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Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/123456789/10606

Title: Remuneration committee and corporate failure
Authors: Appiah, Kingsley Opoku
Chizema, Amon
Keywords: Bankruptcy
Board of directors
Business failures
Issue Date: 2015
Publisher: Corporate Governance
Citation: Corporate Governance Vol. 15 No. 5 2015, pp. 623-640,
Abstract: Purpose – This study aims to examine the role the structure of corporate boards plays in the failure of the firm. Specifically, it examines whether the remuneration committee is related to corporate failure in the UK. Design/methodology/approach – The study uses 1,835 firm-year observations for 98 failed and 269 non-failed UK-listed non-financial firms between the periods of 1994 and 2011. This study used pooled cross-sectional, fixed and random effects LOGIT models to estimate whether corporate failure is related to remuneration committee in the UK. Findings – The findings indicate that corporate failure is negatively related to the independence of the remuneration committee chairman and remuneration committee’s effectiveness but not remuneration committee’s presence, size and meetings. However, a positive and significant relationship was observed between corporate failure and remuneration committee independence. Practical implications – The findings of the study provide support for the appropriateness of agency theory as analytical lens through which to study the efficacy of remuneration committee, especially the independence of the remuneration committee chairperson, as a board monitoring device, in the context of corporate failure. Originality/value – The paper adds to existing literature on corporate governance by establishing the likely causes of corporate failure in the UK.
Description: An article published by Corporate Governance Vol. 15 No. 5 2015, pp. 623-640
URI: http://hdl.handle.net/123456789/10606
Appears in Collections:College of Arts and Social Sciences

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