiar circumstances surrounding the issue. Nachmias and Nachmias (1987) emphasised that a case study method is an approach to studying social phenomenon through a thorough analysis of an individual case. The case may be a person, group, episode, process, community, society or any other unit of social life. All data relevant to the case are gathered and organised in terms of the case.

In the opinion of Gering (2007) and Leedy (1995), a case study is a detailed study of a single case where the purpose of the study is to shed light on a larger class of cases. The principal objective of case study approach according to Bell (1992) is concerned with the interaction of factors and events giving a vivid practical picture of the interactions. Also, the case study approach employs a variety of data collection methods in order to minimise errors and to Bell (1992), observations and interviews are the common data collection methods used in case studies.


Case study research in the view of Denscombe (2010, p.54) emphasises these characteristics- “Depth of study rather than breadth of study, the particular rather than the general, relationships/processes rather than outcomes and end-products, holistic view rather than isolated factors, natural settings rather than artificial situations, multiple sources rather than one research method”.

The major shortcoming of the case study however, is the difficulty of generalising findings because of the limitation of its scope to a particular area (Bell, 2004). That notwithstanding, Denscombe (2007) agreed with the view that generalisation is possible if the situations are similar and the details are sufficient and appropriate.

### 3.3 Research Process

The research process forms the basis on which a study is conducted. Figure 3.1 shows systematic and logical steps followed through from the problem conception stage to the end of the study.

**Figure 3.1: Research Process**



Source: Author's Construct, November, 2011.

The research process had three-phases of Input, Processing and Output. The input phase covered the conception of the problem which guided the setting of the objectives and the research questions for the study. In addition, the available relevant literature around the topic of study were identified, sourced and reviewed. This gave a clear focus to the research problem and aided the choice of appropriate research approach to the problem and the development of the conceptual framework.

The processing phase captured the research design and the selection of the appropriate data collection instruments and the sampling technique used to collect the relevant data from both primary and secondary sources.

The data was analysed using a mix of qualitative and quantitative techniques such as tables, graphs, ratios, percentages, charts and descriptions. The final and output phase covered the key findings, the conclusions drawn from the analysis and recommendations made.

### **3.4 Sources of Data and Methods of Collection**

Kannae (2004) observed that data collection methods refer to the principles, procedures, protocol and strategies employed to obtain the data relating to a particular problem. He further emphasised that the decision about which method of data collection to use depends on the following factors: the nature of issues involved; where the data resides; resources available; time available and the level of available data. The two main approaches to gathering information about a situation, problem, person or a phenomenon in the view of Kumar (1997) are primary and secondary sources. The relevant data for the study was collected from these two main sources employing different instruments.

#### **3.4.1 Primary Data**

Interviews with questionnaire and observation are the instruments used to collect primary data. The choice of any of these methods Kumar (1997) noted is informed by the purpose of the study, the amount of resources available to and the skills of the researcher. With these factors in mind, a mix of interviews and observations were applied on the field to gather the needed data.

- **Interviews**

An interview according to Kumar (1997) is any form of person- to- person interaction between two or more persons with a specific purpose in mind. Interviews are classified into structured and unstructured questionnaire interviews. Structured face-to-face interviews as well as self-administered questionnaires were used to gather the relevant data from the Planning Officers, Finance and Budget Officers and Coordinating Directors of the EJMA and the SEDA. The self-administered questionnaire was convenient for the above listed officers of the MMDAs because the period of the study coincided with the preparation of the Medium Term Development Plans and for that matter, the officers had very little time to spare for face-to face interviews.

- Focus Group Discussions

According to Denscombe (2010), Focus Group Discussion (FGD) consists of small groups of people organised to explore attitudes and perceptions, feelings and ideas about a specific topic. On the desired number of participants for a FGD, Gibbs (2007) opted for a minimum of between six to ten, Saha (2006) suggested six to twelve which MacIntosh (1993) also agreed, and a maximum of fifteen people (Goss and Leinbach, 1996).

Gibbs (2007) summed up the basic advantages of FGDs as very effective where the researcher seeks to find power differences between the participants and decision-makers, when the everyday use of language and culture of particular group is of interest. It is again effective when one wants to explore the degree of consensus on a given topic Morgan and Kreuger (1993), and the opportunity for participants to be involved in decision making processes (Race et al, 1994). However, FGD has the challenges of getting representative sample to form a group and the likelihood of discouraging those who are not confident from participating and others from giving out sensitive or personal information (Gibbs, 2007).

The number of meetings for a group varies as some studies use only one meeting with each of several focus groups (Gibbs, 1997 citing Burgess, 1996). In total, five FGDs were conducted for each of the sampled council areas in the EJMA as captured by table 3.1. In all, 65 council members from the five sampled Town/Area councils participated in the discussions.

In total, 55 males representing 85 percent and 15 females representing 15 percent participated in the FGD. The obvious underrepresentation of females at the FGD stemmed from their relative fewer numbers on the councils. The break –down of the participants is as follows: Ejisu Town Council-11 males and 4 females, Kwabere-Mponua Area Council-8 males and 2 females, Mponua Area Council-9 males and 1 female, Onwe Area Council-15 males and Bonwire-Besease Area Council-12 males and 3 females.

In the SEDA, a total of three FGDs were conducted in each of the sampled council areas as captured by table 3.2. In all, 35 council members from the three sampled Town/Area

councils participated in the discussions. The breakdown is as follows: Asokore Town Council-10 males and 5 females, Seniagya Mponua Area Council-7 males and 3 females and Senchi-Nyanfa Area Council-6 males and 4 females.

**Table 3.1: Focus Group Discussions in Sampled Town/Area Councils in EJMA and SEDA**

EJMA Sub-Districts	Venue	Participants		Total (%)
		Male	Female	
<b>Ejisu</b>	Ejisu	11	4	<b>15</b>
<b>Kwabere-Mponua</b>	Kokobra	8	2	<b>10</b>
<b>Mponua</b>	Kwaso	9	1	<b>10</b>
<b>Onwe</b>	Onwe	15	0	<b>15</b>
<b>Bonwire-Besease</b>	Besease	12	3	<b>15</b>
<b>Total</b>		<b>55(85%)</b>	<b>10(15%)</b>	<b>65(100%)</b>
<b>SEDA Sub-Districts</b>				
<b>Asokore</b>	Asokore	10	5	15
<b>Seniagya - Mponua</b>	Seniagya	7	3	10
<b>Senchi-Nyanfa</b>	Senchi	6	4	10
<b>Total</b>		<b>23(66%)</b>	<b>12(34%)</b>	<b>35(100%)</b>

Source: Author's Field Survey, November, 2011

- Participant and Non-Participant Observation

Participant and non-participant observation is a purposeful, systematic and a selective way of watching and listening to an interaction or a phenomenon as it takes place (Kumar, 1997). A researcher may gather data as a participant or non-participant observer and to Kumar (1997), its use is most appropriate where the desired responses would not be derived because the respondents may be uncooperative. In addition, participant and non-participant observations aid the researcher to gather “data first hand, thereby preventing contamination of the factors standing between him or her and the object of research”. They further identified -What to observe, When to observe, How to record as the three major considerations to ensure that data collected using participant or non-participant observations are systematic and meaningful (Nachmias and Nachmias, 1996, p.206).

The participant and non-participant observations have following shortcomings: the biases of the observer, incomplete observation and recording and the faking of behaviour by individuals upon realising that they are being studied (Nachmias and Nachmias, 1996).

Non-participant observation was used in collecting data on the existing office accommodations for the various Town and Area councils as well as their self-initiated projects.

### 3.4.2 Secondary Sources

Sekaran (2003) defines secondary data as data that exists and readily available to be collected by the researcher and easily accessible, relatively inexpensive. These advantages of secondary data notwithstanding, Descombe (2010) citing Plat (1981 and Scott (1990), cautioned that documentary sources should never be accepted at face value and that their validity need to be evaluated in relation to four basic criteria of authenticity, representativeness, meaning and credibility. Although it is rare for secondary data to provide all the answers to research problem, such data can be useful in a variety of ways (Sekaran, 2003). The secondary data were very relevant in the areas of identifying the problem, answering the research questions and analysing the primary data.

Kumar (1999) lists the following: government or semi-government publications, earlier researches, personal records and the mass media as the main categories of sources of secondary data. The secondary data for the research were collected from books, journals, newspapers, and magazines and the 2006-2010 District Medium Term Development Plans (DMTDPs) of EJMA and the SEDA (Saunders et al., 2009).

## 3.5 Sampling and Sample Design

Sampling in the view of Kumar (1997) is a process of selecting few from a bigger group known as the sample population to become the basis for estimating a fact, situation or outcome regarding the bigger group. Sampling design is a plan that indicates how cases are to be selected for data collection. In order to attain an optimal sample size that fulfills the requirements of efficiency, representativeness, reliability and flexibility in the study Karma (1999), purposive and simple random sampling techniques were applied.



Purposive sampling entails obtaining information from specific target groups. It confines itself to specific types of respondents who can provide the desired and relevant information. In other words, it involves choosing subjects who are most advantageously placed or in the best position to provide the information required (Sekaran, 2003).

In the first stage of the sampling process, the EJMA and the SEDA were purposively chosen as the study areas out of the 27 MMDAs in the Ashanti Region. The choice of a Municipal and a District Assembly is due to the peculiar nature of each of the two in terms of structures and responsibilities. Simple Random Sampling was further used to select one Town Council and five Area Councils out of the total of two and seven Town and Area Councils in the EJMA respectively. The sampled councils are the Ejisu Town Council, Bonwire-Besease Area Council, Mponua Area Council, Kwabere-Mponua Area and Onwe Area Council as captured by table 3.2 below.

In the SEDA, out of the total of two Town and three Area Councils, Asokore Town Council, Senchi-Nyanfa and the Seniagya –Mponua Area Councils were randomly selected for the study as indicated by Table 3.2.

**Table 3.2: Sampled Town/Area Councils in EJMA and SEDA**

<b>EJMA Town/Area Councils</b>	<b>Sampled Town/Area Councils</b>
<b>Ejisu Town Council</b>	Ejisu Town Council
<b>Juaben Town Council</b>	Mponua Area Council
<b>Mponua Area Council</b>	Kwabere-Mponua Area Council
<b>Kwabere-Mponua Area Council</b>	Bonwire-Besease Area Council
<b>Bonwire-Besease Area Council</b>	Onwe Area Council
<b>Onwe Area Council</b>	---
<b>Bomfa Adumasa Area Council</b>	---
<b>Anum River Area Council</b>	---
<b>Hwere-Anum Area Council</b>	---
<b>Total</b> <b>9</b>	<b>5</b>
<b>SEDA Town/Area Councils</b>	
<b>Asokore Town Council</b>	Asokore Town Council
<b>Effiduasi Town Council</b>	Senchi-Nyanfa Area Council
<b>Senchi –Nyanfa Area Council</b>	Seniagya-Mponua Area Council
<b>Seniagya-Mponua Area Council</b>	---
<b>Akwamu Area Council</b>	---
<b>Total</b> <b>5</b>	<b>3</b>

Source: Author’s Field Survey, November, 2011

In the final stage of the sampling, a total of 26 and 17 Unit Committees were selected with a representative number from each of the sampled Town/Area Councils in the EJMA and SEDA respectively using Simple Random Sampling.

In the EJMA, five Unit Committees (UCs) out of the ten within the Ejisu Town Council (TC), five UCs within the Mponua, six from the Kwabere- Mponua, five from the Onwe and five from Bonwire-Besease Area Councils (ACs) were selected and it is captured on table 3.3 below.

In the SEDA on the other hand, a total of 17 UCs made up of four out of the eight unit committees within the Asokore Town Council, six out of 11 UCs from the Seniagya-Mponua Area Council, and seven out of the 13 Unit Committees in the Senchi-Nyanfa Area Councils. Table 3.3 below shows the sampled unit committee of the SEDA.

**Table 3.3: Sampled Unit Committees of EJMA and SEDA**

<b>Sampled EJMA Town/Area Councils</b>	<b>Total Unit Committees</b>	<b>Sampled Unit Committees</b>
<b>Ejisu Town Council</b>	10	5
<b>Mponua Area Council</b>	12	6
<b>Kwabere-Mponua Area Council</b>	10	5
<b>Bonwire-Besease Area Council</b>	10	5
<b>Onwe Area Council</b>	10	5
<b>Total</b> <b>5</b>	<b>52</b>	<b>26</b>
<b>Sampled SEDA Town/Area Councils</b>		
<b>Asokore Town Council</b>	8	4
<b>Senchi –Nyanfa Area Council</b>	11	6
<b>Seniagya-Mponua Area Council</b>	13	7
<b>Total</b> <b>4</b>	<b>32</b>	<b>17</b>

Source: Author's Field Survey, November, 2011

### **3.6 Data Processing and Analysis**

Kannae (2004) described data processing as involving the preparation of data for analysis and it covers the activities of editing, coding, definition of data list, preparation of data file, data entry and cleaning. Data processing in the view of Kothari (2005) facilitates analysis. The data editing was done both in the field and centrally by scrutinizing completed questionnaires and responses to identify and correct errors and omissions.

The editing ensured that the data were accurate, consistent with other facts gathered, uniformly entered, and orderly arranged to facilitate coding and tabulation. The coding

facilitated analysis as the responses were reduced to a small number of classes, which contain relevant information required. The coding of the data was followed by the classification which involved arranging data into sequences and groups according to their common characteristics or separating data into different but related parts (Kothari, 2005). The main object of classification is to present the facts in a simple form, to show similarity and dissimilarity to facilitate comparison, and highlight relationships. The data gathered was subjected to both descriptive and statistical analysis out of which inferences and conclusions were drawn.

### **3.7 The Units of Enquiry**

Units of analysis are the actual empirical units, objects and occurrences, which must be observed or measured in order to study a particular phenomenon (Kumekpor, 2002). It is the smallest unit around which data of the study is gathered and must be related to the scope of the research, and the problem being investigated.

Table 3.4 indicates the various units of analysis and the major issues around which the relevant data was collected and analysis made.

**Table 3.4: Units of Enquiry**

Units	Relevant Issues
EJMA/SEDA Sub-District Structures	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Existing and Operational Sub-Districts.</li> <li>• Collaborations, Structures, Responsibilities, Resources and Competence.</li> </ul>
Civil Society Organizations (CSOs)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Existing and Registered CSOs</li> <li>• Level of engagement and involvement in Local Governance issues.</li> <li>• Contributions to the development of MMDAs.</li> </ul>
Private Sector	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Contributions to the development of MMDAs.</li> <li>• Level of involvement in Local Governance.</li> <li>• Major Concerns and Challenges.</li> </ul>
Traditional Authorities	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Level of Collaboration with Assembly.</li> <li>• Representation on Assembly and Sub-Districts.</li> <li>• Contributions to the MMDAs</li> </ul>
Local Government Legislations and Policies	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Local Government Act 462</li> <li>• 1992 Republican Constitution of Ghana</li> <li>• LI 1589</li> <li>• Model Standing Orders for Unit Committees</li> </ul>

Source: Author's Construct, November, 2011

## **CHAPTER FOUR**

### **FINDINGS AND DISCUSSIONS**

#### **4.1 Introduction**

This chapter presents the analysis, presentation and discussion of the data gathered on the role of Sub-District Structures in Decentralised Local Governance in the Ejisu-Juaben and the Sekyere East District Assemblies. The first part looked at the profiles of the study areas with respect to their Locations and Sizes, Demographic and Economic characteristics which are relevant to the study. The final part covered the analysis of the composition of the Sub-district structures, the level of participation of all the major stakeholders, social accountability mechanisms, sources of funding, available administrative facilities and logistics and the human resource base of the sub-structures.

#### **4.2 Ejisu-Juaben Municipal and Sekyere East District Assemblies in Context**

This part provides the profiles of the EJMA and the SEDA in the areas of the location and size, demographic, economic and educational characteristics.


##### **4.2.1 Location and Size**

The Ejisu- Juaben Municipal Assembly was established by the Local Government (Ejisu Juaben Municipal Assembly) Legislative Instrument 2007 (L. I. 1890). The Ejisu-Juaben Municipal Assembly lies within Latitudes 1° 15'N and 1° 45'N and Longitude 6° 15'W and 7° 00 W. The EJMA occupies a total land area of 637.2 square kilometres. The EJMA shares common boundaries with the Sekyere East and Afigya Kwabre to the Northeast and North-West respectively; the Bosomtwe and Asante Akim South Districts to the South; the Asante Akim North to the East and the Kumasi Metropolitan Assembly to the West.

The EJMA has 42 electoral areas, two Town Councils at Ejisu and Juaben and seven Area Councils at Kwabere-Mponua, Mponua, Onwe, Bonwire-Besease, Bomfa-Adumasa, Anum River and Hwere-Anum and 110 Unit Committees and two Parliamentary Constituencies, Ejisu and Juaben (EJMA, 2010)

The figure 4.1 below shows the location of the EJMA (the study area) within the Ashanti Regional context.

**Figure 4.1: Ejisu- Juaben Municipality in the Ashanti Regional Context**




Source: [www.maps.google.com.gh](http://www.maps.google.com.gh). Retrieved on 5<sup>th</sup> May, 2011.

The Sekyere East District Assembly was created on the 1st of November 2007, by LI 1900 with Effiduase as the district capital. It is located in the North-Eastern part of the region, and lies approximately between latitude 6°45''- 7°32'' North and Longitude 0°22'' West. It covers an estimated area of about 730.5 square kilometres.

The district has 26 electoral areas, two Town Councils at Asokore and Effiduase and three Area Councils at Akwamu, Senchi-Nyamfa and Seniagya-Mponua, 57 Unit Committees and one Parliamentary Constituency, Effiduase-Asokore.

The district shares boundaries with the Sekyere-Afram Plains to the North-East, Sekyere South to the West, Asante-Akim North to the South-East, Ejisu-Juaben Municipal Assembly to the South-West and Sekyere Central to the North. Figure 4.2 shows the location of the SEDA within the Ashanti Regional context (SEDA, 2010)

**Figure 4.2: Sekyere East District in the Ashanti Regional Context**




Source: [www.maps.google.com.gh](http://www.maps.google.com.gh). Retrieved on 5<sup>th</sup> May, 2011.

### 4.3 Sex Distribution of EJMA and SEDA Sub-Districts

The Ghana Human Development Report, UNDP (2007, p.145) concluded that the “deep seated socio-cultural structures, systems and practices which discount the competence and capabilities of women in the spheres of political power, constitute a formidable hindrance to the participation of women in politics and public life”. These assertions equally account for the underrepresentation of females relative to the males in the composition of membership of the Town and Area Councils and the Unit Committees of the EJMA and the SEDA.

Figure 4.3 indicates sex distribution of the elected Assembly members, the Councils and the Unit Committees in the EJMA. Out of a total elected membership of 42, 37 (88.09 percent) were males and only 5 (11.91 percent) were females. At the UCs level, out of a total of 645 members 525 (81.40 percent) were males and 120 (18.60 percent) were females.

Figure 4.3: Sex Distribution of EJMA Sub-Districts



Source: Author’s Field Survey, November, 2011


In the SEDA, figure 4.4 shows that, out of the Assembly’s total elected members of 22, 19 ( 86.36 percent) were males and only 3 (13.62 percent) being females. This male-skewed composition was not any different in the Town/Area Councilors and Unit Committee membership composition.



Out of the total of 91 councillors in the SEDA, 72 (79.12 percent) and 19 (20.88 percent) were females. At the UCs, out of a total of 210 members, 166 (79.05 percent) were males while 44 (20.95 percent) were females. This sex distribution in both the EJMA and the SEDA clearly show an under-representation of females relative to males in the assemblies, the Town councils, Area councils and the Unit committees.

This picture only mirrors the larger picture in all administrative, political and economic facets of the nation even though the sex ratio of Ghana in 2000 was 95 males to 100 females indicating females outnumbered males in Ghana (Ghana Statistical Service, 2000)

Figure 4.4: Sex Distribution of SEDA Sub-Districts



Source: Author's Field Survey, November, 2011

#### 4.4. Economic Characteristics of EJMA and SEDA

The economic characteristics of the EJMA and the SEDA relevant to the study such as the agriculture, manufacturing, and the services sectors were examined. These characteristics are relevant to Sub-districts in particular and the assemblies in general because these characteristics form the major sources of generating IGF which complements central government transfers and other streams of revenue for development activities.

#### 4.4.1 Economic Characteristics of the EJMA

Agriculture is the dominant sector in the EJMA and it employs over 60 percent of the active population followed by service 18 percent, manufacturing 10 percent and (EJMA, 2010). The service sector ranks second to agriculture in terms of the number of people it employs and it covers banking, hospitality and tourism, car repairs and washing, and Information Communication and Technology.

These sectors of the economy of EJMA are the main sources of raising the Internally-Generated Funds from rents, lands, fees and fines, licenses, rates, and investments. The IGF are raised mainly in the major weekly markets at Ejisu, Juaben, Kwaso and Boamadumasi. However, over the years, the IGF has constituted an insignificant part of the total revenue of the EJMA.

The EJMA's IGF generated over the years has been insignificant and constitute less than 10 percent of the total revenue with the bulk of over 90 percent coming from Central Government transfers (EJMA, 2010). The poor IGF generation was attributed to following factors: non-payment of basic rate by eligible adults, immobility of revenue collectors, inadequate revenue officers, absence of reliable revenue database, absence of updated property rate register and non valuation of buildings, inadequate public tax education, lack of tax collection skills, and ineffective Area /Town Council structures (EJMA, 2010).

The EJMA has the following weekly market centres : Ejisu on Sundays and Thursdays, , Juaben on Tuesdays, Kwaso on Tuesdays and Boamadumasi on Fridays. The IGFs are raised from the agricultural, commerce and the manufacturing sectors on rents, lands, fees and fines, licenses, rates, and investments (EJMA, 2010). These markets serve as major marketing centres for maize, yam, plantain, cocoyam and cassava and attract traders from all over the country. This high demand for the foodstuffs has been generating increases in production over the years. In 2009, the EJMA recorded increases in output of the following major food crops: maize 19.23 %, cocoyam 3.35 %, plantain 12.9 % and rice 7.1 % for rice (EJMA, 2010).

The operators in the commerce sub-sector are mainly into retailing and wholesaling of both manufactured goods and agricultural produce in the major weekly markets in the EJMA at Ejisu, Kwaso and Boamadumasi. The EJMA has high tourism potentials though not fully tapped. The potentials sites include the beautiful Bobiri Forest Reserve with its butterfly sanctuary, the Ejisu-Besease Shrine, the Yaa Asantewaa Museum and festival, Kente weaving at Bonwire, and the Sacred Fishes in the Bafo stream, the Anyano sacred tree at Akyawkrom, the Tano Shrine at Asawasi and the Ntonti Rocks at Okyerekrom (EJMA,2010).

#### 4.4.2 Economic Characteristics of SEDA

The economic base of the SEDA is founded on the agricultural sector which employs about 66 percent of the active population.

In addition, commerce employs 18 percent, service 5%, manufacturing 10 percent and others 1%. The SEDA has three major weekly market centres at Effiduasi, Asokore and Seniagya where the IGFs are raised from the agricultural, commerce and the manufacturing sectors on rents, lands, fees and fines, licenses, rates, and investments (SEDA, 2010).

The three weekly markets at Effiduase on Sundays, Asokore and Seniagya on Tuesdays in the SEDA, serve as major centres for the sale of foodstuffs like maize, yam, plantain, cocoyam and cassava and attract traders from all over the country. In the SEDA, the production of these major staples recorded the following increases in 2009: Rice 31.9 %, Cassava 5.72 %, Yam %, Cocoyam 5 %, and Plantain 4.3 % all over the 2008 outputs. However, cassava in the EJMA and rice in the SEDA recorded -6.6% and -1.3% growth respectively (Table 4.1).

The challenges of inadequate funding, poor feeder roads, erratic rainfall pattern to crops production in the EJMA and SEDA notwithstanding (EJMA, 2010, SEDA, 2010), the increase in output of these crops is a positive signal that the farmers in both EJMA and the SEDA have the capacity to supply the markets with more foodstuffs in order to meet the demand from the traders.

This would also go a long way to raise more market rates from the traders and therefore boost IGF generation in the assemblies.

**Table 4.1: Food Crops Production Level in EJMA and SEDA 2008 and 2009**

(000' MT)

CROPS	MMDAs					
	EJMA			SEDA		
	2008	2009	Percentage Change	2008	2009	Percentage Change
Maize	13,082.7	14,551.5	19.23%	11,950	11,791	-1.3%
Cassava	88,463.2	82,713.3	-6.6%	46,807	49,487	5.73%
Cocoyam	7,455.3	5,244.8	3.45%	19,860	20,846	4.96%
Plantain	18,343.3	14,057.1	12.9%	17,475	18,222	4.3%
Rice	349,400	493,000	7.14%	72,000	95,000	31.9%

Source: EJMA and SEDA (2010)

#### **4.5 Educational Qualifications of EJMA and SEDA Sub-Districts**

The Ghana Shared Growth and Development Agenda (2010) emphasised the fact that it is through education that the necessary skills, knowledge and aptitudes are acquired, and the creative abilities of individuals released, to open the way to a better life and society.

This is a pointer to the fact that, educational levels of members of sub-districts are key to the overall performance of these structures. Table 4.2 highlights the educational backgrounds of the members of the sub-districts in the EJMA and SEDA.

In the EJMA, out of the 65 members of the sub-districts interviewed, 7(10.8 %) have had no formal education, 23(35.3%) had primary education, and 15(23.1 %) had Middle and Junior High Schools education at the basic level.

**Table 4.2: Educational Levels of EJMA and SEDA Town and Area Councils**

EJMA SUB-DISTRICTS	Educational Levels							
	Non- Formal	Primary	Middle/ JHS	Senior High School	Post- Sec	Polytechnic	University	Total
Ejisu TC	0	3	4	4	1	2	1	<b>15</b>
Mponua AC	0	3	2	2	2	1	0	<b>10</b>
Kwabere-Mponua AC	2	4	1	2	1	0	0	<b>10</b>
Bonwire-Besease AC	2	7	4	1	1	0	0	<b>15</b>
Onwe AC	3	6	4	2	0	0	0	<b>15</b>
<b>Total(%)</b>	<b>7</b> <b>(10.8)</b>	<b>23</b> <b>(35.3%)</b>	<b>15</b> <b>(23.1%)</b>	<b>12</b> <b>(18.5%)</b>	<b>5</b> <b>(7.7%)</b>	<b>3</b> <b>(4.6%)</b>	<b>1</b> <b>(1.5%)</b>	<b>65</b> <b>(100%)</b>
<b>SEDA SUB-DISTRICTS</b>								
Asokore TC	1	3	4	4	2	0	1	<b>15</b>
Senchi –Nyanfa AC	1	2	3	2	1	1	0	<b>10</b>
Seniagya-Mponua AC	1	3	3	2	1	0	0	<b>10</b>
Total (%)	3( 8.6%)	8 (22.9%)	10 (28.6%)	8 (22.9%)	4 (11.4%)	1 (2.9%)	1( 2.9%)	35 (100%)

Source: Author’s Field Survey, November, 2011

The educational level of members beyond the basic level was relatively lower as 12(18.5%) had Senior High School education, 5(7.7%) Post-Secondary education, 3(4.6%) Polytechnic and 1(1.5%) University education respectively.

In the SEDA, out of the 35 members of the sub-districts interviewed, 3(8.6. %) have had no formal education, 8(22.9%) had primary education, and 10(28.6 %) had Middle and Junior High Schools education at the basic level. Beyond the basic level, 8(22.9%) had Senior High School education, 4 (11.4%) Post-Secondary education, 1(2.9%) Polytechnic and 1(2.9%) University education respectively.

In effect, 45(69.2 %) and 21(60%) of the councillors of the EJMA and SEDA have had the highest educational attainment up to the first cycle. The low levels of education qualification in both the sub-districts of the EJMA and the SEDA beyond the basic level reflected in the challenge on the capacity of the sub-districts to keep proper records especially minutes of meetings (Table 4.8). This became evident during the focus group discussions as members had difficulty expressing themselves in basic written English and Twi and spoken English.

#### 4.6 Funding for Sub-District Structures.

The potential sources of funds available to the SDSs are the payment of 2 % of common fund from the MMDAs to their sub-structures, 50 % of Ceded Revenue and Internally-Generated Funds. The study found out that of the three sources, the sub-districts only have access to the IGF for their activities. The Internally-Generated Funds were raised mainly from annual community harvests; occasional levies as well as proceeds from levies imposed on defaulters of communal labour and caught stray animals. Focus Group Discussions with each of the sampled sub-structures of the EJMA and SEDA respectively as indicated on tables 4.3 confirmed the three major sources of funding to the Town, Area and Unit Committees.

**Table 4.3: Major Sources of Funding for EJMA and SEDA Sub-District Structures**

Major Sources of Funding	EJMA SUB-DISTRICTS						SEDA SUB-DISTRICTS			
	Ejisu	Mponua	Kwabere Mponua	Bonwire Besease	Onwe	Total	Asokore	Senchi Nyanfa	Seniagya-Mponua	Total (%)
Common Fund	0	0	0	0	0	0 (0%)	0	0	0	0(0%)
IGF	15	10	10	15	15	65(100%)	15	10	10	35(100)
Ceded Revenue	0	0	0	0	0	0(0%)	0	0	0	0(0%)
Total	15	10	10	15	15	65(100%)	15	10	10	35(100)

Source: Author's Field Survey, November, 2011

Again, all the sub-structures were unanimous that within the period of the study, the IGF was the only source of funding among the three that the Town Councils, Area Councils and the Unit Committees relied on as revenue for their activities.

#### **4.7 Sub-Districts Administrative Staff**

The Ministry of Local Government and Rural Development specified the minimum administrative staff necessary for the running of the sub-districts as a Secretary, Treasurer, Typist and Messenger (Caretaker) (Local Government Information Digest, July-August, 1998). The analysis of the findings on the required administrative staff for all the Sub-districts of the EJMA revealed that, out of the total required staff of eight, comprising two Secretaries, Treasurers, Typists and Caretakers each for the two Town Councils (Ejisu and Juaben), only four representing 50 percent were at post. The remaining four positions making up 50 percent remained vacant. In the seven Area Councils of the EJMA (Mponua, Kwabere-Mponua, Onwe, Hwere-Anum, Bomfa-Adumasa, Besease Bonwire), out of the total required staff of 28 of four each, only seven (25%) were at post. The other 21 (75%) of the total required, remained vacant for the period.



The staff situation in the SEDA was relatively worse. Out of the required staff strength of eight for Asokore and Effiduasi Town Councils, consisting of two Secretaries, Treasurers, Typists and Caretakers each, only 1(12.5%) was at post. The other 7(87.5%) were vacant. In the Area Councils, out of the staff of 12, only 1(8.3 %) was at post. The other 11 (91.7 %) were never filled. Table 4.4 shows the relative staff positions of the EJMA and SEDA Sub-districts.

**Table 4.4: Administrative Staff of EJMA and SEDA Town and Area Councils.**

Sub-Districts Staff Positions Required and At Post		EJMA SUB-DISTRICTS			SEDA SUB-DISTRICTS		
		Town Councils	Area Councils	Total	Town Councils	Area Councils	Total
Secretaries	Required	2	7	9	2	3	5
	At Post	1	1	2	0	1	1
Treasurers	Required	2	7	9	2	3	5
	At Post	2	1	3	0	0	0
Typists	Required	2	7	9	2	3	5
	At Post	0	0	0	0	0	0
Caretakers	Required	2	7	9	2	3	5
	At Post	1	5	6	1	0	0
<b>Total (%)</b>	<b>Required</b>	<b>8(100%)</b>	<b>28(100%)</b>	<b>36(100%)</b>	<b>8(100%)</b>	<b>12(100%)</b>	<b>20(100%)</b>
	<b>At Post</b>	<b>4(50%)</b>	<b>7(25%)</b>	<b>11(30.6)</b>	<b>1(12.5%)</b>	<b>1(8.3%)</b>	<b>2(10%)</b>
	<b>Vacant</b>	<b>4(50%)</b>	<b>21(75%)</b>	<b>25(69.4%)</b>	<b>7(87.5%)</b>	<b>11(91.7%)</b>	<b>18(90%)</b>

Source: Author's Field Survey, November, 2011

In sum, out of the total staff of 36 for the two Town and seven Area councils of the EJMA, only 11(30.6%) were at post. The other 25(69.4%) remained vacant over the period.

In the SEDA, only 2 staffs (10 %) out of the total staff of 20 (100%) for the two Town and three Area councils were at post. The other 18 (90%) were not filled over the period.

The analysis further revealed that apart from apathy on the part of the assemblies towards nurturing the sub-districts to grow which reflected in their refusal to pay the SDSs share of the 2 % of the DACF (Table 4.3), the vacant positions in the sub-districts with permanent office accommodation was as a result of high labour turnover due to the following poor conditions of service. Firstly, the allowances paid the staffs was meagre. The secretaries were paid a monthly allowance of GH¢ 50 while the other staff positions were paid GH¢ 35. What is worse; the monthly allowance are not paid regularly and had always been in arrears of at least one month. Secondly, no social security contributions are paid to the Social Security and National Insurance Trust (SSNIT) by the assemblies on behalf of the workers thereby contravening the Pensions Act, 2008 (Act 766). Thirdly, the remuneration paid the staff of the SDSs is far below the national minimum wage of GH¢3.73. Finally, all the skeletal staff who have worked between five and 12 years for the councils are still temporary staff which is clear violation of Section 70 (1) of the Labour Act 2003 (Act 651).

#### **4.8 Administrative Facilities and Equipment**

The Table 4.5 depicts the state of administrative facilities and equipment of the SDSs of the EJMA and SEDA. In the EJMA, the study revealed that out of the nine councils, 5(55.6%) have permanent office accommodation. All the office blocks have a meeting hall with a capacity to accommodate at least 35 persons at a time. In addition, all the offices are furnished and connected to electricity.

The other 4(44.4%) have no permanent office accommodation. These four councils hold their respective meetings either in classrooms, church premises or the private residence of some members.

**Table 4.5: Permanent Office Accommodation of EJMA and SEDA Town and Area Councils**

<b>EJMA SUB-DISTRICTS</b>	<b>Permanent Office Accommodation</b>		
	<b>Yes</b>	<b>No</b>	<b>Total</b>
Town Councils	1	1	2
Area Councils	4	3	7
<b>Total</b>	<b>5(56%)</b>	<b>4(44%)</b>	<b>9(100%)</b>
<b>SEDA SUB-DISTRICTS</b>			
Town Councils	1	1	2
Area Councils	0	3	3
<b>Total (%)</b>	<b>1(20%)</b>	<b>4(80%)</b>	<b>5(100%)</b>

**Source: Author's Field Survey, November, 2011**

In the SEDA, only Asokore Town Council (Figure 4.6) has permanent office accommodation. The other 4(80%) councils have no accommodation, and therefore organise their activities in classrooms, churches and in the private homes of members.

The major challenge the councils without permanent office accommodation identified was the insecurity of official documents and other assets of the councils such as tools for communal labour. The state of permanent office accommodation for the councils in the SEDA, is worse relative to EJMA

#### **4.9 Institutional and Legislative Gaps in Local Governance**

The study revealed that though the structure is clearly defined, factors such as political interference, apathy on the part of MMDAs towards sub-structures as well as the overconcentration of greater percentage of all resources at the MMDAs to the neglect of the sub-structures seriously challenge the structure. The politicisation of the SDSs arises from the abuse of the quota of 30 percent government appointees to the MMDAs and the SDSs due to political patronage. This politicisation creates a challenge of composition of membership and for that matter quota for MMDAs, their sub-committees and the SDSs. This situation arises because the tenure of the President and Members of Parliament begin two years ahead of that of the members of MMDAs and the SDSs. Consequently, the tenure of office of the former end two years earlier than the latter. For instance in

2001 when the National Democratic Congress (NDC) lost power, the tenure of office of the 1998-2002 assembly had two years more to run. However, the government appointees to the various MMDAs and SDSs were replaced with New Patriotic Party (NPP) faithfuls. Again, when the NDC regained power in 2009 mid-way into the tenure of the 2006-2010 assembly, all the government appointees perceived to be NPP faithful were sacked.

The absence of by-elections to re-fill vacancies which may be created in the MMDAs and the sub-districts due to death, travelling and resignations of the assembly members and the councilors was identified as major institutional and legislative challenge.

The EJMA and the SEDA lost a total of five assembly members (Table 4.6) in the first year (2007) into their tenure in office and confirmed by the registries of the EJMA and SEDA. The vacancies created by one death and four other members who had all travelled out of the country were not re-filled until the tenure of the assembly expired in 2010.

**Table 4.6: Vacancies Created in the 2006-2010 Assembly in the EJMA and SEDA**

MMDAs	Reason for the Vacation of Post		Total
	Death	Travel	
EJMA	1	2	<b>3</b>
SEDA	0	2	<b>2</b>
<b>Total</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>5</b>

Source: EJMA and SEDA Registry, November, 2011

Cases of vacation of posts were relatively higher among the Town, Area councils and the Unit Committees .These vacancies for the periods that they persists, deny the affected electoral areas, councils and units, representation at the assemblies and the councils.

The following factors are institutional challenges that retard the progress of the SDSs: The failure on the part of MMDAs to transfer the SDSs 2% share of the DACF, award revenue heads to collect revenue on behalf of the EJMA and SEDA to earn some ceded revenue, recruit and retain staff, and the construction of office accommodation for all the councils. These identified bottlenecks in the structure are inhibiting bottom-up

community, town and area council planning leading to the generation of action plans which are harmonised into the Metropolitan, Municipal and District Medium Term Development Plans (MMDMTDPs)

#### 4.10 Community Participation in Local Governance

The study identified community meetings, public hearing and annual community harvest as the common modes of participation through which the people are mobilised to actively partake in community activities in the EJMA and SEDA.

Table 4.7 shows that regular monthly community meetings represent the most popular mode of participation as 13(50%) of unit committees for the period applied it. The next modes of participation in terms of importance were annual meetings 7(23%) and public hearings 6(23%) respectively.

**Table 4. 7: Modes of Community Participation of EJMA and SEDA Unit Committees**

EJMA Sub-Districts	Modes of Participation			Total (%)
	Community Meetings	Public Hearings	Annual Meetings	
Ejisu	3	1	1	5
Mponua	2	1	2	5
Kwabere-Mponua	4	1	1	6
Bonwire-Besease	2	2	1	5
Onwe	2	1	2	5
<b>Total</b>	<b>13(50%)</b>	<b>6(23%)</b>	<b>7(27%)</b>	<b>26(100%)</b>
<b>SEDA Sub-Districts</b>				
<b>Asokore</b>	2	1	1	4
<b>Senchi -Nyanfa</b>	3	2	2	7
<b>SeniagyaMponua</b>	3	1	2	6
<b>Total</b>	<b>8(47%)</b>	<b>4(24%)</b>	<b>5(29%)</b>	<b>17(100%)</b>

Source: Author's Field Survey, November, 2011

In the SEDA, the rate of preference for the three modes of participation by the UCs as shown by Table 4.7 was as follows: 8 (47%) monthly community meetings, 5(29%) annual meetings and 4(24%) public hearings.

#### **4.11 Participation of Traditional Authorities, Civil Society and Private Sector**

The Traditional Authorities, Non-Governmental Organizations, the Private sector are the major stakeholders participating and supporting local governance in the EJMA and SEDA. In the EJMA, there are two paramount chiefs (Ejisu and Juaben) with a number of sub-chiefs.

In the SEDA on the other hand, there are two paramount chiefs at (Effiduasi and Asokore) and their sub-chiefs. The traditional authorities have representation in their respective assemblies and councils and in addition, are consulted in the nomination of government appointees to the assembly. The study further revealed that the traditional leaders felt not satisfied with the level of consultation and their participation in the governance of their traditional areas.

This the Secretary of the Asokore Traditional Council summed up as “...although there is some consultations, in most cases, the assembly take their decisions especially with respect to the selection of appointees to the SEDA and the SDSs and only to inform us”

The relationship between the traditional authorities and the SDSs have been largely mutually beneficial. That notwithstanding, there had been exceptional cases of conflict between the traditional authorities and the SDSs. In one instance, a traditional leader who had some differences with a unit committee in his area of jurisdiction Onwe in the EJMA, illegally dissolved the Unit Committee and replaced it with an appointed one.

The private sector in both EJMA and SEDA serve as the main levying sources of IGF for the assemblies and in addition, provide goods and services to the people. The main private sector operators are mainly Small and Medium Enterprises engaged in the construction sector such as Masons, Carpenters, Steel Benders, Fitters and Mechanics, Tailors and Seamstress, Petty Traders, Transport Operators and Kente Weavers.

These private sector operators identified the following as the major challenges of their operations : unreliable and high cost of utilities especially electricity, high cost of credit, high assembly levies, untarred market and poor structures, lack of large serviced and permanent place of operation for the mechanics.

On the issue of the fixing and review of taxes and levies of the MMDAs, the operators agreed the EJMA and SEDA regularly invite them to participate only in the approval and not the fixing and review of the taxes and levies. The private sector operators therefore call on the MMDAs to factor their inputs into their taxes and levies at the fixing and not only at the approval stage. Lastly, the private sector operators expressed concern about the assemblies denying the operators contracts they have the capacities to execute.

The only registered Non-Governmental Organization (NGO) operating in the SEDA is the World Vision International (WVI). The WVI complements the efforts of the SEDA in the areas of health, education, sanitation, agriculture and micro finance. In the area of Health, Water and Sanitation, the WVI provides boreholes, latrines, clinics and the latest is a community clinic provided for the people of Ahwerewa.

In the area of education, the WVI provide school buildings, furniture, textbooks and stationery, mobile libraries, and award scholarships to needy pupils, teachers accommodation and training in the teaching and learning of English and Mathematics. The WVI also support Small and Micro Enterprises in the area of micro-credit finance, skills training and linkages to markets.

#### **4.12 Sub-Districts and Local Governance Accountability**

The study identified the presentation of annual accounts, the keeping of accounting value books and the keeping of minutes of meetings as the main downward accountability mechanisms from the sub-districts to the People.

The Unit Committees in both the EJMA and the SEDA were found to be the most vibrant sub-structure in terms of the downwards accountability because it is the sub-structure that has a direct contact with the citizenry relative to the Town and Area Councils.

In the presentation of annual accounts as shown by Table 4.8, out of the 26 Unit Committees in the EJMA, 13(50%) honoured it while the other 50 percent failed to present their accounts to the people. In the area of the keeping of simple accounting records, receipts and value books, the Sub-Districts performed poorly. Only 6(23.1%) kept some form of accounting records. No records were found for the remaining 21(76.9 %).



The keeping of minutes of proceedings of meetings was also poorly managed. Only 7(26.9 %) percent kept some form of records of meeting proceedings while the other 19(73.1%) kept no record of minutes of meetings.

**Table 4.8: Downwards Accountability Mechanisms of SEDA and EJMA Unit Committees**

Accountability Mechanisms		EJMA SUB-DISTRICTS						SEDA SUB-DISTRICTS			
		Ejisu	Mponua	Kwabere Mponua	Bonwire Besease	Onwe	Total	Asokore	Senchi Nyanfa	Seniagya-Mponua	Total (%)
Presentation of Accounts	Yes	3	2	4	2	2	13(50%)	2	3	3	8(47.1%)
	No	2	3	2	3	3	13(50%)	2	4	3	9(52.9%)
	<b>Total</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>26(100%)</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>17(100%)</b>
Keeping Value Books	Yes	1	1	1	2	1	6(23.1%)	1	2	1	4(23.5%)
	No	4	4	5	3	4	20(76.9%)	3	5	5	13(76.5%)
	<b>Total</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>26(100%)</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>17(100%)</b>
Keep Minutes of Meetings	Yes	1	2	1	1	2	7(26.9%)	1	2	2	5(29.4%)
	No	4	3	5	4	3	19(73.1%)	3	5	4	12(70.6%)
	<b>Total</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>26(100%)</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>17(100%)</b>

Source: Author's Field Survey, November, 2011

The performance of the SEDA UCs with respect to downward accountability mechanisms as shown by Table 4.8 was poor relative to the EJMA's performance. In the presentation of annual accounts out of the 17 Unit Committees in the SEDA, 8(47.1%) honoured it while the other 9 (54.9%) failed to present their accounts to the people. In the keeping of receipts and value books, only 4( 23.5%) kept some form of accounting records by way of receipts of some pick axes and shovels purchased. No records were found for the remaining 13(76.5 %). The mechanism of keeping of minutes of proceedings of meetings was equally poorly managed. Only 5(29.4) UCs kept some form of records of meeting proceedings mainly on pieces of papers while the other 12(61.6%) kept no record of proceedings of meetings. This is a clear violation of Part 9(20) of the Model Standing Orders for the Unit Committees.

#### 4.12.1 Approval of Accounts of Unit Committees

The analysis of the presentation of the accounts of the Unit Committees further revealed that the interest of the people in the work of the committees was waning and poor accountability on the part of the committees was identified as the most important cause of this apathy as shown by Table 4.9 below. Out of the sampled 26 Unit Committees within the five councils of the EJMA, only 6 (23.1%) had their accounts approved by their respective communities with the other 20(76.9%) rejected by the people over the period.

**Table 4.9: Approval of Accounts of EJMA and SEDA Unit Committees**

EJMA Sub-Districts	Degree of Approval of Accounts		
	Approved	Rejected	Total (%)
Ejisu	1	4	
Mponua	1	4	
Kwabere-Mponua	2	4	
Bonwire-Besease	1	4	
Onwe	1	4	
<b>Total</b>	<b>6(23.1%)</b>	<b>20(76.9%)</b>	<b>26(100%)</b>
<b>SEDA</b>			
<b>Sub-Districts</b>			
Asokore	1	3	
Senchi -Nyanfa	2	6	
Seniagya-Mponua	1	5	
<b>Total</b>	<b>4(23.5%)</b>	<b>13(76.5%)</b>	<b>17(100%)</b>

Source: Author's Field Survey, November, 2011

In the SEDA, only 4(23.5%) UCs out of the total of 17 were approved of by the people as proper whiles the remaining 13(76.5%) of the UCs were rejected.

Interestingly, it was revealed that this trend of poor accountability had been recurring over the years and there was no documented case of sanctions against the committee members.

#### 4.13 Sub-Districts and Local Level Development

The Decentralization Policy Framework (2010) sees Local Level Development as the provision of the economic and social infrastructure and other basic services that improve the lives of the people. The SDSs are mandated to mobilise all available human and material resources to enhance local level development.

The EJMA and SEDA SDSs operating within their funding constraints identified the provision of places of convenience and school infrastructure and facilities as the social services provided for the people during the period.

In the EJMA, table 4.10 indicates that 21(68%) of the Sub-Districts provided pit latrines as places of convenience while 10(32%) provided the communities with kitchen and furniture to support the School Feeding programme.

**Table 4.10: Provision of Social Infrastructure by EJMA and SEDA Sub-District Structures**

<b>EJMA Sub-Districts</b>	<b>Social Infrastructure</b>		<b>Total</b>
	<b>Place of Convenience</b>	<b>School Infrastructure/Facilities</b>	
Town Councils	1	1	2
Area Councils	1	2	3
Unit Committees	19	7	26
<b>Total</b>	<b>21(68%)</b>	<b>10(32%)</b>	<b>31(100%)</b>
<b>SEDA Sub-Districts</b>			
Town Councils	0	1	1
Area Councils	1	1	2
Unit Committees	12	5	17
<b>Total</b>	<b>13(65%)</b>	<b>7(35%)</b>	<b>20(100%)</b>

Source: Author's Field Survey, November, 2011

In the SEDA, 13(65%) of the SDSs provided pit latrines as places of convenience while 35 percent procured furniture and kitchen for the School Feeding programme as captured by Table 4.10 as educational infrastructure and facilities .

#### **4.14 Challenges and Potentials of the Sub-Districts**

The analysis of the data captured at the various Focus Group Discussions revealed a number of challenges which over the years have served as barriers to the operations of the EJMA and SEDA SDSs.

The major challenges are the lack of sustainable source of funding, lack of allowances for members, lack of means of transport, the lack of permanent office accommodation and the creeping of partisan politics into the supposed non-partisan SDSs as confirmed by the Decentralisation Policy Review Final Report (2007,p.34) as "...in Ghana, the authority of Central Government is so overwhelming that, in the exercise of its appointing prerogatives for DCEs, 30% of members of the DAs and other sub-district institutions, such as Unit Committees, Town, Urban and Zonal Councils, partisanship considerations are becoming

more paramount than the claim of stakeholder participation and gender balance”. Table 4.11 captures the challenges of the confronting the EJMA and SEDA sub-districts.

In order of importance, the ranking of the five challenges were as follows: the lack of funding came top with 26(40%) and followed by the payment of allowances for the SDS 15(23%), provision of means of transport for the SDSs 12(12%), politicization of the SDSs 7(11%) and finally, the provision of office accommodation, 5(8%) in the EJMA.

**Table 4.11: Major Challenges of EJMA and SEDA Sub-District Structures**

<b>EJMA Sub-Districts</b>	<b>Challenges</b>					
	<b>Funding</b>	<b>Allowance</b>	<b>Transport</b>	<b>Politicisation</b>	<b>Office</b>	<b>Total</b>
Ejisu	6	4	2	1	2	<b>15</b>
Mponua	4	2	2	1	1	<b>10</b>
Kwabere-Mponua	3	2	3	2	0	<b>10</b>
Bonwire-Besease	6	4	2	1	2	<b>15</b>
Onwe	7	3	3	2	0	<b>15</b>
<b>Total</b>	<b>26(40%)</b>	<b>15(23%)</b>	<b>12(12%)</b>	<b>7(11%)</b>	<b>5(8%)</b>	<b>65(100%)</b>
<b>SEDA Sub-Districts</b>						
Asokore	6	5	3	1	0	<b>15</b>
Senchi -Nyanfa	4	2	1	1	2	<b>10</b>
Seniagya-Mponua	3	3	2	1	1	<b>10</b>
<b>Total</b>	<b>13(37%)</b>	<b>10(29%)</b>	<b>6(17%)</b>	<b>3(9%)</b>	<b>3(9%)</b>	<b>35(100%)</b>

Source: Author’s Field Survey, November, 2011

The order of importance of the challenges of the SEDA SDSs are as follows: the lack of funding came top with 13(37%) and followed by the payment of allowances for the SDS 10(29%), provision of means of transport for the SDSs 6(17%), politicization of the SDSs 3(9%) and finally, the provision of office accommodation, 3(9%).

These findings corroborate the observations of both (USAID, 2010) and the (EJMA, 2010 and MTDP, 2010) which summed up the challenges of the SDSs as mainly the lack of personnel, budgetary support and permanent offices.

These challenges notwithstanding, the sub-districts identified a number of potential tourist sites that hold the prospects of aiding them to raise more IGFs when the sites are fully developed. These tourist attractions are the Yaa Asantewaa museum at Ejisu that was razed down by fire in 2004, the Bobiri Forest Reserve with its butterfly sanctuary, the Ejisu-Besease

Shrine, Kente weaving at Bonwire, and the Sacred Fishes in the Bafo stream, the Anyano sacred tree, the Tano Shrine at Asawasi and the Ntonti Rocks at Okyerekrom.

- **Conclusion**

The discussions have unveiled the following facts which would form the basis for the recommendations in the last chapter of the study, that: the structure, roles, responsibilities of the EJMA and the SEDA are virtually the same though the EJMA is a Municipal Assembly; the levels of educational qualifications of most of the members of the SDSs are low; females are underrepresented in the MMDAs and the SDSs; the IGF is the only revenue source available to the SDSs; the SDSs are poorly resourced in terms of human, infrastructure and logistics; the SDSs-community accountability is poor, lack of funds, transportation, allowances are the main challenges of the SDSs and the SDSs have a lot of tourism potentials that have not been fully developed.

## CHAPTER FIVE

### SUMMARY OF KEY FINDINGS, RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION

#### 5.1 Introduction

This chapter presents the summary of the key findings, the institutional-specific policy recommendations and the conclusion.

##### 5.1.1 Weak Human Resource Base and Capacity Training

The SDSs have very weak human resource base. None of the councils in both the EJMA and SEDA had the full complement of the required administrative staffs ( Secretary, Treasurer, Typist and Caretaker/Messenger).

In the EJMA Town Councils (Juaben and Ejisu) , only 4(50%) out of the required staff of eight, comprising two Secretaries, Treasurers, Typists and Caretakers each were at post with the remaining half 4(50 %) percent being vacant. The staff situation in the ACs was worse as compared to the TCs. In the seven Area Councils (Mponua, Kwabere-Mponua, Onwe, Hwere-Anum, Bomfa-Adumasa, Besease Bonwire and Achiase), 7(25%) of the total staff of 28, were at post while the other 21(75%) were vacant for the period.

In the SEDA, out of the required staff strength of eight (for Asokore Town Councils), only one (12.5%) was at post. The other 7(87.5%) were not filled. In the three Area Councils, only 1(8.3%) out of the total staff of 12 was at post. The other 11 (91.7 %) were vacant. The staff at post have not benefited from any additional refresher training or workshop to build their capacities since the inaugural series of orientation for the Sub-Districts.

##### 5.1.2 Poor Staff Motivation and Working Conditions

The conditions of service in terms of remuneration of the skeletal staff at the SDSs are very demotivating because of the following reasons:

Low remuneration below the national minimum wage of GH¢3.73. The low monthly remuneration of the SDSs staff ranges between GH¢35 and GH¢50 and are always in arrears of at least a month.

Social Security contributions are not paid to the Social Security and National Insurance Trust (SSNIT) by the assemblies on behalf of the workers thereby contravening the Pensions Act , 2008 (Act 766).

All the skeletal staff of the Sub-Districts who have worked between five and 12 years for the councils are still temporary staff which is clear violation of Section 70 (1) of the Labour Act 2003 (Act 651).

The MMDAs failed to pay the allowances of members of the UCs over the period in contravention of Part 12(29) of the Model Standing Orders for Unit Committees.

### 5.1.3 District Assembly and Unit Committee By-Elections

None of the existing local government legislations such as the Local Government Act, 1993 (Act 462), L. I. 1589 Local Government (Urban, Zonal and Town Councils and Unit Committees) Establishment Statutes 1994, the C. I. 18 Unit Committee Regulations 1997, Act 473 District Assembly Elections Act 1994 made provision for By-Elections at both the District Assembly and Unit Committee levels. As a result, none of the five vacancies created by the elected assembly members (Table 4.6) were filled in the EJMA and SEDA. Cases of elected Unit Committee members who abandoned their post were even more widespread than at the District Assembly level. This obviously denied the people of the affected areas representation at the Sub-Districts.

### 5.1.4 Downward and Upward Accountability Mechanisms by Sub-Districts

Upward and downward accountability at the Sub-district levels is very weak. Upward accountability from the SDSs towards the EJMA and the SEDA was very weak.

Conversely, downward accountability from the SDSs towards the citizenry was an improvement over the upward accountability as the unit committees' account for their stewardship to the people at either the annual Easter or Christmas community gatherings. This affords the citizenry the opportunity to hold their elected representatives accountable.

### 5.1.5 Participation of Local Government Actors

The Traditional Authorities, Non-Governmental Organisations, the Private sector and the Communities are the major stakeholders participating and supporting local governance in the EJMA and SEDA. There are four traditional paramountcies with a number of sub-chiefs at Ejisu, Juaben, Effiduasi and Asokore. The Paramountcies have representation in their respective assemblies and councils and in addition, consulted occasionally by the assemblies in the nomination of government appointees to the assembly. The study further revealed that the traditional leaders felt not satisfied with their level of participation in the governance of their traditional areas. This breeds conflict between the traditional authorities and the SDSs. In one instance, a traditional leader who had some differences with a unit committee in his area of jurisdiction (Onwe, EJMA ) illegally dissolved the Unit Committee and replaced it with an appointed one.

The private sector in both EJMA and SEDA serve as the main levying sources of IGF for the assemblies and in addition, provide goods and services to the people. The private sector operators are in the Small and Medium Enterprises dominated by Masons, Carpenters, Steel Benders, Fitters and Mechanics, Tailors and Seamstress, Petty Traders, Transport Operators and Kente Weavers. The operators identified high cost of utilities, high cost of credit, high assembly levies, untarred market floor and poor structures, lack of large serviced and permanent place of operation for the mechanics as their main challenges. The operators raised concerns with the restriction of their involvement in the fixing and approval of taxes by both the EJMA and SEDA to only the final approval stage where their inputs cannot influence the final decisions. Lastly, the operators expressed concern about the assemblies not awarding contracts to the local operators.

The only registered Non-Governmental Organization operating in the SEDA is the World Vision International (WVI). The WVI complements the efforts of the SEDA in the areas of Health, Water and Sanitation and Education. Their latest support is the provision of a community clinic for the people of Ahwerewa.

In education, the WVI provide schools with buildings and staff accommodation, furniture, books, mobile libraries, scholarships to needy pupils, and training of staff in English and



Mathematics. The WVI also support Small and Micro Enterprises in the area of micro-credit finance, skills training and linkages to markets.

The participation of women at all the levels of the sub-districts is very low. In the EJMA, 37 (88.09%) of the 42 elected members were males, with only 5 (11.91%) being females. In the Unit Committees, 525(81.40%) of the 645 members were males and only 120 (18.60%) being females. In the SEDA, 19(88.36%) of the 22 elected members were males, with only 3 (13.62%) being females. In the councils, out of the of 91 Town and Area councillors in the SEDA, 72 (79.12 %) were males while 19(20.88%) were females.

#### 5.1.6 MMDAs Apathy towards Sub-District Structures

The apathy on the part of the MMDAs to offer their obligatory financial assistance to the SDSs is a barrier towards the effective running of the SDSs. This apathy in the SEDA and EJMA manifests in the failure of the assemblies to cede the collection of revenue to the SDSs, pay the salaries of council staff, and the councils' share of the common fund. The apathy on the part of MMDAs to devolve power and resources to the sub-districts is informed by the scepticism about the capacities of the SDSs to manage their own affairs. In that sphere, Schroeder and Eaton (2010) observed that it is because national governments are often hesitant about the loss of authority that decentralisation reform might entail.

#### 5.1.7 Inadequate Office Accommodation for Sub-District Structures

Office accommodation is a major challenge to the effective running of the SDSs. Permanent office accommodation, equipment and other logistics facilitate the operations of the sub-districts. In the EJMA, out of the two Town and seven Area councils, only 5(55.6% (Juaben, Kwabere Mponua, Onwe,Hwere-Anum and Bomfa-Adumasa) have permanent office accommodation . Each of the office blocks has three offices in addition to a meeting hall with a capacity to accommodate at least 35 persons at a time. The other 4(44.4%) have no permanent office accommodation.

In the SEDA, only the Asokore Town council has a permanent office accommodation. The other 4(80%) organize their activities in classrooms, churches and in the private homes of members. The major challenge the councils without permanent office accommodation identified was the insecurity of their documents and other assets of the councils such as tools

for communal labour. The existing office accommodations underutilised by the Town and Area councils for the intended use because of the dormant nature of the councils.

For example, part of the Asokore and Onwe offices have been converted to residential use by some staff of the assemblies while the hall of the Juaben Town Council office is being used for church services on Sundays.

#### 5.1.8 Inadequate Funds for the Sub-District Structures

The study identified the lack of sustainable source of funding to SDSs as a barrier to their operations and the promotion of decentralised local governance. The EJMA and the SEDA for the period failed to transfer the SDSs share of 2 percent of the DACF. The EJMA for example received a total of Seven Hundred and Fourty One Thousand, Seven Hundred and Eighty Cedis (GH¢ 741,780) as its share of the DACF for 2007, 2008 and 2009 fiscal years (EJMA, 2010). If the EJMA had adhered to the DACF guidelines, a total amount of GH¢14,835 representing 2 percent of the total common fund for the three years would have been transferred to the EJMA SDSs.

The SEDA on the other hand received a total of Three Million, Nine Hundred and Sixty Six Thousand, Two Hundred and Fourty Four Cedis, Eighty Pesewas (GH¢3,966,244.80) between 2006 and 2009 as its share of the Common Fund. (SEDA, 2010). In effect, a total of GH¢79,324 representing 2 percent of the DACF allocation for the four years was not allocated to the SEDA sub-districts. These undisbursed amounts of money could have been used to procure at least one more office accommodation for any of the other sub-districts without an office.

The IGF raised from annual community levies imposed on the people, levies imposed on owners of stray animals caught, defaulters of communal labour and proceeds from community places of convenience though inadequate, was the only means of funding for the SDSs.

#### 5.1.9 Weak Administrative Capacity of Sub-District Structures

Apart from the series of inaugural orientation training organized for the members SDSs, they have not benefited from any form of capacity training. This partly explains the weakness of the SDSs in the area of record keeping. In the area of the keeping of simple accounting

records, receipts and value books, out of the 26 Unit Committees in the EJMA, only 6(23.1%) kept some form of accounting records. The other 21 (76.9%) kept no records. In the keeping of minutes of proceedings of meetings, 7(26.9%) kept some form of records while the other 19 (73.1%) had no records of minutes of meetings.

In the SEDA, out of the 17 UCs, 4 (23.5%) kept some accounting records by way of receipts of some communal labour tools purchased. The other 13 (76.5%) had no records. Only 5(29.4%) percent kept some form of records of meeting proceedings mainly on pieces of papers while the other 12 (61.6%) had no record of proceedings of meetings. This is a clear violation of Part 9(20) of the Model Standing Orders for the Unit Committees.

#### 5.1.10 Institutional and Legislative Gaps in Local Governance

By-elections are held from time to time to replace elected parliamentarians when vacancies are created as provided by section 12 (1) of The Presidential and Parliamentary elections law. However, the major legislation governing District Assembly and Unit Committees elections, District Assembly Elections Act, 1994 (Act 473) made no provision for by-election as and when a vacancy is created in an Assembly or a Unit Committee. The study revealed that EJMA and the SEDA lost 2 assembly members each in the first year (2007) into their tenure and the vacancies were not re-filled until the tenure of the assembly expired in 2010.

Cases of vacation of posts are relatively higher among the Town, Area councils and the Unit Committees. These vacancies for the periods that they persist, deny the affected electoral areas, councils and units, representation at the Assemblies and the Councils.

## 5.2 Policy Recommendations

Strong and vibrant Town, Area Councils and Unit Committees are necessary for an effective local government system. In this regard, the following recommendations are made for consideration and action in future policy decisions in order to strengthen Sub-Districts in Local Governance.

### 5.2.1 Capture SDS Staff as Permanent Staff of the MMDAs

In order to overcome the remuneration challenges of low salaries, irregular payments, and the non-payment of SSNIT contributions of the staff of SDSs, it is recommended the staff of the SDSs should be made permanent staff of the MMDAs. As a result, the Ministry of Local Government and Rural Development should regularise the appointment of the staff some of whom have been casual staff for more than a decade with part of its DDF share.

#### 5.2.2 Pay Members of SDSs a Monthly Stipend

It is further recommended to the MLGRD and the District Development Facility Secretariat to press on the MMDAs to pay all members of the Town and Area Councils and the Unit Committees GH¢ 100 GH¢ 50 a month respectively. This stipend payment should be tied to each MMDAs share from of the DDF. This intervention would rekindle the dying interest of the people in the work of the SDSs which had been perceived to be voluntary and sacrificial.

#### 5.2.3 Sustainable Sources of Funding for Sub-Districts

The following interventions are recommended towards providing the Sub-Districts with sustainable funding.

- Functional SDSs as a District Assembly Common Fund Indicator

The Parliament of Ghana, the Ministry of Local Government and Rural Development and the Common Fund Secretariat should team up to revise the DACF disbursement formula to capture Operational Sub-Districts as a second indicator under the Responsiveness factor in addition to the existing improvement in Internally Generated Funds factor .

Consequently, MMDAs that provide permanent office accommodation, recruit, maintain and pay the salaries of staff of SDSs and for that matter make their Sub-Districts operational, be awarded more points which would qualify them to earn relatively higher common fund allocations. Again, the Sub-Districts share of the Common Fund which was reduced from five percent in 2007 to two percent should be reverted to the original 5 percent.

- Operational SDSs as Minimum Condition under District Development Facility

The effective MMDAs-SDSs relationship should be added to the five existing minimum conditions to satisfy under the Functional Organisational Assessment Tool (FOAT) to qualify a MMDA for a share in the basic grant of 40 percent out of the total DDF for a particular year.

In addition, the four out of the total of 110 scores allotted for the relationship between MMDAs and their Sub-District structures which is the least among the nine performance measures under the FOAT should be increased to eight. This would raise the potential of the MMDAs to earn more of the grant out of District Development Facility (DDF) and also motivate them to grow and nurture their SDSs. Also, the MMDAs-SDSs relationship should be assessed based on proof of disbursement of all funds due the SDSs by the MMDAs. In addition, the Ministry of Local Government and Rural Development should revise the guidelines governing the disbursement of the DDF in order to allocate at least five percent of the total grant realised by the MMDAs from the DDF into the development of the SDSs.

- Develop Sub-Districts Tourist Sites

The assemblies should develop the identified tourist sites in the various council areas by developing tourist reception and information points manned by trained members of the councils and UCs as tour attendants. In addition, these sites should be publicised on the respective assemblies' websites on the ghanadistricts.com homepage.

#### 5.2.4 Legislate District Assembly and Unit Committee By –Elections

The Ministry of Local Government and Rural Development, through the cabinet and the Electoral Commission (EC) should table a Bill in Parliament to review the Local Government Act, 1993 (Act 462).

The rest are the L. I. 1589 Local Government (Urban, Zonal and Town Councils and Unit Committees) Establishment Statutes 1994, the C. I. 18 Unit Committee Regulations 1997 and the Act 473 an the District Assembly Elections Act 1994 to make room for District Assembly and Unit Committee By-elections.

### 5.2.5 Enforcement of Downward and Upward Accountability

In order to enhance both upward and downward accountability, the MMDAs should intensify their monitoring roles over the SDSs in the following areas: the keeping of minutes of meetings, keeping of receipts and simple financial records, regularity of meetings, regular presentation of accounts to the people and self-initiated and executed projects. So as to collate enough data on the performance of the various SDSs to guide them in the allocation of funds to the Sub-Districts. This measure would motivate the Sub-Districts to apply standard and acceptable administrative practices.

### 5.2.6 Participation of Local Government Actors

The participation of the various local government actors such as the private sector, NGOs and CSOs and the traditional authorities should be promoted. The strategic role of the private sector as the main source of IGF to the MMDAs is obvious. To step up the role of the private sector in local governance and boost their capacities to IGF mobilisation, it is recommended that:

The various private sector trade associations should be given representations on the Finance and Administration sub-committee of the MMDAs as well as on the Sub-Districts. So as to make them active participants in the fixing and revision of the taxes and levies of the MMDAs so as to minimise cases of tax evasion and avoidance.

The private sector players should be facilitated by way of capacity building in order to enter into partnerships with the Assemblies.

The Assemblies should design a local content policy which would bind all contractors who win contracts in the districts to procure at least 80 percent of all readily available inputs from within the district.

Again, qualified local contractors and suppliers should be selected over other bidders outside the districts when it comes to the procurement of goods such as furniture, stationery, foodstuffs, wood, sand, and school uniforms which are not too technical to supply.

The MMDAs should again identify and register all NGOs and CSOs and draw them into the activities of the SDSs and for that matter the MMDAs through the invitations to all relevant business of the MMDAs. The traditional authorities who have representation on the councils should be engaged and made more active participants in the assemblies.

#### 5.2.7 Office Accommodation

Inadequate permanent office accommodation is a draw back to the smooth running of the sub-districts. As a result, it is recommended to the MMDAs to make it a priority to provide all existing councils with permanent office accommodation. In addition, NGOs such as the Danish International Development Agency (DANIDA) and Ibis West Africa that have shown practical interest in building the capacities of the Sub-Districts over the years should also consider the construction of office accommodation as a component in their future interventions.

#### 5.2.8 Regular Refresher and Capacity Training for the SDSs

The MMDAs should provide annual regular capacity training workshops for all members of SDSs in the area of minutes writing, basic bookkeeping and report writing and presentation as well as other relevant topics.

#### 5.2.9 Civil Society Coalition on Operationalisation of Sub-Districts

I again recommend to Civil Society Organizations operating in the area of Decentralisation and Local Governance to form a coalition on Local Governance across the country to monitor the utilisation of all funds specifically allocated for the development of the Sub-Districts by MMDAs as is the case for Coalition of Civil Society in Water and Sanitation (CONIWAS) and Health.

### 5.3 Conclusion

The poor state of the Sub-Districts and decentralised local governance more than two decades into the promulgation of Provisional National Defence Council Law (P.N.D.C.L 207) and subsequently, the Local Government Act of 1993, (Act 462) leaves so much to be desired. This is as a result of the fact that the whole superstructure of the Local Government system in Ghana had been pivoted on weak and poorly resourced sub-structures of Town, Area Councils and Unit Committees.

In effect, the SDSs that would have served as the bridge between the grassroots and the MMDAs, have over the years proven to be a very weak link between the MMDAs and the grassroots. The study identified the following interconnected factors that operate to render the SDSs which are the pivot of local governance weak and non-operational:

A larger number of Unit Committees from where the memberships of the councils are drawn are not fully constituted and functional;

There is no legislative provision that call for District Assembly and Unit Committees By-Elections when vacancies are created;

Ghana unlike Uganda which has chosen decentralisation by devolution, has not taken an emphatic position as to which form of decentralisation it is pursuing and it is a major challenge to the system;

There is poor motivation of staff and members of Assemblies and the sub-districts in terms of poor salaries, low sitting allowances causing high rates of staff attritions and resignations;

The councils lack qualified and well motivated staff to run affairs of the councils and units;

The lack of permanent office accommodation and logistics equally draws back the progress of the Sub-Districts and the;



Apathy and weak institutional linkages between the MMDAs and their sub-districts to nurture and grow the sub-districts.

With the current state of the SDSs, going into the third decade of the introduction of the revised Local Government System calls for a shift from the lack-lustre manner exhibited in the first two decades of the implementation of the local government into radical, best practices approach and thinking by all actors within local governance space. This shift is necessary to redress the imbalance between the enormous roles and responsibilities placed on the SDSs and the scanty resources provided them.

Finally, redressing the SDSs role/responsibility-resource imbalance calls for the strengthening of the SDSs in the following pragmatic ways through the : provision of adequate and sustainable funds; qualified and highly motivated staff, participation of all stakeholders and more importantly, the support, commitment and political will of the political and administrative hierarchy of the country.

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**LIST OF APPENDICES**

**APPENDICE 1: QUESTIONNAIRES**

**DEPARTMENT OF PLANNING**

**FACULTY OF PLANNING AND LAND ECONOMY**

**KWAME NKRUMAH UNIVERSITY OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY-  
KUMASI**

**Assessing the Role of Sub-District Structures in Decentralized Local Governance: A  
Case Study of the Ejisu-Juaben Municipal and Sekyere East District Assemblies.**

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**APPENDIX 1.A: HOUSEHOLD QUESTIONNAIRE**

**A. Profile of Respondents**

- 1. Date.....
- 2. Name of Unit.....
- 3. House Number.....
- 4. Age

18-27	01
28-37	02
38-47	03
48-57	04
58-67	05

**5. Sex**

Male	01
Female	02

6. What is the highest educational level you attained?

Primary	01
Middle School/JHS	02
SHS	03
Post-Secondary Teacher/Nursing Training	04
Polytechnic	05
University	06
Others(Specify)	07

7. How long have you lived here?

1-3 years
4-6 years
7-9 years
10-12 years

8. Do you know your unit committee members?

Yes	01
No	02

9. If yes, describe how well you know the committee members.

By names	01
By Residence	02
Place of work	03
Others(Specify)	04

10. In which ways do you participate in community activities?

Communal labour	01
Community meetings	02
Participation in elections	03
Payment of taxes	04
Community Action planning	05
Others(specify)	06

11. Suggest ways of improving the community participation.

i.
ii.
iii.
iv.
v.

12. Did the committee provide any project for the community?

Yes	01
No	02

13. If yes, which development project did the committee provide?

School	01
Clinic	02
KVIP.	03
Borehole	04
Others(Specify)	05

14. Did the committee render accounts to the people for the period in question?

Yes	01
No	02

15. If yes, in which periods was it done?

Weekly	01
Monthly	02
Yearly(at Easter)	03
Yearly(At Christmas)	04
Others(Specify)	05

16. In the last four years was there a period that an account was never rendered?

Yes	Yes
No	No

17. If yes, describe the occasions and the reasons for that.


18. Describe the level cooperation of the people to the work of the committees.

Very Good	01
Good	02
Poor	03
Very Poor	04

19. What are the major challenges facing the unit committees?

Funds for activities	01
Poor motivation of members	02
Conflict with traditional council	03
Lack of commitment	04
Politisation of committee.	05

20. What measures need to be put in place to overcome these challenges?

i.
ii.
iii.
iv.

22. How would you rate the total performance of the unit committee based on the following?

<b>Indicators</b>	<b>Very Good(01)</b>	<b>Good(02)</b>	<b>Poor(03)</b>	<b>Very Poor(04)</b>
Promotion of participation				
Accountability to the people				
Service delivery				
Office accommodation				
Office staff				

**APPENDIX 1.B:**

**TOWN, AREA COUNCILS AND UNIT COMMITTEES**

**DEPARTMENT OF PLANNING**

**KWAME NKRUMAH UNIVERSITY OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY-  
KUMASI**

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**1. TOWN /AREA COUNCILS/UNIT COMMITTEES**

**A. PROFILE OF RESPONDENTS**

1. Name of Council/Committee.....

2. Status of Respondents

Chairman	01
Secretary	02
Others (Specify)	03

3. Age

<b>20-29</b>	<b>01</b>
<b>30-39</b>	<b>02</b>
<b>40-49</b>	<b>03</b>
<b>50-59</b>	<b>04</b>
<b>60-69</b>	<b>05</b>

4. Sex

Male	01
Female	02



5. What is your highest educational level?

Primary	01
Middle School/JHS	02
SHS	03
Post-Secondary Teacher/Nursing Training	04
Polytechnic	05
University	06
Others(Specify)	07

**B. ADMINISTRATION**

1. Do you have the full complement of the council members?

Yes	01
No	02

2. If no, what reasons account for the shortfall?


3. What is the composition of the council membership?

Assembly members		Unit Committee Members		Government Appointees	
Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female

4. Did you lose any member of the council/committee?

Yes	01
No	02

5. What was the cause of the loss?

Death	01
Travel	02
Sickness	03
Resignation	04
Others(Specify)	05

6. Did you replace the lost members?

Yes	01
No	02

7. If no, list the effects of the loss of these members on the communities they represent?

i.
ii.
iii.
iv.

8. How many times are you supposed to meet in a year as a council?

Once	01
Twice	02
Thrice	03
Others (Specify)	04

9. Did you conduct all the meetings for the four years you were in office?

Yes	01
No	02

10. If no, what were reasons for not being able to meet?


11. Do you have a permanent office accommodation with a Secretary?

Yes	01
No	02

12. If no, where do you hold meetings?

Classroom	01
Church	02
Chairman's Residence	03

Others (specify)	04
------------------	----

13. Which items do you have in the office?

Bank Account/Cheque Book	01
Furniture	02
Computer/Typewriter	03
Books of Accounts	04
Others(Specify)	05

14. Which administrative staff do you have in place?

Position	Permanent	Temporary	None
Secretary			
Treasurer			
Typist			
Caretaker			

15. Do you keep records of meetings proceedings?

Yes	01
No	02

16. If yes, can I see the minute's book?

17. Did you initiate any development project?

Yes	01
No	02

18. If yes, which development project did you initiate?

School	01
Clinic	02
KVIP	03
Borehole	04
Others(Specify)	05

18. How did you fund the projects?

Government	01
Community	02
NGO(Specify)	03
Assembly	04

19. What are the sources of funding for your activities?

Community Income Generating Activity	01
Common Fund	02
Philanthropists	03
Assembly	04
Others (Specify)	05

20. Do you manage any income generating activity?

Yes	01
No	02

21. If yes, which community income generating activity do you manage?

Borehole	01
KVIP	02
Cocoa Farm	03
Others(Specify)	04

22. How much do you realize from the income activities in a month in cedis?

10-29	01
30-39	02
40-49	03
50-59	04

### C. ACCOUNTABILITY

1. Do you run any bank account?

Yes	01
No	02

2. Which bank do you operate with?

GCB	01
Juaben Rural Bank	02
Asokore Rural Bank	03
Kumawuman Rural Bank	04
Others(Specify)	05

3. Who are the signatories to the account?

Chairman	01
----------	----

Secretary	02
Treasurer	03
Others (Specify)	04

4. List the books of accounts that you keep.


5. Do you account for your activities to the community and the Assembly?

Yes	01
No	02

6. By which means do you account to the people?

Community Christmas Meetings	01
Community Easter Harvest	02
Others(Specify)	03

5. Do you account for your activities to the community and the Assembly?

Yes	01
No	02

6. By which means do you account to the people?

Community Christmas Meetings	01
Community Easter Harvest	02
Others(Specify)	03

7. Is the accounts audited before presentation?

Yes	01
No	02

8. Who are the auditors?

Community auditors
Assembly
Others (Specify)

#### **D. PARTICIPATION**

1. Do you perform any assigned roles on behalf of the assembly as specified by L.I 1589?

Yes	01
No	02

2. If yes, specify the roles you play on behalf of the assembly.

i.
ii.
iii.
iv.

3. Do you involve the communities in your activities?

Yes	01
No	02

4. If yes, specify the ways and modes of involving the communities in your activities.

i.
ii.
iii.
iv.

5. What major challenges do you face in your work?

i.
ii.
iii.

6. Suggest ways and means of addressing these challenges

i.
ii.
iii.

**E. CAPACITY BUILDING AND MOTIVATION**

1. Did you attend any form of capacity training during your tenure?

Yes	01
No	02

2. If yes, which type of training did you attend?

Workshop	01
Training	02
In-service Training	03

Others (specify)	04
------------------	----

3. How did you find the capacity training?

Highly beneficial	01
Fairly beneficial	02
Fairly not beneficial	03
Highly not beneficial	04

4. Did you receive any form of remuneration during the period?

Yes	01
No	02

5. If yes, what was the duration of payment?

Weekly
Monthly
End of tenure
Others (Specify)

6. How much was the amount?

10-20
21-40
41-60
61-80
Others (Specify)

7. How do you want members to be motivated?

<b>i.</b>
<b>ii.</b>
<b>iii.</b>
<b>iv.</b>
<b>v.</b>

8. How would you rate the sub-structures based on the following indicators?

<b>Indicators</b>	<b>Very Good(01)</b>	<b>Good(02)</b>	<b>Poor(03)</b>	<b>Very Poor(04)</b>
Promotion of participation				
Accountability to the people				
Service delivery				
Office accommodation				
Office staff				

### **APPENDIX 1.C: PRIVATE SECTOR**

#### **DEPARTMENT OF PLANNING**

#### **KWAME NKRUMAH UNIVERSITY OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY- KUMASI**

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A. Profile of Respondents

1. Date.....
2. Name of Association.....
3. Town/Area Council/Assembly.....
4. Status of Respondent.....
4. Age

18-27	01
28-37	02
38-47	03
48-57	04
58-67	05



5. Sex

Male	01
Female	02

6. What is the highest educational level you attained?

Primary	01
Middle School/JHS	02
SHS	03
Post-Secondary Teacher/Nursing Training	04
Polytechnic	05
University	06
Others(Specify)	07

7. In which ways do you contribute to the activities of the Assembly?

Payment of taxes	01
Provision of goods and services	02
Others (specify)	03

8. Which benefits do you derive from the activities of the Assembly?

1.
2.
3.
4.

9. Is your association consulted in the fixing and revision of levies and rates by the assembly?

Yes	01
No	02

10. Are you aware the assembly awards contracts from to clients?

Yes	01
No	02

11. If yes, have you ever bid for a contract from the assembly?

Yes	01
No	02

12. If no, explain why.

1.
----

2.
3.

13. What are the major challenges facing your association?

1.
2.
3.
4.

14. Suggest areas of assistance you require from the assembly.

1.
2.
3.
4.

**APPENDIX 1. D: NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANISATIONS**

**DEPARTMENT OF PLANNING**

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**A. Profile of Respondents**

1. Date.....
2. Name of Organisation.....
3. Town/Area Council/Assembly.....
4. Status of Respondent.....

5. Age

18-27	01
28-37	02
38-47	03
48-57	04
58-67	05

6. Sex:

Male	01
Female	02

7. What is the highest educational level you attained?

Primary	01
Middle School/JHS	02
SHS	03
Post-Secondary Teacher/Nursing Training	04
Polytechnic	05
University	06
Others(Specify)	07

8. How long have your organization been working and supporting the Assembly?

1-5 years	01
6-10 years	02
11-15 years	03
16-20 years	04
Others(Specify)	06

9. Which programmes do you provide to the communities?

1.
2.
3.
4.

10. Which specific projects have you provided for the communities so far?

Project	Beneficiary Community
1	
2	
3	
4	
5	

11. Is the funding for the projects shared between the NGO, Assembly and the community?

Yes	01
No	02

12. If yes, what is the sharing formular for the funding of projects?

Institution	Percentage Share of Total Cost of Project
NGO	
Assembly	
Community	
Others (Specify)	

13. Which of the sub-district structures do you engage in your project planning?

Unit Committees	01
Town/Area Councils	02
Others(Specify)	03

14. Do you hand over the management of your projects after completion to the sub-structures?

Yes	01
No	02

15. If yes, what measures do you put in place to ensure accountability to you and the people?

1.
2.
3.

16. How would you assess the performance of these structures?

Very Poor	01
Poor	02
High	03
Very High	04

17. Which major challenges have you identified with the operations of these structures?

1.
2.

18. Suggest measures to improve the performance of the Sub- structures

1.
2.

**APPENDIX 2 : LIST OF TABLES**

**Table 1: Sex Distribution of EJMA Sub-Districts-2006-2010**

EJMA/SEDA Sub-Districts	Elected Assembly Members			Town/Area Councils			Unit Committees		
	Male	Female	Total	Male	Female	Total	Male	Female	Total
<b>EJMA</b>	37	5	<b>42</b>	—	—	—	—	—	—
<b>Ejisu TC</b>	—	—	—	25	5	<b>30</b>	58	13	<b>71</b>
<b>Juaben TC</b>	—	—	—	24	3	<b>27</b>	73	18	<b>91</b>
<b>Mponua AC</b>	—	—	—	18	2	<b>20</b>	48	5	<b>53</b>
<b>KwabereMponuaAC</b>	—	—	—	15	3	<b>18</b>	50	10	<b>60</b>
<b>Besease-Bonwire AC</b>	—	—	—	23	3	<b>26</b>	67	10	<b>77</b>
<b>Anum River AC</b>	—	—	—	25	3	<b>28</b>	29	12	<b>41</b>
<b>Hwere Anum AC</b>	—	—	—	18	2	<b>20</b>	135	24	<b>159</b>
<b>Bomfa-Adumasa AC</b>	—	—	—	15	2	<b>17</b>	40	13	<b>53</b>
<b>Onwe AC</b>	—	—	—	20	4	<b>24</b>	25	15	<b>40</b>
<b>Total (%)</b>	<b>37</b> <b>(88.09%)</b>	<b>5</b> <b>(11.91%)</b>	<b>42</b> <b>(100%)</b>	<b>183</b> <b>(87.14%)</b>	<b>27</b> <b>(12.86%)</b>	<b>210</b> <b>(100%)</b>	<b>525</b> <b>(81.40%)</b>	<b>120</b> <b>(18.60%)</b>	<b>645</b> <b>(100%)</b>

Source: Author's Field Survey, November, 2011

**Table 2: Sex Distribution of the SEDA Sub-Districts-2006-2010**

	Elected Assembly Members			Town/Area Councils			Unit Committees		
	Male	Female	Total	Male	Female	Total	Male	Female	Total
<b>SEDA</b>	19	3	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
<b>Effiduasi TC</b>	—	—	—	15	5	<b>20</b>	67	13	<b>80</b>
<b>Asokore TC</b>	—	—	—	14	7	<b>21</b>	22	8	<b>30</b>
<b>Akwamu AC</b>	—	—	—	16	4	<b>20</b>	24	6	<b>30</b>
<b>Senchi-Nyanfa AC</b>	—	—	—	15	4	<b>19</b>	30	10	<b>40</b>
<b>Seniagya-Mponua AC</b>	—	—	—	17	2	<b>19</b>	33	7	<b>40</b>
<b>Total (%)</b>	<b>19</b> <b>(86.36%)</b>	<b>3</b> <b>(13.64%)</b>	<b>22</b> <b>(100%)</b>	<b>77</b> <b>(79.38%)</b>	<b>22</b> <b>(20.62%)</b>	<b>99</b> <b>(100%)</b>	<b>176</b> <b>(80%)</b>	<b>44</b> <b>(20%)</b>	<b>220</b> <b>(100%)</b>