


**ELECTORAL VIOLENCE AND DEMOCRATIC CONSOLIDATION IN THE
FOURTH REPUBLIC OF GHANA, 1993-2016**

KNUST

BY

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REQUIREMENTS FOR THE AWARD OF THE MASTER OF PHILOSOPHY
(M.PHIL) DEGREE IN POLITICAL SCIENCE**

NOVEMBER, 2017

DECLARATION

I hereby declare that with the exception of quotations, which I have exhaustibly acknowledged, this research is a personal effort carried out under the supervision of Dr. Kwasi Amakye-Boateng. This thesis has not been submitted either in a whole or in part for a degree anywhere.

I therefore remain solely responsible for all shortcomings in the entire work.

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DEDICATION

To the glory of God, Christ Jesus, Amen

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


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ACRONYMS


AU	African Union
CADA	Centre for African Democratic Affairs
CCR	Centre for Conflict Research
CDD	Centre for Democratic Development
CODEO	Coalition of Domestic Election Observers
ECG	Electoral Commission of Ghana
EMB	Electoral Management Body
EPRDF	Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front
IFAD	International Fund for Agricultural Development
IPAC	Inter Party Advisory Committee
MMGJ	Macho Men for Good and Justice
MSE	Microsoft Excel
NCCE	National Commission for Civic Education
NDC	National Democratic Congress
NPP	New Patriotic Party
OAU	Organization of African Unity
RPA	Rwandese Patriotic Army
RPF	Rwandan Patriotic Front
RUF	Revolutionary United Front
SPSS	Statistical Program for Social Sciences
SSA	Sub-Saharan Africa
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
WFP	World Food Programme
WTO	World Tourism Organization

ABSTRACT

The study seeks to explain the growing development of electoral violence and democratic consolidation in the Fourth Republic of Ghana: 1993-2016. What are the motivating factors which generate electoral violence when the democratic process is expected to be consolidating in Ghana? What is the trend of electoral violence in a democratic process which demonstrates dynamics of stability and continuity? How does electoral violence militate against the ability of democratization in Ghana's Fourth Republic and what could be done to mitigate electoral violence in the countries democratic processes when the political elites appear to use this violence instrumentally to win political power?

The study used mixed methods (qualitative and quantitative) as a research design. The study collected data from multiple sources and SPSS (version 20) and MS Excel (2010) were used to analyze the responses collected.

The study therefore makes contribution to existing knowledge on democratic processes in Ghana by emphasizing the link between electoral violence and democratic consolidation.



CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background of the Study

Ghana is 'a beacon of hope' in Africa for its achievements in democracy from the time it embarked on multi-party elections in 1992. Despite this feat, it has come with positive and negative results including electoral violence. Electoral violence is beset with economic, political and socio-cultural effects on countries or states if not properly taken care of (Almami, 2010). The consequence of this include break in family ties, economic recession, loss of cultural identity and the potential to derail the whole democratization process. Elections are not expected to result in violence and conflict though it sometimes does. The ability to resolve this conflict in the contest is very crucial to the stability of democracies in transition (Almami, 2010).

Several years of trying various forms of models of governance structures in the country, Ghana went back to democratic politics in 1992. Ever since, the landscape of the country in terms of politics has witnessed two important developments. Firstly, military takeovers which characterised part of the country's history gave way to the Fourth Republic which has seen a relatively peaceful democratic continuity (Gyimah-Boadi, 2010). All these have become possible, and as a result, entrenched rules governing political exchanges (Bekoe, 2010). The political processes are primarily based on the principle of separation of powers which is overseen by structures for checking abuse of politics and other administrative processes.

In spite of the significant part elections play in democratic consolidation in the country, elections in Ghana are faced with internal violence that tend to erode the long lasting peace, stability and security achieved in the country. Though limited to a few or selected areas,

these violent acts have been part of almost all elections in the Fourth Republic. “They usually occur before, during and after elections, and are characterized by threats, intimidation, physical assault, vandalization of electoral materials, as well as the use of hate speeches and incendiary language. Election-related violence is routinely employed by the political class as an operational strategy or counter strategy to obtain electoral advantage” (Dapatem, 2013: 97).

Often, individuals or groups of party supporters pursuing diverging agenda resort to violence to promote a multiplicity of interests which may include material reward or political office (Gyimah-Boadi, 2009; Whitfield, 2009). There have been many cases in recent times where particular clients, mainly the youth, have threatened and actually used violence against their patron(s). The patron’s failure to perform their side of the bargain after the former had sacrificed time, resources, life and limb to ensure ascent by the patron to political power. The patrons control, distribution of state resources, provide the opportunity for groups to express other grievances, which may relate to such issues as land ownership, boundary demarcation or determination, and chieftaincy succession (CDD, 2016).

According to Adjei (2012), cases of politically motivated violence during elections in Ghana have been largely localized and confined. Yet the underlying factors that inspire electoral violence in Ghana and other African countries are not markedly different. They have often included challenges such as zero-sum patterns of political interaction, pervasive neo-patrimonial arrangements, and more importantly the failure of institutional mechanisms to cope with political dynamics (Adjei, 2012). Violence in Ghanaian politics are surface expressions of more profound structural difficulties pertaining to such issues as ethnocentrism, political polarization, exclusionary politics, multiple and competing centres of authority (traditional / modern), youth unemployment, and inadequate state

capacity. While formal and informal institutions, which are indispensable for managing these difficulties, continue to develop at a fairly steady pace, they still find it difficult to respond effectively to the challenges being encountered (Adolf, 2013).

In Ghana, the violent manner in which the various political (and economic) undercurrents are given expression, particularly by the political class and their supporters during election periods, for example through direct clashes between opposing local party supporters, burning and looting of property; seizure of ballot boxes by 'macho men' and unemployed youth constitute a formidable threat to the growth and consolidation of the country's fledgling democracy (CODEO, 2010). Often, these acts of violence combine to produce a tense, volatile and unpredictable electoral atmosphere that create an urgent sense of insecurity in the minds of many Ghanaians during elections periods. More importantly, these challenges expose critical frailties and inadequacies inherent in the Ghanaian body politics and call into question the viability of Ghana's democracy. Electoral violence, as it has been visible in the history of Ghana's Fourth Republic, unquestionably represents a potent force for deconsolidation within an otherwise dynamic context of democratic continuity and stability (Bekoe, 2010).

Ghana is a beacon of hope in Africa for her democratic achievements ever since it embarked on multi-party system in the Fourth Republic. However, beneath this achievement underlies electoral violence.

Competitive politics contributes to the increasing political violence in Ghana's Fourth Republic (Adarkwa, 2012). The Electoral Commission (EC) and the Ghana Police have identified 81 polling stations in the country as 'flashpoints leading to electoral violence'. Asowase, Asunafo South and Krachi Nchumuru constituencies are noted as among the leading flashpoints in the country.

Bombande (2010) is of the opinion that politically motivated violence may be one of the most disturbing problems societies are facing today. It may be found in almost all parts of the world, be it industrialized societies as well as the developing countries of Asia and Africa. However, there is a growing concern that democratic governance is the most important tool for achieving development, particularly in Africa of which election is not only integral and the most single source of political participation but also the primary source of legitimate power in all democracies (CDD, 2012). Yet, the Fourth Republic in particular has witnessed more political violence than hitherto known to Ghanaians. Violence has characterized Ghanaian politics (though this is not systematic and wide spread in relation to cases in Sudan, Nigeria, Somalia, Democratic Republic of Congo, Togo, Sierra Leone and recently Ivory Coast among others in Africa), after the introduction of multi-party politics predating to the colonial era. Lives have been lost and others have been maimed through political violence. The incidence of electoral violence tends to threaten the whole democratic project given that elections remain one of the primary means of democratic legitimacy.

Democracies in transition tend to progress through deepening and consolidation (Diamond, 1999), or stall around elections thus becoming essentially electoral, or reverse into authoritarianism (Bratton and Van de Walle 1997). What therefore can be said about the impact of the incidence of electoral violence on democracy in Ghana, for Ghanaians, its ability to consolidate is concerned?

1.2 Statement of the Research Problem

The reputation of Ghana over the years has been a stable, peaceful and a democratic state in West Africa. Underneath this recognized notion the world over, there have been many

localized conflicts centred on chieftaincy, land and especially issues with politics (SakyiAddo, 2010).

Like some African countries and elsewhere around the globe, Ghana is not an exception in terms of electoral violence. Politically motivated violence has characterized the Ghanaian electoral system since the inception of the Fourth Republic. Elections from 1992 to 2016 have witnessed some form of electoral violence. Comparing those elections to other Asian and African countries in terms of death, injuries, and destruction to property, Ghana is far ahead of them in the elections management and continues to receive commendations from democracy lovers all over the world. However, from 1992 to 2016, there have been pockets of electoral violence in various dimensions. The incidences of electoral violence are real as at least there have been issues of intimidations, injuries, loss of lives, and damage to property through electoral processes (CDD, 2016).

According to Aning (2009), most acts of electoral violence in the country are perpetrated through open confrontations, death threats, mob action, intimidation, molestations, abductions, lynching and murder. Properties worth millions of Ghanaian cedis owned by political parties and their supporters as well as government property got vandalized by disgruntled party supporters and elements of unscrupulous political opponents. The trend of the electoral violence is very complex as it manifests when least expected.

Even though, the 1996 elections witnessed an improvement over the 1992, there were issues with regards to credibility, legitimacy of the voters register, abuse of incumbency, unequal access to resources, lack of equal access to the media to enhance level playing field which were antecedents to electoral violence. The 2000 elections seemed to be more credible as compared to the 1996 elections in terms of transparency. However there were some incidences of violence. Areas such as Akwatia, Asawase, Tamale Central, and

Bawku among others are considered electoral flash points as they are normally characterized by politically motivated violence (CDD, 2016).

The literature on Ghanaian elections shows that the political elite rely on the youth groups to indulge in election related violence as a means to capture and retain power (Adarkwa et. al, 2010). In the Ashanti, Volta and Bono-Ahafo Regions, the phenomena looks pronounced and identified by the Electoral Commission (EC) and Ghana Police as regions among the highest cases of electoral violence in the country (CDD, 2016). The problem that every concerned Ghanaian will like to find solution to is the increasing cases of electoral violence in Ghana, as Ghana makes all effort to consolidate democracy. Regardless of the achievements made to consolidate democracy in the Fourth Republic of Ghana, there are forms of violence motivated by politics when conducting elections in some constituencies amidst tension that characterizes elections and democracy in Ghana. This study thus addresses the problem of electoral violence and democratic consolidation in the Fourth Republic of Ghana: 1993-2016.

1.3 Research Objectives

Flowing from the above discussions, it is argued in this study that there is a growing phenomenon of electoral violence in the Fourth Republic of Ghana. There is political volatility, pockets of violence and tension: before, during and after elections in Ghana (CODEO, 2010). The growing development threatens the efforts of Ghana to democratize.

Efforts shall therefore be made to respond to the following:

- i. Find out the motivating factors which generate electoral violence during elections in Ghana.
- ii. Assess the trend of electoral violence in Ghana's Fourth Republic.

- iii. Analyze how electoral violence militates against the ability of democratization in Ghana's Fourth Republic?
- iv. Outline possible solutions to the involvement in electoral violence during elections in Ghana.

1.4: Research Questions

The study is intended to find solutions to the following questions.

- i. What are the motivating factors which generate electoral violence when the democratic process is expected to be consolidating in Ghana?
- ii. What is the trend of electoral violence in a democratic process which demonstrates dynamics of stability and continuity?
- iii. How does electoral violence militate against the ability of democratization in Ghana's Fourth Republic?
- iv. What could be done to mitigate electoral violence in the country's democratic process when the political elites appear to use this violence instrumentally to win political power?

1.5 Significance of the Study

This study intends establishing ramifications surrounding electoral violence and democratic consolidation in the Fourth Republic of Ghana and that whether democratic politics is getting consolidated in the Ghanaian body politics or not.

Existing studies (Aning: 2009, CDD: 2012, Adarkwa & Gyimah-Boadi: 2010, BobMilliar: 2014) established the incidence of electoral violence resulting to issues of intimidations, injuries, loss of lives, damage to property, open confrontation, death threats, mob action, molestations, abductions, lynching and murder but did not fully addressed this crucial issue of establishing empirical ramifications of physical and psychological effects on the country.

The study potentially seeks to provide to the citizens of Ghana and other interestees factors which generate electoral violence. The trend it has taking in the Fourth Republic, how electoral violence militates against Ghana's ability of democratization in the Fourth Republic and finally what could be done to mitigate electoral violence in the country's democratic process when the political elites appear to use this violence instrumentally to win political power?

The research is relevant because it shall constitute a significant addition to existing literature on electoral violence and democratic consolidation in Ghana. The final relevance of the study is its ability to serve as springboard for further research on Ghana's democratic process in the light of its ability to consolidate.

1.6 Limitations and Delimitation

The major challenge was financial. Giving the nature of data collected from three constituencies in three different regions (Ashanti, Volta and Bono-Ahafo respectively). The research encountered additional challenge in the field of data collection. Some respondents failed in answering questionnaire and being interviewed. They were of the view that questionnaires were too much while some feared victimization through their responses. However, respondents were assured of confidentiality of the research work and its intended academic purposes.

Another challenge faced was in the area of questionnaire administration, retrieval and interview of respondents. Respondents were busy at work making it difficult to meet selected respondents for scheduled interviews. Despite these expected constraints, stringent attempts were put in place leading to better responses by scheduling an appropriate time with respondents to be interviewed, other respondents were encouraged to answer the questionnaires while others were sent via e-mails.

Furthermore, the study was challenged with absent of credible information's from respondents. Human beings are relative and may not give credible information's all the time. However, suitable question order was employed. Important variables (questions) were asked in several ways to minimized respondent's errors making the research findings more credible.

Finally, it was not possible to make generalization about the findings due to the size of the sample (150). However, the position of the researcher was made explicitly clear in addressing the challenge.

1.7 Methodology: An Overview


The research design was a mixed method (qualitative and quantitative). Secondary and primary data constituted the main source of information. With primary data questionnaires and interviews were the main instruments. Written materials such as articles, journals and books were used as secondary information.

The population and target group was all eligible stakeholders such as the Police, E.C Officials, Opinion Leaders, Political Activist, and Electorates who are eligible voters in the Asawase, Asunafo South and Krachi Nchumuru Constituencies in Ghana. The sample size was (150). The distribution of population was proportional and each electoral constituency had 50. A non-probability sampling method was used in choosing respondents of this study. In analyzing the response, SPSS (version 20) was used to encode and decode the responses and MS Excel (2010) was used for generating tables and charts (bar and pie charts)

1.8 Organization of Study

The study is structured into five chapters.

i. Chapter one considers the general introduction comprising background of the study, the statement of the problem, objectives of the study, research questions, rationale or significance of the study and limitation of the study. ii. Chapter two concentrates on the review of relevant literature. iii. Chapter three focuses on the methodology used in the study. iv. Chapter four analyses the empirical results of the estimated models in the study. V The final chapter summarizes the findings of the study, recommendations for policy considerations and conclusion.



CHAPTER TWO

LITERATURE REVIEW

2.0 Introduction

This chapter on electoral violence provides context for this study, in the effort of democratic consolidation in the Fourth Republic of Ghana. This is to tell whether there are motivating factors in the involvement in electoral violence when the democratic process is expected to be consolidating in Ghana.

The literature review is thus to examine the trend of electoral violence before, during and after elections in a democratic process which demonstrates dynamics of stability and continuity in Ghana. It further examines effects of electoral violence on democratic consolidation in Ghana.

The literature review is thus to examine possibilities that could be done to address the incidence of electoral violence in Ghana's democratic process when the political elites appear to use this violence instrumentally to win political power. A particular attention is paid to whether such a study has been done about the electoral violence and democratic consolidation in the Fourth Republic of Ghana: 1993-2016.

The review shall therefore cover the theoretical and conceptual underpinnings of the study and their application to politics in Africa in general and Ghana in particular. It has been treated and discussed under the following sub- themes:

- i. Democratization, elections and politically motivated violence.
- ii. Theoretical frameworks: electoral theory, electoral violence theory, institutional functionalism theory of electoral violence, the structural theory of electoral violence.
- iii. Causes of politically motivated violence and electoral violence in Ghana.
- iv. Effects of politically motivated violence and electoral violence in Ghana.

- v. Conceptual framework: causes and effects of electoral violence.
- vi. Democratic consolidation: conditions for ensuring democratic consolidation, consolidating democracy in Ghana.

2.1 Democratization, Elections and Politically Motivated Electoral Violence

The relationship between democratization, elections and electoral violence is a complex one. This complexity may not be all that surprising, however, given the prevailing assumption that democracy and peace are, ideally, mutually reinforcing, with elections serving as the connecting cord between them. Elections do not only allow for political competition, participation and legitimacy, but also permit peaceful change of power, thereby making it possible to assign accountability to those who govern. This is why it is often argued that ‘elections facilitate communication between the government and the governed, and also have symbolic purposes by giving voice to the public’ (Höglund, 2011: 29). As such, a democratic society is, expectedly, a non-violent and orderly society. This partly explains why elections have become part of the international peacebuilding strategy, which strongly links peace to democratic development (*ibid*). However, democratization, depending on its form and character, does have security implications that may serve to promote or retard violence. This is as a result of the capacity of democratization to impact seriously on the distributive and redistributive systems of the state, which elections instrumentalize (Omotola 2010). The challenges of the democratization process are, therefore, daunting at all stages, including the transitional contexts, the contents of the transition and the question of consolidation at the post-transition stage (*ibid*).

As a people-driven enterprise, democratization retains its meaning, essence, substance and relevance provided it accords the people, irrespective of ideological and or identity affiliations, adequate recognition in shaping and reshaping issues of governance of their

own affairs. The electoral process offers the widest and best avenue to do this, given the premium it places on popular participation. It then follows that the electoral process must be of high integrity, measured in terms of its degree of adherence to the electoral laws, openness, transparency, accountability, competition and participation. Any attempt to pervert the electoral process against these virtues may serve to engender electoral violence (Laakso 2012).

“As a concept, politically motivated violence basically has to do with ‘all forms of organized acts or threats thus physical, psychological, and structural aimed at intimidating, harming, blackmailing a political stakeholder before, during and after an election with a view to determining, delaying, or otherwise influencing an electoral process” (Albert, 2013: 56). The import of this is that politically motivated violence is multidimensional, having physical, psychological and structural dimensions. The physical elements include assassination of political opponents, arson, looting, shooting, kidnapping and hostage taking, forceful disruption of campaign rallies, armed raids on voting and collating centres, including snatching of ballot papers and boxes at gun point. The psychological dimension relates to official and unofficial actions that create fear in the people, which may be a product of physical violence. These include threats to opposition forces by security agents or through phone calls and text messages. The structural dimension of politically motivated violence seems much more pronounced, being a product of structural imbalance, including coercion of citizens by government to register or vote, unequal opportunities for political parties and candidates, abuse of power of incumbency, falsification of election results, as well as the politicisation of security and electoral officials (Nwolise, 2010).

It is also evident that politically motivated violence, like an election itself, is not restricted to Election Day alone. It can happen before, during and after the elections. Preelection

violence may include acts or threats against electoral stakeholders during voters' registration or electioneering campaigns. Election Day violence includes the snatching of ballot papers or boxes, assaults on opposition agents or parties, and harassment or intimidation by security agents. In the aftermath of an election, politically motivated violence may take the form of violent protests against electoral rigging, whether real or imagined, and of the state's deploying its apparatus of force in response to the protest, thereby further fueling the violence.

Politically motivated violence is a form, perhaps the most deadly form, of electoral fraud, which has been defined as 'clandestine efforts to shape election results' (Lehoucq, 2010). This can be perpetrated both by the incumbent power holder to avoid defeat and by opposition elements seeking to wrest political power from the governing party. In most cases, politically motivated violence is targeted at electoral stakeholders such as voters, candidates, party agents, election workers, media and monitors; electoral information such as registration data, vote results, ballots; campaign materials, for example, vehicles and public address systems; electoral facilities such as polling and counting stations; and electoral events, including campaign rallies (Höglund, 2011). Given the fact that electoral violence can be employed by both the ruling and opposition forces, coupled with the wide array of its likely targets as enunciated above, electoral violence no doubt constitutes a major source of democratic instability. Indeed, the argument in the literature is that electoral violence poses itself as a fundamental threat to the prospects of democratic consolidation. The literature failed to admit that competing for political power runs the risk of dividing society along class, ethnic and party lines that could destroy the path of democratization. The response to this challenge is that democracy can be said to be consolidated when it can avoid democratic breakdown and erosion by 'eliminating, neutralizing, or converting disloyal players' (Schedler, 2010:43), and moving a step further

towards completing and deepening democracy, measured by high ‘expectations of regime continuity’ (Schedler 2010: 44). These demand three core elements, namely the structural, behavioural and attitudinal foundations of democratization (Schedler, 2013).

2.2 Theoretical Framework

Polit, Tashakkori & Teddlie (2006) defines theory as “a set of interrelated constructs (variables) definitions and propositions that presents a systematic view of phenomena by specifying relations among variables with the purpose of explaining natural phenomena.”

Theory forms the bedrock of the activities of human beings. Theories are used by the social and physical sciences in finding the root of the causes and effects of human actions. It serves as the empirical explanation to the problems of humanity (Polit, Tashakkori and Teddlie, 2006).

This study has merged the Electoral theory and the Electoral Violence theory as theoretical framework. The theories provide understanding to the problem of why there exist pockets of violence in the electoral competition in Ghana’s elections under the fourth republic.

2.2.1 Electoral Theory

Elections are among one of the numerous means of selecting and disposing of leaders and old governments in a political system the world over. It is the heart of the democratic process. “Elections constitute the legitimate means of determining who should be elected to hold office as a legislature or executive in a democratic system of government in present day politics” (Lindberg, 2006:72). The election theory defines the modalities for the smooth organization of elections and sets the benchmark for measuring the performance of democratic elections. The main argument of the election theory is placed under fundamental assumption of democratic process. In the view of Debrah (2005) an election

is deemed democratic where there exists free and fair competition that enhances the respect for all contestants to compete on equal grounds.

The election theory posits that elections are the common denominator of democracy and should occur in democratic setting. This view of election theory places competitive elections not only at the centre of democratic governance but also as the cause of democracy Lindberg (2006). Elections are well organized in the democratic arena where there is the operation of the rule of law, the respect and promotion of the people's economic, social and political right and the freedom of the people Ninsin (2006). The literature on the electoral theory gives an in-depth meaning and understanding of how competitive democratic elections are to be organized. A clean conduct of electoral competition is important to the democratic process in that it enhances the achievement of self-government in which the masses can obtain accountability and responsiveness from their elected officials Lindberg (2006).

Within the context of electoral competition, the electoral theorists stress that competitive democratic elections should conform to the components of liberal democracy. This is manifested in the assumption that the executive power is constrained by other governmental agencies such as the existence of independent judiciary, the legislature and horizontal accountability. Electoral outcomes in the state are unknown and all groups that abide by the constitutional means are not denied that access to compete in the election. There exists the respect for ethnic, cultural and religious minority rights. Citizens are under one common law that safeguards their rights and liberties. The right to information is guaranteed and citizens have free access to information, the mass media is independent and draws its powers from the constitution of the state Dahl (2009).

In discussing the electoral theory in the context of competitive democratic arena, it is important to describe the component of competitive elections as argued by Hayward. That is elections involve the consent of the people (the governed) a period evaluations of the political leaders by the voters in the state using the electoral mechanisms in place (Hayward, 1987). The rudimental arguments of competitive electoral theory are rightly pointed out by Hayward (1987:79) as follows:

“All law-abiding adult citizens are entitled to vote; political organizations are free to put up candidates, debate their merits freely, and criticize opponents; political organizations campaign with the objective of winning; each voter cast one vote and is not hindered in expressing a choice (preferably in secret); votes are honestly counted and the results faithfully reported; the candidate, party or coalition with the most votes wins; the losing individual or party does not try to use force to alter the outcome or prevent the winner from taking office; and the party in power does not restrict political participation and competition which are within the parameters of existing rules”.

These norms are requirements for democratic elections that stipulate the utopian competitive democratic electoral system. In Africa and newly democratic states they are not fully achieved. The plank of the electoral theory argument talks about the conditions that must be in place for competitive democratic elections to be smoothly organized. The argument of this theory is that peaceful, free, fair, competitive and violent free elections can be organized only in the atmosphere of democracy. Among the fundamental features is that people with ethnic, cultural, religious and minority groups are included in the democratic process and their interest respected.

This is the reason why it is a common knowledge that for the smooth conduct of competitive elections in the state, some conditions must be in place including a liberalized

level playing field for all groups in the society to contest for power and to control and govern the whole population for the betterment of everyone, irrespective of race or ethnic origin, gender, creed or political belief.

While the proponents of the electoral theory advocate the respect for all political parties and candidates to compete for political office, the promotion of universal adult suffrage, secret ballot, credible counting of ballot with the winner being faithfully declared and the avoidance of the use of force to change the electoral outcome, there are elements of deviation in newly democratic states in Africa and for that matter Ghana. Although there exist elements of competition and participation in the electoral process, there still remain the use of force, violence and physical attacks on political opponents (Laasko, 2012). The electoral theory is appropriate to this study. The core premise of the theory stresses that for electoral competition to be violent free and for that matter free, fair and transparent, there must be in place democratic tenets such as the existence of the rule of law, the independence of the judiciary and the Electoral Commission and the tolerance of dissenting views among other things.

The theory is important to the study because it helps us know the criteria for the conduct of successful democratic election so as to consolidate it as well. It tells us the conditions that competitive democratic elections go through to produce political leaders. The critics of the theory argue that the numerous elections that are organized in Africa and some newly democracies do not conform to the electoral theory. They opine that these elections in newly democracies are characterized by violence, fraud, manipulation of results and physical attacks (Oquaye, 2006).

2.2.2 Electoral Violence Theory

Electoral violence occurs in democratizing states as a result of political violence. Among the scholars behind this theory are Bekoe, Fischer, Hoglund, Laasko, Sisk and Straus and Taylor Hoglund (2009). Electoral violence has not become the only tool used by politicians to gain political power, but it also connotes the manifestation of a political order of competition in democratizing states Mehler (2007). In addressing the issues under this theory, the definitions of electoral violence shall be investigated; the features of electoral violence and the causes of electoral violence shall be dealt with.

Fischer (2002:3) defines electoral violence as “any random or organized act or threat to intimidate, physically harm, blackmail or abuse a political stakeholder in seeking to determine, delay or to otherwise influence an electoral process.” The definition of electoral violence is broadened by Sisk as “acts or threat of coercion, intimidation, or physical harm perpetrated to affect an electoral process or that arises in the context of electoral competition. When perpetrated to affect an electoral process, violence may be employed to influence the process of elections- such as to delay, disrupt, or derail a poll- and to influence the outcomes: the determine of winners in competitive races for political office or to secure approval or disapproval of referendum questions (Sisk, 2008:48).” In an extensive study, Hoglund (2011) sees the term electoral violence in two-folds that is electoral violence is analyzed in the perspective of political struggle as a microcosm of political conflict. This is mostly associated with social conflicts that have lineage with communal lines. Whiles on the other hand electoral violence is viewed in the form of electoral malpractice and fraud that is used as “clandestine effort to shape election results.”

An insightful definition of electoral violence is given by Laasko. He defines electoral violence as “act motivated by an attempt to affect the results of the elections- either by manipulating the electoral procedures and participation or by contesting the legitimacy of the results. It might involve voters” and candidates” intimidation, killings attacks against their property, forceful displacement, unlawful detentions and rioting” (Laakso 2012:17). Straus and Taylor (2009) have classified electoral violence into the timing, motive of the players in the conflict and the action itself. A difference is drawn between the perpetrators of electoral violence; that is between the incumbent regime and the parties challenging the electoral results. The incumbent maintains power based on the recourse to force. A distinction is drawn between the time frame in which the violence occurs, whether the violence is incited pre-or post-election period. The pre-election violence is influence by the desire for parties to change voter preference in the elections. The post- election violence is used to alter the final electoral results. Finally the proponents behind this theory identifies four main level of electoral violence and these are; no incident of violence recorded, atrocious harassment, and this include the use of the police to “break rallies, party supporters fighting, street brawls and opposition newspaper being confiscated and limited short terms arrests of opponents” violent repression among these include “long-term high level arrests of party leaders, the consistent use of violence intimidation, limited use of murder and torture” Straus and Taylor (2009:39).

Interestingly, Hoglund (2011) debates the motives of the use of violence as yielding the profit of influencing the result in the electoral process. A dissatisfied group in the electoral process may resort to violence to register their grievances or to alter the results in their favour. On the other hand the grieved group may use violence and if violence fails, to achieve the needed results, the same means can be used to in a move to get in finality the desired goal of winning the election being met (*ibid*).

The theory is significant to the study in that, it presents the meaning of electoral violence from several scholastic perspectives. The mode that electoral violence takes in terms of its types is being discussed. The main reasons why political actors in a competitive election resort to violence is explained by the electoral violence theory. The theory best explains the phenomena of electoral violence in Africa and why competitive democratic elections degenerate into violence. The recourse during the pre and post elections times is as a result of the goal of parties competing for the elections to win (Biegon, 2012).

2.2.2.1 Institutional Functionalism Theory of Electoral Violence

The theory of institutional functionalism explains instability or delicateness of a country and the citizens' political participation. According to Swain (2011), political disorder is more likely to occur in societies marked by high levels of political participation but with slow or weak processes of political institutionalization. To him, institutional functionalism draws a direct correlation between fragile or weak states and the phenomenon of violence. Thus, violence is likely to erupt where the state fails to meet popular demands, leaving the masses in grinding poverty. For example, a weak or fragile state would definitely have the problem of non-functioning state institutions that is supposed to protect human beings and property. Hence, weak institutional functionalism has a direct correlation between weak state and the eruption of violence especially when such violence coincides with competitive multiparty elections. According to Nathan (2000) cited in Biegon (2012) in supporting Swain added that, where underdevelopment is coupled with inequality, violence may occur as expression of anger, frustration and fear. Such violence is more real if the state lacks institutions for addressing grievances, and even more apparent in periods of elections that offer the possibility of changing the status quo. Vallings and Moreno (2001) cited in Biegon (2012), have asserted that fragility can occur

when poverty or economic decline are combined with the presence of weak state institutions that cannot manage the very real grievances caused by, for example, inequitable distribution of resources or unequal access to formal institutions. Essentially, this means that in fragile states political institutions are not strong enough to manage effectively the natural conflicts that occur in society. This 'fragility' or weakness will be most evident at any time that the state undergoes processes of economic, political and social change. When president Obama visited Ghana in 2009, he stated that elections alone do not promote democracy but building of strong and independent institutions.

The institutional functionalism theory emphasizes that violence could be triggered when there is breakdown of institutions such as the judicial system, law enforcement agencies and electoral commission that are mandated to address grievances and concerns of the people. In Ghana, election disputed cases are normally reported to the Electoral Commission (EC), the police, or the judicial service for redress. For example, in the 2008 general elections, the disputed parliamentary election results in the Wa East, Sissala East and Lawra constituencies were brought before the High Court in Wa for settlement and the 2012 presidential election petition which ended in the Supreme Court for amicable settlement. In a situation where these institutions fail to discharge their duties as expected, it could engender violence among the aggrieved parties (Bekoe, 2010).

2.2.2.2 The Structural Theory of Electoral Violence

The structure theory of violence suggests that society and politics are organised in a manner that generates conflict and the causal factor of electoral violence is the political economy of the state. According to Biegon (2012), where the state is organised in such a way that significant elements of the population are excluded from meaningfully participating in and benefiting from the states' economic and political life, such segments are bound at some

point to resort to violence to reverse the effects of exclusion. In essence, such exclusion increases a state's level of fragility. This occurs in a state where there is discrimination and marginalization and manifestation of social stratification

(where 'the haves not' are more than 'the haves'). Such condition creates social forces to seek redress through violent means. Security advice led to the introduction of Youth Employment Program during President J. A. Kuffours administration which saw significant migration of Ghanaian youth into the working force. On the other hand, abysmal continuation of the program contributed to the exit of President J.D. Mahama on the advice of IMF and World Bank on halting of employment as a strategy to cut down government expenditure and also getting the economy going.

Additionally, electoral violence may be ignited by a disputed election but its root causes may lie in historical marginalisation and exclusion. Again, where there is multiparty competitive elections between the 'included' and the 'excluded', the stakes of winning such an elections are definitely raised to a point that violence is a real outcome in the event of disappointment for either group. Vallings and Moreno (2001) as cited in Biegon (2012) emphasized that, the stakes are even raised higher where it is assumed that the likelihood that resources will be channelled to a particular group is directly related to whether the politician who controls those resources is from that group. In such a situation, those in power will seek to retain it at all cost including by foul means. Conversely, if those outside power have long been excluded from mainstream state political power and economy, they will seek to attain it at all cost including violence. These situations normally arise when the electoral system is skewed towards the concept of winner takes all. Here the party that won the elections is constituted to form government, have control over the country's resources to rule the people while the defeated parties are left out of the governance system. This situation is what is happening in Ghana currently where the governance structure is

organized in a way such that the party that win the general election forms the government at the expense of other political parties that contested the election creating the situation of the winner takes all.

According to Sisk (2008), when parties are quite certain of loss or exclusion in an electoral contest, especially when they expect to be 'permanent minorities' (to lose not just once, but again and again), the certainty of outcomes is also a strong causal driver of violence.

When a strongly insecure party or faction expects to be systematically excluded from political power, they may well turn to violence to either prevent their exclusion or to prevent the election process.

The institutional functionalism and structural theories above may explain why electoral violence is common among least developed countries in Africa and Asia (Biegon, 2012).

Most African countries have weak political institutions with high unemployment and poverty level. In a majority of these countries, development of political institutions lags behind social and economic change. Sisk observes that a common cause of election violence is that the stakes of winning and losing valued political posts in many situations, and especially in conditions of high scarcity and underdevelopment is incredibly high. By implication, in a community or a state where a section of the people feel that they are marginalized and excluded from participating in decision-making process, they may easily resort to violence to press home their demands. Lack of access to socio-economic and political resources which could enhance peoples' participation can fuel electoral violence. This normally happens when marginalised groups perceived that, they are systematically and structurally excluded from the benefits of the state and there is no possibility of overcoming such phenomenon (Sisk, 2008).

2.3 Politically Motivated Violence

Politically motivated violence has been defined as “commission of violent acts motivated by a desire, conscious or unconscious, to obtain or maintain political power” (Moser & Clark, 2012:67). It is, therefore, the pursuit of political objectives, and not the end result of gaining or not gaining political power, that is at the core of the notion. Politically motivated violence takes place in the collective sphere where acts of violence are typically committed by an individual, a multitude of individuals from one group against individuals from another group.

Cairns (2015:11) defines political motivated violence as “those acts of an intergroup nature that are seen by those on both sides, or on one side, to constitute violent behaviour carried out in order to influence power relations between the two sets of participants.” Thus, when individuals or groups resort to violence to attain change of a political nature, one speaks of political violence.

The term political violence ranges from terrorist attacks, armed revolution, violent demonstrations or attacks by citizens aimed at less than the overthrow of their government to humanitarian intervention and intra-state wars (Coady, 2007). Friedrich Ebert Stiftung [FES] and Centre for Conflict Research [CCR] (2010) found that the most common acts of political and electoral violence include abduction and kidnapping, assault, violent disruption of political meetings and rallies, murder attempts, murder, hooliganism, torture, arson, death threats and threats to violence. Political violence typically takes the form of murder, assaults, sexual abuse such as rape, forced pregnancy or sterilization (Hansen, 2009). For Sisk (2008: 5) election-related violence involves “acts or threats of coercion, intimidation, or physical harm perpetrated to affect an electoral process or that arises in the context of electoral competition.” In effect, political violence is the exercise of such

force that is politically motivated and can be exercised by governmental or anti-governmental groups.

Politics, according to Sodaro (2011), is the process by which communities pursue collective goals and deal with their conflicts authoritatively by means of government. Politics is a process because it is a continuing sequence of events and interactions among various actors: individuals, organizations and governments. The concept of process also implies that these political interactions generally take place within a structure of rules, procedures and institutions. Politics is about how people organize their communities for the purpose of collectively tackling the problems they face. In the best of the circumstances, the members of a community are able to define and accomplish their goals on the basis of cooperation. But few communities are so fortunate as to be without conflict. However, even if there is a wide consensus on what the community's goals should be, conflicts frequently arise over how to go about achieving them. Indeed, many political observers would assert that conflict is the driving force of politics. At times these conflicts are fairly mild and can be dealt with in a peaceful manner through negotiation, bargaining and compromise. But under less propitious circumstances political conflict may turn violent, exploding into bloody demonstrations, terrorism or outright warfare (Sodaro, 2001).

Afari-Gyan (1991: 15) defines politics as “activities ranging from persuasion to force, which the parties to a political situation may undertake in the desire to get their preferred course of action to prevail”. Embodied in the definition is the capturing of power to make public decisions and to use that power to order the common affairs of the group. Politics is concerned with the seizure, consolidation or the redistribution of power to decide who gets what, when and how. If violence is resorted to in this perpetual struggle for power, it is labeled as politically motivated violence.

2.4 Causes of Politically Motivated Violence and Electoral Violence

In the words of Lawal (2010) absence of good governance, low political culture, hunger, marginalization, incapacitation, intolerance, domination, apathy and cynicism as contributory factors to political motivated violence in Ghana. Esey (2010: 232) list these as causation reasons:

“Domination and marginalization of sections and groups and persons in the acquisition and sharing of political positions; rigging of elections and manipulation of political process in favour or against certain groups, sections and persons; and falling apart of sponsors and those sponsored over contracts, appointments or methods of management of states”.

For the purpose of this study, economic and land rights marginalization, sociodemographic factors, ethnic marginalization, desire to amass power and wealth, lack of trust in governance and inciting comments which contribute to political violence are discussed. In actual sense these reasons are influenced by stakeholders in politics.

2.4.1 Economic and Land Rights Marginalization

Stakeholders in politics exploit feelings of economic discrimination or the domination of one ethnic group by another. Boone (2009) argued that violence in Côte d'Ivoire over economic crises, nationalism and confused privileges between indigenes and foreigners in the southern and south western parts of the nation were used by politicians who entrenched the fears of the local people. As a result, foreigners were harassed to leave their lands and homes.

Ayai (2009) found that the way whereby bad policies in the economy could lead to recurrence of violence is enormous. Among them are greed, concerns and unhappiness and a breakdown of the bond that binds voters and politicians. According to Ayai, when these

situations are related and other moves become less appealing to a disadvantaged part, rejuvenated skirmishes look the only option and the danger of it goes up. Ayai (2009) also stated that poor quality of life and stumbling blocks to political involvement could aid predict which countries are likely to experience violence alongside those who would not. “In some societies, such as Uganda and Burundi, public employment is a great way to go. In such cases, this type of discrimination could fuel resentment and transfer resource interference when the government seems involved. In one example, Ivory Coast has become unstable when President Felix Houphouët-Boigny has allocated public spending across the country on the basis of political loyalty. A similar situation occurred in northern Uganda, an area of force of opposition was deprived of public spending, which threatened the social contract between the people and its government” (Ayai, 2009).

In addition, Collier and Hoeffler (2004) noted that poor economic development goes with unhappiness and nations with good economic improvements have fewer tendencies toward conflict. Their study indicates that the state of being poor is a contributing factor to violence and political instability.

Fearon and Laitin (2003) revealed that an underperforming economy that does not improve the well being of its citizenry increases the possibility of conflict. They emphasized, however, that disrespect for people and repression leads to high risk of violence.

Newbury (2008) found two reasons or factors that led to violence in Rwanda in 1994. The first is the dramatic decline in coffee prices in the world market – Rwanda’s chief export – that worsened the economy and the number of unemployed workers increased. Secondly was the large number of unemployed young people in both modern and traditional sectors. In the modern sector, opportunities for education and employment are limited. Even in the traditional sector, the scarcity of land and lack of money makes it difficult for young people

to establish that farmers land. Newbury concluded that with nothing to do and no hope for the future, young Tutsi from Rwanda Patriotic joined the army (RPA) in Uganda while young Hutus joined the rebels.

Moreover, Fox and Hoelscher (2010) found that the state of being poor leads to other avenues for people to create the items or provisions they need. They, however, concluded that in theory, the ideals between inequalities, state of being poor and economic opportunity and the probability for people to engage in violence is positively related.

2.4.2 Socio-Demographic Factors

Population, age structure, urbanization and ethnic diversity influence political violence. Goldstone (2009) observed that the continuous reoccurrence of violence is always linked with youth bulges thus those between 18-24 years of age compared to those who are much older. Ostby and Urdal (2010) also discovered that the youth are more prone to violence. Other researchers like Elbadawi and Sambanis (2000) and Neumayer (2003) have posited that the vibrant youth are the main architects when it comes to violence. Moreover, Cinotta, Engleman & Anastasion (2003) and Goldstone (2009) have observed that sizeable youth companions may lead to violence when access to jobs and better education are missing or cannot be found.

2.4.3 Ethnic Marginalization

The ordeal of disputed elections reduces belief or reliability among people in a state or nation. Globally experience shows that in an event where tribes are careful and shows signs of fear of being victims, this notion may cause them to resort to violence beforehand, in a preventive measure to reduce harm (Bardhan, 2007).

Hoglund (2009) found that in countries where ethnicity is highly politicized, where ethnic identities are politicized, winning elections is very tough, particularly for parties based on

ethnic or tribal lines. This is especially exciting when the main ethnic based party is sure it might lose to the other party. He said that violence related to elections could be dangerous in new countries embracing democracy.

Once again, Nzongola-Ntalaja (2004) pointed out that the refusal of full citizenship some individuals on the continent has led to violence. A good example is the disqualification of former president of Zambia President Kaunda and Alassane Ouattara of Cote d'Ivoire in 1996 and 2000. With Kaunda he was told his parents were not Zambians but rather came from Malawi and that did not make him eligible to be voted for in Zambia though he had been president for almost three decades. If Ouattara, he was disqualified using a diplomatic passport from Burkina Faso and, in addition to his mother, who came from Burkina Faso. He was also the Prime Minister of Ivory Coast from 1990-1993.

The remote cause of the Ivorian civil war in 2002 for example, was at the instance of the strategies adopted by Konan Bedie and General Robert Guei to deny Ouattara and others from contesting the 1995 and 2000 presidential elections. As an example, Guei got the Supreme Court to disqualify candidates whose both parents were not Ivorians and had never held another country's nationality. This barred Ouattara from contesting the 2000 election after the court declared that his mother came from Burkina Faso. These politically motivated acts of exclusion led to violent repercussions and divided the nation along ethnic lines (Nzongola-Ntalaja, 2004).

Nzongola-Ntalaja (2004), again, noted that the denial of full citizenship rights to minority Tutsi in Rwanda and the denial of those in exile to return to Rwanda triggered the 1994 deliberate killing of innocent people belonging to a particular race, tribe or political group. On April 6, 1994, the jet escorting Presidents Juvenal Habyarimana of

Rwanda and Cyprien Ntaryamira of Burundi (all Hutus), got hit by surface-to-air missiles. Everyone aboard died. It was alleged that the Tutsi rebel group, the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), ordered the missile attack.

2.4.4 Desire to Amass Power and Wealth

According to Lawal (2010) Sit-tight Syndrome, thus where an individual holds power for his or her own selfish interest contributes to political violence. In the quest to cling on to power an atmosphere of fear and panic is created. Machomen and hooligans are used to perpetuate these heinous acts.

Ivory Coast, Kenya, Zimbabwe, Togo, Egypt and Libya among other countries, the incumbents used undemocratic means to perpetuate themselves on power. In Kenya for example, the ruling party till December 2007 tried to intimidate other political opponents by recruiting and sponsoring violent acts in the country, these have been used in other parts of the African continent (Esew, 2010).

Lawal (2010) observed that politics is seen as a means to an end in Nigeria. This is because huge sums of monies are pumped into campaigns and the quest to win power at all cost. Subsequently, violence through employing hooligans and thugs are used to intimidate other opponents.

Teshome (2009) found that the defeat of the incumbent president in Ethiopia and the government's attempt to turn or change results lead to post election violence in that country in 2005. The incumbent had control of the army and police and in Africa these forces to an extent is politicized and tribalized in favour of the ruling party. "The perpetrators of the electoral violence (who usually are members of the ruling party) get away with it and the opposition party members and supporters who are the victims of the violence end up in jail as the case of Ethiopia in the 2005 elections" (Teshome, 2009:

195).

According to Gyimah-Boadi (2009), “elections are by their very nature full of uncertainties. He observed that election-related violence could be ignited when there is high uncertainty about the result of the election, particularly when the margins of electoral victory are very close”. Sisk (2008: 11) noted “the allegation of fraud would lead to frustrations and violent clashes would erupt.” During such time, the party in power can try to hold on to its presidency by engaging in violence.

2.4.5 Inciting Comments

According to Dolan (2010: 2) incitement is defined as “broadcasting that incites imminent violence, ethnic or religious hatred, civil disorder or rioting among the people and carries clear and immediate risk of causing such incitement.”

Benesch (2008) postulated that the incitement works through the exercise of influence and influence is a function of the processes of time. Benesch noted that incitement seems to play a critical role in which designated victims live among the majority, so that mass murder can not take place without the participation or at least the tacit acceptance of many members of the majority.

Jean Kambanda, Prime Minister, during the months of the Rwandan genocide confessed to her trial four years later when she pleaded guilty to genocide that had appeared on the RTLMC radio station on June 21, 1994 to encourage the station to continue to to incite the massacres of the Tutsian civilian population. The judges of the trial process urged prefects and mayors to commit massacres and killings of civilians and visited several prefectures to incite and encourage the population to commit these massacres, including greetings to those committed crimes (African Organizational Unit [OAU] 1998). The causes of electoral violence could be classified into two; namely the process and structural factors. The process as the name denotes means the violence that occurs during the electoral cycle.

The process or internal factors could also be called the triggers of electoral violence because they go into the very nature of the entire electoral processes. Therefore, if the electoral processes or internal factors are not professionally handled, they could lead to the eruption of electoral violence since elections are by their very nature competitive of ideology and struggle for political post. Iff (2010: 29), identified process factors that trigger electoral violence to include: inefficient conflict resolution methods, distrust in election bodies problems bordering on technicalities which might give advantage to one party.

The critical roles played by elections management bodies in ensuring credible elections cannot be over emphasized. If the stakeholders in the electoral processes do not understand the work of the EMB, they tend to hold wrong suspicions against them (Bombamde, 2010).

2.5 Electoral Violence

Many Ghanaians in recent years have expressed doubts about peace before, during and after the presidential and legislative elections of December 2012. The guarantees of government officials and leaders of political parties on their commitment to peaceful elections have fallen into serious and legitimate doubts when people who work for these leaders involved in the violence both verbal and physical without being rebuked by the same leaders who seem to be the ultimate beneficiaries of such acts. Electoral violence, however small, has been denounced in almost all elections in Ghana since 1992 (Debrah, 2014). In the biometric election registration exercise recently completed before the 2016 election, cases of violent acts were reported in various parts of the country. Some have tried to suggest that such violent acts are not widespread and therefore the people of Ghana should be commended for the relatively peaceful behavior of the register. Even though

Ghanaians could be congratulated for this, it is however worrying that a simple biometric registration could lead to violence when there are clear procedures to follow.

Voter registration unlike elections is held in more than one day and Ghanaians could not solve the recording problems with all the time allotted for the exercise, so that the differences and the arguments would change. What then is the guarantee that the electoral arguments will be resolved amicably to avoid violence during the day of the elections?

Ghanaians have to be even more concerned about electoral violence when political parties begin to establish the Heroic Fund, waiting to deal with members who may face electoral violence (Debrah, 2014). Given Ghana's democratic credentials, electoral violence in any form and scale is unacceptable and Ghanaians must work to reach free elections.

Onsarigo (2010:32) posits that “any act or series of act that result or are likely to result in harm, whether physical or psychological, to an individual or group of people for the purpose of influencing electoral choice and outcomes” is considered electoral violence. The history of electoral competition in Africa is many sided; there are issues of periodic electoral fraud that are characterized by fierce violence. At some point in time, cruel means such as the arrest and detention of opposition members and some members in government who disagree with the government is done so as to enable the government achieve its desired goal of forcibly capturing power (Onsarigo, 2010).

Laakso (2012:75) on the other hand strongly supported the above definition and added more. Electoral violence by definition is “an activity motivated by an attempt to effect the results of the elections- either by manipulating the electoral procedures and participation or by contesting the legitimacy of the results. It might involve voters’ intimidation, demonstrations, killings, destruction of properties, detentions among others.” The period in which the these occurs is of grave concern to Laakso (2012). The use of intimidation, victimization and threat is often common.

The causes of electoral violence are numerous and can be divided into two major categories: firstly, structural factors linked to underlying power structures prevalent in new emerging democracies such as informal patronage systems, bad governance, exclusion and socioeconomic uncertainties of losing political power in states where almost all powers are concentrated in the center; secondly, factors related to the electoral process and the electoral competition itself, such as failed or defective elections, electoral fraud and weak or manipulated institutions, and institutional rules governing the electoral process.

2.5.1 Use of “Machomen” (strongly built men)

Machomen live in the imaginary world of Ghanaians (Debrah, 2014) In Ghana, the machomen term man is used to describe any man who enjoys exercise and workouts, but those who are actually involved in electoral violence and intimidation are poor young men from Zongo communities and ethnic groups in disadvantaged North. Men from economically depressed areas often build bodies to find work as security guards. The use of macho men by politicians has become an emerging development in Ghana's electoral system. They are used as bodyguards for politicians and are most in the fore front violence and intimidation of others.

From the 2012 elections, a group of bodybuilders tried to change their image from political warriors to the concerned citizens (Daily Guide, 2012). Some have tried to recruit machomen for good but the notion and perception allotted to machomen does not sit well with Ghanaians as they are known to be prone to violence.

2.5.2 Weak State Institutions and Political Influence

The electoral commission and the Ghana police service have ensured the establishment of peace in the country during elections period. However when such institutions are not properly resourced their activities and actions could spell doom for the country. The recent

2016 general election in the country saw the NPP launching operation protect ballot and subsequently dispatching party faithful to various polling stations to follow suit. The weak nature of the Electoral Commission and the fear of political influence ahead of December 7, 2016 general election motivated stakeholders as political parties and media establishing their own election command centres collating and declaring provisional results ahead of E.C which were not different from E.Cs certified results in the final round.

2.5.3 Ignorance about the Ghanaian Electoral Process

“Having conducted seven consecutive elections successfully in Ghana since 1992 it is tempting to presume that Ghanaians understand the electoral process adequately, but this is not the case. Many Ghanaians today believe that the Electoral Commission is capable of altering or changing election results that have been declared at the constituency level and copies obtained by agents of all candidates or political parties. If people know that with the current Ghanaian electoral system, no one can change results declared at constituencies they will not readily take up cutlasses, stones and sticks and march to the offices of the Electoral Commission simply because of a mere allegation that elections results from certain constituencies were being changed without asking relevant questions, as it happened in 2008. We should not take the people's ignorance of the electoral process for granted due to its inherent potential to create violence (GyimahBoadi, 2010).

2.5.4 Deliberate Acts of Violence by Political Party Actors and Disregard for Rules and Regulations

“Even though ignorance of the electoral process is a threat to our peace, it is also the case that some acts of election violence are perpetrated by people who are knowledgeable about the electoral process and its rules and regulations (Frempong, 2013). In the just ended biometric voters' registration prior to election 2016, some politicians publicly declared that they would physically prevent applicants they deemed ineligible to register and would not

abide by the regulations and procedures outlined by the Electoral Commission to deal with such cases (ibid). The Centre for African Democratic Affairs strongly condemns this blatant dishonest and hypocritical behaviour of our political actors which is gradually becoming a sub culture in Ghanaian politics”.

2.5.5 Media Reportage

“Electoral victory and defeat have become emotional as candidates invest a lot of resources to prosecute their campaigns. If the electoral atmosphere is so emotionally charged, people tend to lose their logical reasoning and believe and act on any sensational reportage by the media. The only possible reason why anyone will engage in sensational media reporting is the monetary or political benefit but if violence can destroy economic gains made as individuals and as a nation, what is the worth? The media in Ghana must exhibit a very high sense of professionalism and responsibility in order to make a meaningful contribution to the sustenance of our democracy”. An arguable fowl committed by the media in the recent 2016 general election is the establishment of Election Command Centres, the dispatch of personnel, collation and declaration of provisional results ahead of E.C, and granting media coverage to the government election command monitoring centre led by Koku Anyidoho and the President Mahamah and the comfortable lead statement made as against NPPs led Sammy Awukus press conference and the statement their flag bearer Nana Addo is leading by 53.74 and that the party will not accept any figure otherwise from the E.C. creating fear, panic and tension in the country must be discouraged and not entertained.

2.5.6 “Winner Takes All Attitudes and the Polarized Nature of the Society”

“Every political party in Ghana claims that its ultimate goal for seeking political power is to improve the lives of Ghanaians. It is instructive to note that no single party claims to

seek power to improve the living conditions of its members alone. Since all political parties seek to promote national and not parochial interest, one would expect that after elections all national resources, including human would be harnessed to achieve this national goal but what we have experienced here in Ghana over the years is the direct opposite”. Once a party assumes the reigns of governance, political appointments become exclusive to its members, officials appointed to state owned institutions by the previous government are changed regardless of performance, public facilities like public places of convenience are forcibly ceased by its members, party functionalist become contractors overnight and begin to win and execute government projects, some state institutions engage in selective application of the law for the benefit of party in power etc. :”Because of elections, Ghanaians are no longer one people with one destiny but rather 'we in power' and 'those in opposition'. Owing to these tendencies, elections which are supposed to be a contest of ideas have become contest for national resources and all means, including violence are employed to win political power irrespective of the consequences. The earlier we changed this winner takes all attitude and approach governance in a more nationalistic way the better it will be for our peace and democratic development”.

2.6 Effects of Politically Motivated Violence in Ghana

“Electoral violence, particularly in Africa, has received much attention in academic as well as media circles. Political violence jeopardises political stability, democratic reform, prospects of economic development, and creates human suffering and in some cases degenerates into civil war” (Fearon & Laitin, 2013).

The effects of electoral violence discussed are undermining election results, substitution and spill over effects, underdevelopment, human rights violations and trauma on people.

2.6.1 Undermining Election Results

Teshome (2009) observed that threats of skirmishes or fights affect the results of partisan politics. He further posited that a politician's campaign by putting fear in people by threatening violence should they lose elections. Also, Teshome stated that in 1997 presidential elections in Liberia, voters were coerced to choose for a particular candidate.

He indicated that Ethiopia was not different in this case in favour of the ruling Ethiopian Peoples' Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF).

Hoglund (2009) postulated that political violence can undermine elections. As an example, Laurent Gbagbo of Ivory Coast cited political violence and postponed presidential elections six times between 2005 and 2010. When domestic and international observers judge that an election has been marred by violence, the legitimacy of the results is jeopardised, as is the legitimacy of the elected officials

(Biegon, 2012).

2.6.2 Spillover Effects and Substitution

Neumayer (2003) found that there has been spill over effects and substitution effects as a result of political violence. On the spill over effect, Teshome (2009) observed that over fourty thousand individuals fled to other countries sharing borders with Togo.

According to World Food Programme [WFP] (2011) an estimated number of 1.06 million Libyans were expected to cross borders into Egypt and Tunisia as a result of the major protest that engulfed the country in February 2011. In the first week of March 2011, over 110,000 Libyans crossed into Tunisia alone. In addition, WFP launched a massive aid emergency operation to provide food assistance for estimated 1.06 million Libyans over a three-month period. This clearly shows that political violence in a country affects other countries and institutions.

2.6.3 Underdevelopment

Bodea and Elbadawi (2006) have found that organized political violence, especially civil war, greatly reduces long-term economic growth. Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) has been disproportionately affected by civil wars, which represent a substantial part of its economic decline, including widening the income gap over East Asia. Civil wars were also very expensive for the SSA. In the case of Sudan, a typical large African country experiencing a long-lasting conflict, the cost of the war was \$ 46 billion, which was about double the balance of foreign debt (Bodea and Elbadawi 2006). Neumayer (2003) noted that political violence is considered to be an essential ingredient of a broader notion of political instability. Clearly, when a government is overthrown by violence, the lives are lost and the properties are destroyed.

Neumayer (2003) stated that violence events could have an impact on tourism. The World Tourism Organization [WTO] (2002) revealed that revenue generated by tourism of \$ 476 billion in 2002 and growth rates exceeded 5 percent each year. For example, Ghana earned 1.8 billion dollars from the 950,000 tourists who visited the country in 2010 (Awuku, 2011). In addition, Levantis and Gani (2000) found that developing country regions, where tourism is growing faster, have much to gain from providing highly qualified tourist services and skilled labor services that could provide a higher income stream constant than volatile income from extracting natural resources. The political violence that hit Egypt on January 25, 2011, according to Reuters (2011), cost the country about US\$310 million a day. The violence ended on February 11, 2011 when the former president Hosni Mubarak resigned.

2.6.4 Human Rights Violations

Teshome (2009) said that the 2007 election in Kenya is the most bloody in Kenya's history, which provoked ethnic conflicts mainly fired between Kikuyu and Luo. He added that

post-election violence in Ethiopia in 2005 led to the deaths of 193 demonstrators and the imprisonment of more than 40,000 people. In addition, Gloor (2005) noted that in the 1999 elections in Mozambique, more than 100 people were killed when supporters of RENAMO, Afonso Dhlakama, protested against the winner of the election, Joaquim Chissano, leader of FRELIMO.

The controversy over the presidential defeat of 28 November 2010 in Côte d'Ivoire has also led to human rights violations. The United Nations personnel in Côte d'Ivoire found 536 bodies in the West of the country from the end of March 2011 until April 12, 2011. Staff said at least 400 people died in Abidjan city before Gbagbo captured on April 12 2011. Crimes committed as the bombing of a market in Abobo district and the murders of women protesting peacefully, as well as numerous murders and abductions, are equivalent to crimes against humanity (Reuters 2011).

Again, the United Nations (2010) said it received hundreds of reports of people being shot by their armed men in their military nightclubs and that there was no growing evidence of massive human rights violations after the war, Election contested in Côte d'Ivoire in 2010 In addition, in March 2011, there was a shaky record showing two men who were burned alive by a crowd in Côte d'Ivoire. The incident took place in the Yopougon district of Abidjan, the main commercial city of Côte d'Ivoire (Observers, 2008).

In the Sierra Leonean civil war between 1991 and 1999, children up to seven years old were kidnapped in the Revolutionary United Front (RUF), armed, trained to kill, dizzily cocaine, and incited to attack villages all of Sierra Leone. These incursions were directed against civilians, especially women and children. His mark was coarse amputations: feet, hands, ears, lips and nose. The war has claimed more than 75,000 lives, causing more than

500,000 Sierra Leoneans to become refugees and moved more than half of the country to 4.5 million people during that time (Teshome, 2009).

2.6.5 Trauma on Citizenry

“The trauma associated with the political conflict is mainly due to the destruction of the individual, social and political structures of a society” (Hamber, 2010). Hamber underlined that in an “authoritarian regime, where violence is common, they develop and control a number of rigid processes and structures”. According to Hamber, these can be manifested in various other forms, such as political opinions preaching the violence or exclusion of others, interpersonal aggression, demonization of others perceived, discrimination, intolerance of others' opinions, forms non-democratic social control, along with psychological harassment at work or elsewhere. “In addition to inflicting psychological and physical damage, political violence often seeks to undermine social relations between individuals, as well as between individuals and society in general. In

Chile, for example, it was argued that political violence during the dictatorship of Augusto Pinochet (1973-1990) undermined people's sense of belonging to society” (Hamber, 2010).

Simpson and Rauch (2011) noted that the culture of perpetuated violence from the Apartheid system quickly extended to all aspects of the social and civic arena of South African society following forced racial segregation. When violence penetrates into daily life, there is always the possibility that, as a society emerging from the conflict, there are residual violence.

2.7 Conceptual Framework

ELECTORAL VIOLENCE




Figure 2.1: Causes and Effects of Electoral Violence.

Source: Researcher's construct 2017.

From Figure 2.1, the framework explains how the desire to have power at all cost, inspire some politicians to reverse poll results by force or to rig elections as it happened in Ivory Coast's presidential run-off held on November 28, 2010 a development that triggered violence between the forces loyal to the then incumbent Laurent Gbagbo and the opposition leader Alassane Ouattara.

From the figure, other compelling factors that cause electoral violence are inciting comments by politicians and ethnicity which by far has been a great challenge in Ghanaian politics. While the former has the tendency to lead to agitations, misunderstandings and clashes, the latter may lead to polarization of the country. All this has the tendency of sparking violence.

Figure 2.1 show that, the causes of electoral violence undermine election results, violate human rights, adversely affect development, culminate in substitution and Spillover effects, and degenerate into civil war with their attending problems on the national economy leading to general insecurity. Electorate sometimes vote for the candidates through intimidation, as found by Teshome (2009) in the case of Charles Taylor in Liberia. Also, some voters may decide to stay away from polls and stakeholders in politics employ violence as a way to halt elections. All this undermine election results and negatively affect democratic consolidation. Again, electoral violence, many people lose their lives or get injured and most times leads to the destruction of properties. Electoral violence causes the nation in question and other regional bodies to incur cost in keeping security personnel to maintain peace and order at the affected areas at the expense of development.

In addition, countries and regions that experience electoral violence lose foreign investors and tourists. In contrast, safe countries attract foreign investments and revenue through the tourists for developments. Besides, the safe countries receive refugees from the violent countries.

Furthermore, the safe countries experience increase in prices of some goods as supplies disrupt in the violent regions. At worst, the incidence in a state affects others as it occurred Egypt and Libya among others as a result of the successful political protest that hit Tunisia on December 18, 2010 and in Ghana as a result of political violence in Ivory Coast, Liberia

and Togo (Atuobi, 2012). This explains the substitution and spillover effects in the figure. All this culminates in general to un-consolidation of democracy as the figure shows.

2.8 Democratic consolidation

“Democratic consolidation may have been a nebulous concept since its very inception. The conceptual fog that veils the term has only become thicker and thicker the more it has spread through the academic as well as the political world. Democratic consolidation depends on where we stand (our empirical viewpoints) and where we aim to reach (our normative horizons). Democratic consolidation varies according to the contexts and the goals we have in mind (Schedler 1998: 91-107). Democratic consolidation is the process by which a newly established democratic regime becomes sufficiently durable that a return to nondemocratic rule is no longer likely (Mark J. et al. 1980).

2.9 Conditions for ensuring Democratic Consolidation

Schedler (1998:77) argues that five interconnected and mutually reinforcing conditions must be present, or be crafted, in order for a democracy to be consolidated. First, the conditions must exist for the development of a free and lively civil society. Second, there must be a relatively autonomous political society. Third, throughout the territory of the state all major political actors, especially the government and the state apparatus, must be effectively subjected to a rule of law that protects individual freedoms and associational life. Fourth, there must be a state bureaucracy that is usable by the new democratic government. Fifth, there must be an institutionalized economic society.

2.10 Consolidating Democracy in Ghana

Lane (2011:65) opines that “political development in any society relates to the ability of such a society to acquire a political system that initiates new patterns of integration and

penetration that in turn regulate the tensions and conflicts produced by increased differentiation”.

While the elections are crucial for the consolidation of democracy, its potential contribution to stabilization, in turn, depends on a number of complementary factors that provide the framework for the orderly interaction between competing operators in the political process. Among them, the degree of institutionalization of the political system and, more specifically, the ability of state institutions to achieve compliance with rules and procedures to guarantee and maintain political power (ibid).

Because the elections usually involve actors with different interests and, most importantly, ultimately providing access and control over political power, electoral processes tend to be highly controversial (Lane, 2011). Therefore, the role of formal institutions becomes a way to shape the behavior of actors in a way that transforms their political actions into or aligns with desirable social outcomes. This can happen or happen when conventionally agreed rules, rules and procedures provide the context for political interaction, "create incentives and restrictions on the behavior of actors to reward those who follow the rules and punish those who do not they do "(Norgaard, 201:471). Behavior that modifies or influences the imperative of institutions means that they are effective as they prove to be capable of causing actors compliance. As rational actors normally break the rules have decided to maximize interest (short term), assured that victims can claim compensation or get justice in case of violation of rules or cheating becomes crucial to the sustainability of democracy. In the absence of this, an "eye-toeye" situation arises when violations of the rules respond to other violations of the rules (Axelrod, 2013). This situation, a clear result of institutional degeneration, can destabilize current provisions and lead to total violence and the subsequent deconsolidationof democracy.

Therefore, although the re-activation of new pre-existing democratic institutions and creation has been an important feature of the transition from Ghana to the constitutional government is refreshing, the level of violence that characterized the elections in Ghana suggests that the role of the mediator of institutions is not currently properly discharged. This inadequacy seems to undermine the trust of players in the police and the judiciary, for example, and inspire politicians and their advocates to do justice with their own hands. The corrosive effect of such a scary development on the rule of law, on democracy and on its stability can not be exaggerated (Axelrod, 2013).

Therefore, although Ghana has managed to hold a series of elections, it does not necessarily follow that the level of democratic consolidation is improving. The nature and scope of the violence that accompanied the 2008 elections, as with other previous elections, clearly indicate that the prevailing conditions are not yet fair or not favorable to long-term stabilization. As oil policy is beginning to appear in an already precarious situation, political and economic incentives to use violence are increasingly evident. The infamous Nana Akufo-Addo declaration of the NPP flag carrier, asking party supporters to use all available means to secure the PNP victory in the 2012 elections confirms this matter (Monney, 2013). At the same time, however, there are great perspectives for stability, peace and democratic security if it is possible to implement urgently short and long-term ways of channeling conflicting needs and interests within the framework of democratic institutions.

With two decades of democratic practice, Ghana's Fourth Republic appears to gain strong foothold. This is generally evidenced by seven successful general elections held and acclaimed as free fair and transparent. It is important to note that the first two elections; 1992 and 1996 remained the military leader in office since Jerry John

Rawlings won the two elections, the election was referred as a “transition without change.” Ninsin (2010) termed the transitional elections in Ghana and some states in Africa as “stage-managed” its results been predetermined and openly rigged, coupled with the decision of the electorate “stolen” is an indication of the absence of democratic culture. In describing the 2000 elections, Gyimah-Boadi (2001) referred to the general elections as “indeed, they herald the end of an era and the beginning of a new one for Ghana”. However the 2000 and 2012 elections have led to a turn-over of political power (Frempong, 2013).

There is the need for Ghanaians to safeguard the progress made under its democracy. Democracy is now the most cherished and effective form of government the world over, in line with Ghana’s quest to develop and to champion human rights and freedoms, its democracy should be promoted. As a result of achieving the goal of developing Ghana’s democracy, Ninsin (2010) recommended the building and strengthening of institutions of state in which there is independent judiciary, liberalized mass media that operate without censorship, respect for all forms of the citizenry freedom, existence of impartial and independent Electoral Commission (EC), that will organise periodic free and fair elections (ibid). The creations of a joint dialogue among political parties by the EC under the Inter Party Advisory Committee (IPAC) in Ghana’s electoral politics should be strengthened. The IPAC operates as a platform for discussions before the elections and promotes consensus building among the various disagreeing political parties on issues of the modality on how elections should be conducted. The EC uses the forum to address grievances and remove doubts and fears of the parties and the electorate. The IPAC has since its establishment in 1994 has achieved monumental benefits that have helped in the democratic growth, in going forward the prospects of the IPAC must be highlighted and strengthened (Debrah, 2013).

Dundas (2014) provides a framework for strengthening Ghana's democracy. In his view there must be an eagle's eye watch of the electoral system. Thus the EC should give accreditation to political parties' agents to monitor and supervise the elections on the day of the elections. The activity of these party agents will serve as "eyes and ears" supervisors of their various parties in whose interest they are there to serve as a watchdog. The monitoring of elections by parties and groups lead to the compliance of the electoral rules and this in turn leads to the smooth conduct of the elections. Violence and conflict in elections erupts as a result of poor monitoring of counting and the declaration of the electoral results in polling stations and particularly at the EC headquarters where the final results are declared. The activities of the electoral monitors is to promote transparency and fairness, reduce fraud if not eradicate it, build legitimacy and trust in the declared results. The pivotal role played by either domestic or external supervisors is important in achieving the democratic objective of free and fair elections (Gill, 2014).

Oppong (2012) opines that voter education must be given considerable attention so as to safeguard the progress made under Ghana's democracy. He stresses that voter sensitisation and enlightenment is a prerequisite for violence free elections. There must be education of electorate that they are entitled by law to one vote and should respect the civic rights of others. The incessant mistakes and high levels of misunderstanding that characterises the voting day are attributed to poor voter education (Oppong, 2012). Hesseling shares the same view about electoral monitoring with Oppong, to him; "the importance of electoral watchdog is based on the numerous contested electoral results in

Africa of which Ghana is inclusive. He argues that there is a widely held view that electoral observer's particularly international observers are viewed generally as neutral. Monitoring elections is necessary especially in a pluralist society owing to the good results it brings on the democratic growth". In Hesseling opinion, electoral monitoring achieves the

following function; “showing support for the growth of a solid democracy, building the trust and confidence of the people in the democratic system and to facilitate the smooth running of free and fair elections” (Hesseling, 2013). According to BofoArthur (2008) democracy can be strengthened in any state including Ghana by safeguarding the rights and freedoms of the people in Ghana. He debunked the notion that democracy thrive well only in a stable political environment alone. In that political stability is inextricably linked with the safeguard of fundamental human rights and other freedoms and liberties of the citizenry. His argument is that economic growth and development acts as a catalyst to the nurturing of democracy, this is not the summation of all the conditions needed for the growth and strengthening of democracy. In citing South East Asia, democracy there are not robust and their political environment are not liberal to enhance the promotion and protection of human rights, yet their economy is booming. There is the need for Ghana to place emphasis on the rights of its citizens in its quest to promote democracy and a stable political environment.

Oquaye (2004:11) and Bofo-Arthur (2008:28) on the other hand recommend that “Ghana’s democracy can be protected by Ghanaians building a good civil military relation. The derailment of Ghana’s democracy in the past was attributed to the involvement of the military in politics and the frequent coups that characterized the state”. In going forward, “there should be a cordial relationship between the military and the civilian government. The military should stick to its constitutional mandate of protecting the state against external aggressions” (Oquaye, 2004 and Bofo-Arthur, 2008). The president being elected president of the people of Ghana must build the confidence of the military in democratic governance. As they termed it, “the president should provide political direction and also allay the fears of the citizens of the possibility of coups”.

Schedler (1998:91) argues that, "democratic consolidation was meant to describe the challenge of making new democracies secure, of extending their life expectancy beyond the short term, of making them immune against the threat of authoritarian regression, of building dams against eventual reverse waves." To this original mission of rendering democracy "the only game in town," countless other tasks have been added. As a result, the list of "problems of democratic consolidation" has expanded beyond all recognition. In Schedler opinion, "democratic consolidation has come to include such divergent items as popular legitimation, the diffusion of democratic values, the neutralization of antisystem actors, civilian supremacy over the military, the elimination of authoritarian enclaves, party building, the organization of functional interests, the stabilization of electoral rules, the routinization of politics, the decentralization of state power, the introduction of mechanisms of direct democracy, judicial reform, the alleviation of poverty, and economic stabilization". Ghana's young and new democracy can be moving towards consolidation when the indicators mentioned above with other democratic credentials are deeply rooted in our democratic culture.

2.11 Conclusion

(Lawal :2010, Esew: 2010: 232, Boone: 2009, Ayal: 2009, Hoeffler: 2004, Newbury: 2008, Hoelscher: 2010, Goldstone: 2009, Bardhan: 2007, Hogland: 2009, Teshome: 2009: 195: Gyima-Boadi: 2009, Dolan: 2010: 2, Benesch: 2008, bombande: 2010) argue that politically motivated violence and electoral violence are caused by: economic and land right marginalization, socio-demographic factors, ethnic marginalization, inciting comments, weak state institutions and electoral process, deliberate act of violence by political party actors and disregard for rules and regulation, media reportage, winner takes all attitude and polarized nature of society. The challenge here is that, the literature failed

to analyze the trend of electoral violence in the Fourth Republic of Ghana as the process to democratize endures with respect to time.

(Fearon et al: 2013, Teshome: 2009, Hogleung: 2009, Neymayer: 2003, Bonkougou: 2011, Bodea et al: 2006, Awuku: 2001, Levantis et al: 2000, Reuter: 2011, Galoor: 2005 and Hamber: 2010) opine that effects of electoral violence ranges from human rights violation, trauma and psychological effects, under development, undermines election result and spillover effects. There are some incoherencies in the literature analyzed. Democracy is a man made institution and in the process to consolidate it Ghana is challenged with electoral violence. The literature failed to address the incidence of electoral violence in Africa's democratic process when the political elites appear to use this violence instrumentally to win political power. No possibilities were put in place to address the ramification of electoral violence as Africa struggle to democratize. Periodic, free and fair elections are a key component of democracy and are perceived as a medium through which democracy can be consolidated. In fact, Huntington (1993) is of the view that a democracy becomes consolidated after it has gone through the 'two turnover elections test' of two successive and peaceful handovers of power from an incumbent to an opposition party. Although some African countries have instituted electoral democracies such as Nigeria, Kenya, South Africa, Senegal, etc. while Ghana has passed the two election test, democracy is not yet consolidated as election-related violence still exists in these countries. There exist issues with electoral violence

CHAPTER THREE

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

3.0 Introduction

The outline of methodology adopted for the survey is presented here. The chapter entails the research design, sources of data, data collection tools, sampling and sampling techniques and analysis of data.

3.1 Research Design

Mixed method design was adopted to explore the growing phenomena of electoral violence and how to consolidate democracy in Ghana. In an attempt to obtain the needed information, qualitative and quantitative were used. Qualitative research is by definition exploratory. That is qualitative research examines information from the perspective of both groups and individuals and generates case studies and summaries rather than lists of numeric data. In addition, quantitative research design was used because it involves collecting and interpreting numerical data which is mostly done through the use of questionnaires and sometimes through interviews. In the enterprise of electoral violence, key stakeholders such as Opinion Leaders, E.C officials, Political Activists, the Police and Electorates constituted the population and the target group of the study. Respondents who could not be interviewed due to the nature of their work were given questionnaires to respond to on their own schedule some through personal contacts and others through electronic mails.

3.2 Research Purpose

Given the objectives of the work, exploratory research purpose was seen to be the most suitable for the study. The reason is that, the research intended to explore several avenues involving several stakeholders such as Political Activist, Opinion Leaders, the Police, the Electoral Commission and the Electorates who plays major role in Ghana's democratic processes.

3.3 Population

In this study, the population were all eligible stakeholders' such as the Electoral Commission Officials, Police, Opinion Leaders, Political Activists, Victims of electoral violence, and Electorates who play integral role in the Ghana's democratic processes. Asawase, Asunafo South and Krachi Nchumuru electoral constituencies were selected as study area because the are captured as flashpoints for electoral violence since the introduction of the Fourth Republic in Ghana. National Democratic Congress did not do well in the Ashanti Region in the last three elections. This is because of New Patriotic Partys effort to consolidate the region as their strong hold. However, National Democratic Congress has maintained Asawase seat in the opposition stronghold ever since it was created in spite of opposition challenge. The case of Krachi Nchumuru is similar to that of Asawasi. Asunafo South is a no go area noted for electoral violence since the commencement of Fourth Republic in Ghana. These electoral constituencies pose a great threat to the democratic processes of Ghana in the light of the latter's ability to consolidate. It has become necessary to empirically research into the electoral ramifications in these areas.

3.4 Sampling and Sampling Technique

Sampling is a proportion or subset of a larger group (Fink, 2003:18). It can also be defined “as a finite part of a statistical population whose properties are studied to gain information about the whole”. Next section discusses the sample size and sampling technique adopted for the study.

3.4.1 Sampling Technique

In this study, purposive sampling was selected because it enabled the selection of unique respondents such as the Police, Electoral Commission Officials, Opinion Leaders, Political Activists, and Victims of electoral violence and Electorates who are knowledgeable in electoral processes and its growing development of electoral violence in Ghana.

The primary consideration of this method was using the options of the researcher as to respondents who can contribute to the study. The researcher purposely chose the Police, E.C Officials, Opinion Leaders, Political Activists, Civil Society Groups, and Victims of Electoral Violence because of their involvement in elections which play central role in democratic processes in Ghana.

3.4.2 Sampling Size

“In order to get a sample size which is representative of the population of customers”, the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD, 2009) formula for determining sample size is applied.

IFAD sample size formula:

$$n = \frac{t^2 \cdot p \cdot (1-p)}{m}$$

Description of variables in the formula $n =$

required sample

size $t =$ confidence level at 95% (standard value

of 1.96) $p =$ estimated proportion of the study

population with similar

characteristics.

$m =$ margin of error at 5% (standard value

of 0.05).

With proportion of the study population that make one form of payments or the other (p) set at ninety one (91) percent which is equivalent to 0.91 the sample size for the study is calculated as follows:

Calculation of the sample size

$$n = \frac{t^2 \cdot p(1-p)}{m^2} = \frac{1.96^2 \cdot 0.9(1-0.9)}{0.05^2} = \frac{0.31462704}{0.0025} = 1.49.850816 \approx 150$$

In relation to this one hundred and fifty (150) respondents were selected for the study as shown in Table 3.1.

The distribution of respondents was proportional and is as follows;

50 sample size questionnaires are allocated to Asawase Constituency in the Ashanti

Region of Ghana. 50 sample size questionnaires are allocated to Asunafo South

Constituency in the Bono-Ahafo Region of Ghana and the final 50 sample size

questionnaires are allocated to Krachi Nchumuru Constituency in the Volta Region of

Ghana.

In this study, Opinion Leaders, E.C. Officials, Party Activists, Security services, Victims of Electoral Violence and Civil Society Groups from these selected Constituencies were chosen. The researcher conveniently chose these targeted groups for the study due to their involvement in elections, accessibility, limited resources and limited time frame for the research and the participation of respondents for this survey was entirely voluntary and anonymous. The distribution is indicated in Table 3.1.

Table 3.1 Distribution of Population and Respondents

Constituency	Respondents
Asawase	50
Asunafo South	50
Krachi Nchumuru	50
Total	150

3.5 Sources of Data

This study made use of secondary and primary information.

3.5.1 Primary Sources

In this study, Opinion Leaders, E.C. Officials, Party Activists, Security services, Victims of Electoral Violence and Civil Society Groups from the selected Constituencies were chosen. The researcher conveniently chose these targeted groups for the study due to their involvement in elections, accessibility, limited resources and limited time frame for the research

3.5.2 Secondary Sources

They included publications, journals, books and articles on electoral violence and democratic consolidation. This source gave the researcher significant insight into electoral violence and democratic consolidation which provided the foundation for the literature

review and also served as springboard to research further into the growing phenomena of electoral violence and democratic consolidation in the Fourth Republic of Ghana: 1993-2016.

3.6 Data Collection Instruments

Data collection instrument was primarily questionnaires and interviews. Structured questionnaires were prepared with open-ended and close ended questions addition to guided interviews. The nature of the questionnaires was such that they helped respondents to provide relevant response. In this study, questionnaire was chosen as it helped reach lots of people quickly as compared to others like interviews. The items in the questionnaires were closed-ended, which made it easier to compare the responses to each item. These were based on those used by Likert and adopted a scale from 1 = strongly disagree, 2 = disagree, 3 = Neutral, 4 = agree, and 5 = strongly agree. Guided interview was employed to gather pertinent information's from key stakeholders in the enterprise of electoral violence.

3.6.1 Questionnaire Development

The questionnaire was in sections. The sections were aimed at developing or sourcing for information relating to the study. The first section demanded information on demographic data while the other sections dealt with the objectives and research questions of the study. In this study, the questionnaire development helped the researcher to achieve the objectives for carrying out the research. Interview guide was developed to provide in-depth external information from key respondents to the researcher.

3.7 Data Analysis Techniques

Data analysis involves sieving raw data into manageable size, developing summaries and applying statistical inferences. This is because raw data is meaningless until it is properly

turned into information (Emery and Couper, 2003). Data collected were concord to help detect errors, omissions and made the necessary corrections. The data was organized into tables and figures based on the questionnaire given to respondents. The result were then analyzed and converted into percentages and other charts. The result was subsequently computed into numerical values and explained or analyzed.

Computer data analysis such as SPSS (version 20) and Microsoft excel (2010) were the main tools employed to analyze the data in order to help interpreted results. The statistical program for social scientist (SPSS, version 20) was used to analyze the precoded questions. This packaged was used to compute the percentages because it is easier to use. It was also used to make a tables needed for discussions of the results. Also MS Excel (2010) was used to draw the graphs for the computed data. These were used by the researcher because of the ease in using SPSS (version 20) and MS excel (2010) for this purpose over the other software. The other questions that were open-ended were analyzed by listing all the vital response given by the respondents. They were then considered based on their relevance to the research.

3.8 Validity and Reliability

The researcher understood the data needed for the study and therefore designs questions that produced such data. Simple and clear statements and words were used to foster easy understanding of respondents. Meaning of the questions was understood in the way it was anticipated and this helped the researcher to decode the responses of respondents.

CHAPTER FOUR

PRESENTATION AND ANALYSIS OF DATA

Introduction

The literature on democratization in Ghana's Fourth Republic argued by (Lawal: 2010, Esey: 2010:232, Boone: 2009, Ayai: 2009, Laitin: 2003, Ostby et al: 2010, Neumayer: 2003, Hoeffler: 2004, Hoglund: 2009, Dolan: 2010:2, Fearo et al: 2013, Hoglund: 2009, Gyima-Boadi et al: 2009, Bonkougou: 2011, Awuku: 2011, Reuters: 2011, Teshome: 2009, United Nations: 2010, Hamber: 2010 and Simpson et al: 2011) opined that, democratic processes in Ghana and especially Africa, is threatened by a growing phenomena of electoral violence caused by several factors ranging from economic, social, political and cultural. The literature further outlined the effects of electoral violence on the efforts of African states including Ghana to consolidate democracy. They point to the causal elements as consisting of social, political, economic, health and cultural. This chapter does an analysis of the two positions stated above. It uses the data presented above in chapter two and data collected from respondents to provide responses to the research questions below.

- i. What are the motivating factors which generate electoral violence when the democratic process is expected to be consolidating in Ghana?
- ii. What is the trend of electoral violence in a democratic process which demonstrates dynamics of stability and continuity?
- iii. How does electoral violence militate against the ability of democratization in Ghana's Fourth Republic?

- iv. What could be done to mitigate electoral violence in Ghana's democratic process when the political elites appear to use this violence instrumentally to win political power?

Descriptive Statistics

Description of gathered data is a first step to explain any details or statistics. They are used to illustrate and summarize simple attributes data in any study. Frequency tables and figures are mainly used.

4.1 Demographic Characteristics of Respondents

This section describes the demographic data of respondents. Data analyzed and gathered were about demographic variables such as gender, educational level and occupation of respondents.

4.1.1 Gender Distribution of Respondents

The study sought to find out the gender of respondents in relation to the study. In dealing with gender, there were 110 males forming 73 percent of respondents with 40 females constituting 27 percent of respondents. Table 1 further explains.

Table 4.2: Gender Distribution of Respondents

Gender	Frequency	Percentage %
Males	110	73
Females	40	27
Total	150	100

Source: field survey, 2017.

From Table 4.2 it is realized that 73 percent of respondents were males while 27 percent were females. This tells out rightly that there were more males than females and this may be as a result of the study area having more males than females.

The study also sought to find out the educational background of respondents. This is an important variable since the aim of the study was to examine electoral violence it was imperative to seek for the level of education of the respondents. Results are presented in

Figure 4.2 below.




Figure 4.2: Educational Level of RespondentsSource: field survey, 2017.

It is realized from Figure 4.2 that, majority of respondents thus 51 forming 34 percent of respondents had tertiary education, 33 representing 22 percent of respondents had diploma, 24 constituting 16 percent of respondents had secondary education, and 23 making 15 percent of respondents had basic education while the least number of respondents thus 19 forming 13 percent of respondents had no formal education. As indicated in the figure above, it was realised that the educational level of respondents was fairly high.

The study also sought to find out the occupation or jobs of respondents involved in the study. Responses are presented in Figure 2 below.




Figure 4.3: Occupation of Respondents Source: field survey, 2017.

Figure 4.3 shows that 38 respondents forming 25 percent of the sampled size were students, 28 constituting 19 percent of respondents were businessmen/women and traders, 14 making 9 percent of respondents were E.C Officials, 12 representing 8 percent of respondents were priests/imams, teachers formed 18 percent of respondents, 19 forming 13 percent of respondents were of security service background, 11 representing 7 percent of respondents were administrators while one forming 1 percent of respondents was a medical doctor.

4.2 Motivating Factors of Electoral Violence

Laako (2012) defines violence in elections as “acts motivated by an attempt to affect the results of the elections- either by manipulating the electoral procedures and participation or by contesting the legitimacy of the results”. “It might involve voters and candidate’s intimidation, killings, attacks against their property, forceful displacement, unlawful detentions and rioting”. The study sought to find out from respondents the motivating factors that lead to electoral violence in the selected areas. To achieve this several statements were provided for respondents to choose on the factors that lead to electoral violence.

4.2.1 Money (Financial Rewards)

This was to find out from respondents if money or financial rewards is a motivating factors that influence or lead to electoral violence in the selected areas of the study. Out of 150 respondents, 49 representing 33 percent of respondents strongly agreed with the statement that money or financial rewards were motivating factors that lead to electoral violence, however the majority of respondents thus 101 forming 67 percent of respondents agreed with the statement. Table 2 explains further.

Table 4.3: Money (Financial Rewards)

Response	Frequency	Percentage %
Strongly Agree	49	33
Agree	101	67
Total	150	100

Source: field survey, 2017.

Table 4.3 clearly shows that respondents believed the statement is true as 67 percent agreed with the statement while 33 percent strongly agreed with the statement. The response from respondents corroborates the assertion by Debrah (2014) that “most people especially the

youth engage in electoral violence because of financial gains they stand to earn. These finances and monies are paid by people who have high stakes in the electoral results”.

4.2.1 Perpetrators of Electoral Violence Hopeful of Being Released

The researcher wanted to find out from respondents whether a motivating factor for electoral violence in the selected areas is the notion that perpetrators of electoral violence are hopeful of being released by politicians even if they are arrested.

Out of 150 respondents, 19 forming 13 percent of respondents strongly agreed with the statement that a motivating factor for electoral violence in the selected areas is the notion that perpetrators of electoral violence are hopeful of being released by politicians even if they are arrested, the majority of 98 constituting 65 percent of respondents agreed with the statement while 33 representing 22 percent of respondents were not sure of the statement. Table 4.4 further explains.

Table 4.4: Perpetrators of Electoral Violence Hopeful of Being Released

Responses	Frequency	Percentage %
Strongly Agree	19	13
Agree	98	65
Not Sure	33	22
Total	150	100

Table 4.4 shows that majority of respondents forming 65 percent of respondents agreed with the statement while 22 percent were not sure of the statement. According to Onsarigo (2010), electoral violence is very common on the African continent partly because of weakness in some of our systems. According to him most perpetrators of electoral violence do so with the confidence and hope that they will be released by their political parties when

arrested and their party is in power. This assertion therefore tallies with the responses by respondents.

4.2.3 Issue of ‘Macho’ Men

“Machomen are used as body guards of political leaders, they are used to intimidate voters especially in areas considered to be strongholds of opposing parties and they are also used to disrupt the electoral process where one perceives defeat”. This assertion made the researcher if that was the case that ‘machomen’ is factor in electoral violence. From 150 respondents, 14 forming 9 percent of respondents strongly agreed with the statement that the issue of ‘machomen’ is a factors that leads to electoral violence, 96 constituting 64 percent of respondents agreed with the statement while 17 representing 11 percent of respondents were not sure of the statement, however, 23 making 16 percent of respondents disagreed with the statement that the issue of ‘machomen’ is a factor that leads to electoral violence. Table 4.5 further explains.

Table 4.5: Issue of ‘Machomen’

Responses	Frequency	Percentage %
Strongly Agree	14	9
Agree	96	64
Not Sure	17	11
Disagree	23	16
Total	150	100

Source: field survey, 2017.

It is realized from Table 4.5 that 64 percent of respondents agreed with the statement that the issue of ‘machomen’ leads to electoral violence while 16 percent of respondents disagreed with the statement. The responses from respondents corroborates the assertion by Debrah (2014) who opines that the issue of ‘machomen’ has long played an important

part in the politics of Ghana and over the years their activities has been bad and not good for democracy.

4.2.4 Material Rewards

From 150 respondents 23 forming 15 percent of respondents strongly agreed with the statement that material rewards for perpetrators is a motivating factor that leads to electoral violence in the selected areas, the majority of 61 representing 41 percent of respondents agreed with the statement, 16 making 11 percent of respondents were not sure whether material rewards lead to electoral violence in the selected areas. However, 50 constituting 33 percent of respondents disagreed with the statement that material rewards for perpetrators leads to electoral violence in the selected areas. Table 4.6 explains further.

Table 4.6: Material Rewards

Responses	Frequency	Percentage %
Strongly Agree	23	15
Agree	61	41
Not Sure	16	11
Disagree	50	33
Total	150	100

Source: field survey, 2017.

Table 5 shows that 41 percent of respondents agreed with the statement that material rewards is a motivating factor for electoral violence in the selected areas while 11 percent were not sure of the statement.

4.3 Causes of Electoral Violence

The section tries to find out the causes of electoral violence in the Asawase, Asunafo South and Krachi Nchumuru Constituencies. Respondents were provided with statements relating to the causes of electoral violence in the selected constituencies.

4.3.1 Ethnic Marginalization

“Ethnically divided societies where ethnic identities have become politicised, getting electoral victory could be a matter of survival, particularly for ethnic parties. This is particularly true if the ruling ethnic-party is convinced that it would be ruined by an opposition victory” (Bardhan, 2007). With this background ethnic marginalization was asked a cause of electoral violence in the selected constituencies.

From 150 sampled respondents, 44 representing 29 percent of respondents strongly agreed that ethnic marginalization is a leading cause of electoral violence in the selected constituencies, the majority of 53 forming 35 percent of respondents agreed with the statement while 43 making 28 percent of respondents were not sure of the statement. However, 10 constituting 8 percent of respondents disagreed with the statement that ethnic marginalization is a contributing factor to electoral violence in the selected constituencies. Table 6 explains further.

Table 4.7: Ethnic Marginalization

Responses	Frequency	Percentage %
Strongly Agree	44	29
Agree	53	35
Not Sure	43	28
Disagree	10	8
Total	150	100

Source: field survey, 2017.

Table 6 shows that most respondents agreed with the statement that ethnic

marginalization are a cause of electoral violence in the selected constituencies. Asawase is predominantly made up of large numbers of people from the northern part of the country living or surrounded by Asantes. Over the years during elections tension is created especially between the National Democratic Congress and New Patriotic Party this is because the parliamentary seat is occupied by National Democratic Congress. The New Patriotic Party has tried over the years to unseat the Member of Parliament while the National Democratic Congress backed by the Northerners wants to hold on to the seat. The case of Asawase however is direct opposite to Krachi Nchumuru in the Volta Region of Ghana. This sometimes leads to confrontation especially on ethnic backgrounds. Høglund (2009) agrees that “experience has shown that in situations where ethnic groups distrust each other and are afraid of being victimised, this fear might drive them to resort to violence first in a preemptive move to minimise damage”.

4.3.2 Inciting Comments

Dolan (2010:19) define incitement as “broadcasting that incites imminent violence, ethnic or religious hatred, civil disorder or rioting among people and carries clear and immediate risk of causing such incitement.” The researcher therefore wanted to find out from respondents whether inciting comments is a factor for electoral violence in the selected constituencies.

Out of 150 respondents, 79 representing 53 percent of respondents strongly agreed with the statement that inciting comments is a factor that leads electoral violence in the selected constituencies while 71 constituting 47 percent of respondents agreed with the statement. Figure 3 illustrates further.




Figure 4.4: Inciting Comments

Source: field survey, 2017.

It is realized from Figure 4.4 that respondents were unanimous with their response as 53 percent strongly agreed with the statement while 47 percent agreed. Responses from respondents corroborates the view of Dolan (2010:41) who opines that “most of the electoral violence in African countries including Ghana come about as a result of inciting comments by political leaders”.

4.3.3 Influence of Electronic and Print Media

The electronic and print media is supposed to inform the general populace but sometimes some take political stands and spread false news and sometimes incite listeners to the detriment of the nation as a whole. The researcher wanted to find out whether the electronic and print media is a cause of electoral violence in the selected constituencies. Out of 150 respondents, 54 forming 36 percent of respondents strongly agreed with the statement that electronic and print media is a primary cause of electoral violence in the selected constituencies, the majority of 78 representing 52 percent of respondents agreed with the

statement while 18 making 12 percent of respondents were not sure of the statement.

Figure 4 further explains.




Figure 4.5: Influence of Electronic and Print Media

Source: field survey, 2017.

Figure 4.5 show that respondents were of the opinion that the influence of electronic and print media is a contributing factor to electoral violence in the selected constituencies. Responses agree with the assertion by the AU (2013) that most leaders and political holders use the print media to incite political violence on the continent as in the case of Rwanda and Liberia.

4.3.4 Desire to Amass Wealth

The researcher wanted to find whether the desire to amass wealth by political leaders is also a cause of electoral violence in the selected constituencies.

From 150 respondents, 33 making 22 percent of respondents strongly agreed with the statement that the desire to amass wealth by some political leaders leads to electoral violence, 77 forming 51 percent of respondents agreed with the statement while 21

representing 14 percent of respondents were not sure of the statement. However, 19 constituting 13 percent of respondents disagreed with the statement that the desire to amass wealth by politicians is a cause of electoral violence in the selected constituencies.

Table 7 further explains.

Table 4.8: Desire to Amass Wealth by Political Holders

Responses	Frequency	Percentage %
Strongly Agree	33	22
Agree	77	51
Not Sure	21	14
Disagree	19	13
Total	19	100

Source: field survey, 2017.

It is realized from the table that 51 percent of respondents agreed with the statement while 13 percent disagreed with the statement. According to Lawal (2010:47) “a situation in which an individual tries to hold on to power for personal aggrandisement contributes to electoral violence. In an attempt to hang on to power, leaders often create a regime of violence, repression and incite the populace in order to hold on to power”. This truly shows that the desire to amass wealth is a contributing factor to electoral violence.

4.4 Trend of Electoral Violence from 2008-2016

According to respondents the areas are characterised with lots of electoral violence even before, during and after elections. Respondents were of the view that electoral violence in 2008 was on the lower side but from 2012 to 2016 there has been an increase in election related violence. According to respondents of Asawase due to political incitements there was violence at Dagomba line as a result of the late arrival of electoral materials as some politicians tries to politicised that the ruling National Democratic Cngress was trying to rig the elections in the constituency. According to respondents of Asunafo South due to

political incitement there were violence at Sankore, Kukuom and its environs leading to the death of some people.

More so, during the limited registration by Electoral Commission in 2016, violence erupted at the Aboabo polling station as both the National Democratic Congress and New Patriotic Party claimed that minors were being registered.

Vandalism of political party offices and homes occurred especially in 2012 and 2016 in the Asawase constituency and Asunafo South. Furthermore, an NPP member was murdered at Asowase constituency office during a protest by youth groups of the party in relation to the 2016 elections.

Late counting of votes also led to tension and skirmishes in the selected constituencies in Ghana before, during and after 2012 and 2016 elections. At Asawase in the recent 2016 elections, recounting of votes also led to clashes when they disputed on the outcome of the results.

In short from respondents even though there have been incidents of electoral violence in the selected constituencies from 2008 to 2016, electoral violence was severe during the 2012 election period followed by 2016 and finally 2008. The figure below illustrates further.






Figure 4.6 Election Year with Most Violence

4.5 Regression Analysis of Data

The following section of the chapter presents two multiple regression models assessing the effects of electoral violence on democratic consolidation in the country using questionnaire data.

4.5.1 Regression Model on Effects of Electoral Violence on Democratic Consolidation

Table 4.8 below shows the constant (intercept) and the slope of the effects of electoral violence (X1) are 2.425 (on a 5-point scale) and 0.550 respectively and these are statistically significant ($p < .05$). The regression model is therefore as follows;

$Y = 2.425 + 0.850X_1$ (where, Y= statements (options), X1= effects of electoral violence).

Table 4. 9: Summary of Regression Model on Effects of Electoral Violence.

Model Summary	Constant	Slope-X1	R	Rsquare
	2.425	.850	.911	.784
ANOVA Summary	F-Ratio	df1	df2	Significance
	205.479	4	15	.000*
	Variable	B	t-value	Significance

Coefficient Summary	Constant	2.425	5.101	.000*
	X1	.500	5.214	.000*
	X2	-.255	-1.231	.210
	X3	.237	1.187	.254
	X4	.128	.512	.616

*Significance at 5% level.

The table explains effects of electoral violence on democratic consolidation in the country and it shows that respondents were unanimous in their responses as over 85 percent agreed on the effects it has on democratic consolidation. The results corroborate studies by Fearon and Laitin (2013) they highlighted the effects of electoral violence on democratic consolidation. The other variables (namely, undermines election results (X2), human rights violation (X3) and losses (life and employment) (X4) have a significant impact on democratic consolidation in the country ($p < .05$).

Significantly, it should be noted $R^2 (.911)$ is much higher than any bi-variant correlation with the effects of electoral violence on democratic consolidation, seen in Table 9. This shows that the model is a significant advancement in explaining the effects of electoral violence.

Table 4.10: Analysis of the Correlations of the Effects of Electoral Violence

Description	Destruction of Properties	Undermines Election Results	Human Rights Violations	Effectiveness
Destruction of properties	-	$r = .684^*$	$r = .601^*$	$r = .911^*$
Undermines election results	$r = .684^*$	-	$r = .769^*$	$r = .879$
Human rights violations	$r = .601^*$	$r = .769^*$	-	$r = .852$
Effectiveness	$r = .911^*$	$r = .879$	$r = .852$	-
%				

*Significance at 5 level

Over all, it is realized the correlation had had marks for the effects of electoral violence on democratic consolidation were all high as seen from the table $r=.911$ and $r=.879$.

4.6 Curbing Electoral Violence

This was to find out ways of minimizing and if possible solving electoral violence in the country in order to enhance democratic consolidation in the country. Several statements were provided to find out from respondents ways of curbing electoral violence in the country.

4.6.1 Education on Political Tolerance

This was to find out from respondents whether education on political tolerance was a way of curbing electoral violence in the selected constituencies.

From 150 sampled respondents, 77 representing 51 percent of respondents strongly agreed with the statement that educating the populace on political tolerance will go a long way to curb electoral violence in the country especially in the selected constituencies while 73 forming 49 percent of respondents agreed with the statement. Table 10 explains further.

Table 4.11: Education on Political Tolerance

Responses	Frequency	Percentage
%		
Strongly Agree	77	51
Agree	73	49
Total	150	100

Source: field survey, 2017.

It is realized from Table 4.11 that all respondents were in agreement that educating the populace on political tolerance will go a long way minimize if not curb electoral violence in the country. Responses from respondents are supported by Oppong (2012) who posits that “voter education must be given considerable attention so as to safeguard the progress made under Ghana’s democracy. He stresses that voter sensitisation and enlightenment is a prerequisite for free and fair elections and violent free elections. There must be the education of the electorate that they are entitled by law to one vote and should respect the civic rights of others. The incessant mistakes and high levels of misunderstanding that characterises the voting day are attributed to poor voter education”.

4.6.2 Resourcing State Agencies

This was to examine whether one way of curbing electoral violence in the selected areas and the country as a whole was to resource states agencies like the police, electoral commission and the judiciary to properly handle electoral violence. Out of 150 respondents, 43 representing 29 percent of respondents strongly agreed with the statement that resourcing state agencies like the police, electoral commission and judiciary properly could help curb electoral violence in the country, the majority of 86 forming 57 percent of respondents agreed with the statement while 21 making 14 percent of respondents disagreed with the statement that resourcing state agencies like the police, electoral commission and judiciary could curb electoral violence in the selected areas. Table 11 further explains.

Table 4.12: Resourcing State Agencies

Responses	Frequency	Percentage %
Strongly Agree	43	29
Agree	86	57
Disagree	21	14

Total

150

100

Source: field survey, 2017.

Resourcing of state agencies as seen in Table 4.12 was agreed upon by 57 percent of respondents as one way of curbing electoral violence in the selected areas and the country as a whole while 14 percent of respondents disagreed with the statement. In short respondents are of the opinion that state agencies should be resourced enough to handle general elections before and after. This is supported by Ninsin (2010:27) who recommends that “building and strengthening of institutions of state in which there is independent judiciary, liberalized mass media that operate without censorship, respect for all forms of the citizenry freedom, existence of impartial and independent Electoral Commission (EC), that will organise periodic free and fair elections must be resourced to handle all electoral issues before and after”.

4.6.3 Allowing the Police and Judiciary to Work without Interference

This was to assess whether allowing the police and judiciary to work without any interference will go a long way to curb electoral violence in the country.


From 150 respondents, 67 forming 45 percent of respondents strongly agreed with the statement that the judiciary and police should be allowed to work without interference in order to deal with those who try to cause violence before, during and after elections. The majority of 83 representing 55 percent of respondents agreed with the statement. Table 12 explains further.

Table 4.13: Allowing the Police and Judiciary to Work without Interference

Responses	Frequency	Percentage %
Strongly Agree	67	45
Agree	83	55
Total	150	100

Source: field survey, 2017.

Table 4.13 shows that 55 percent of respondents agreed that allowing the police and judiciary to work without any interference before, during and after elections will help curb electoral violence in the selected areas. Responses from respondents corroborate Norgaard (2012:45) assertion that “role of formal institutions (judiciary, police etc) becomes one of shaping actors' behaviour in a manner that transforms political actions into or aligns them with socially desirable outcomes. This can or does happen when commonly agreed rules, norms and procedures providing the context for political interaction, 'create incentive and constraint for actors' behaviour by rewarding those that follow the rules and sanctioning those that do not.



CHAPTER FIVE

SUMMARY OF KEY FINDINGS, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

5.0 Introduction

This chapter presents the summary, conclusion and recommendation of the study which sought to explain the challenge of electoral violence and democratic consolidation in the Fourth Republic of Ghana: 1993-2016. The chapter is in three sections, first is the summary of the study, and second is conclusion and finally recommendations.

5.1 Summary of the Study

The study examined electoral violence in the democratic process of Ghana and democratic consolidation. The issues studied included the following:

- i. What are the motivating factors which generate electoral violence when the democratic process is expected to be consolidating in Ghana?
- ii. What is the trend of electoral violence in a democratic process which demonstrates dynamics of stability and continuity?
- iii. How does electoral violence militate against the ability of democratization in Ghana's Fourth Republic?
- v. What could be done to mitigate electoral violence in the country's democratic process when the political elites appear to use this violence instrumentally to win political power?

Primary and secondary data were used in the course of the study. The purposive and simple random sampling techniques were used in selecting respondents for the study. One hundred and fifty (150) respondents were selected for the study.

Findings of the study are as follows;

The electoral violence occurs in Ghana's democratic process although the process has gone through three political turnovers in 2000, 2008 and 2016.

5.1.1 Motivating Factors in the Involvement of Electoral Violence

First and foremost the study revealed that lots of factors motivate individuals or groups to engage in electoral violence which tends to affect the democracy of Ghana. Some of the motivating factors in the involvement of electoral violence included the influence of money or any form of financial reward. More so it was realised that another motivating factor in the involvement of electoral violence was that perpetrators involved in electoral violence are hopeful of being released if arrested.

Another motivating factor was the issue of 'machomen' who are hired by politicians before during and after elections to do the bidding of such politicians. Finally material rewards were seen as a factor responsible for involvement in electoral violence. The study furthermore found other elements to be the causes of electoral violence in the selected area of the study. Firstly, it was realised from the study that ethnic marginalization is a leading cause of electoral violence in the selected areas and for that matter the whole country. Another cause of electoral violence was found to be inciting comments from politicians and members of political parties. Following the points above was the influence of electronic and print media, the desire to amass wealth by politicians as they would do everything to hold on to power was found to be another cause of electoral violence in the study.

5.1.2 Effects of Electoral Violence on Democratic Consolidation in Ghana

The study concludes that the theoretical statement of the research which is restated as "the occurrence of electoral violence is a threat to democratic consolidation in Ghana and for

that matter Africa in general.” The study revealed several effects of electoral violence on democratic consolidation in Ghana. Among the effects of electoral violence were that it undermines election results, human rights violation, leads to losses (life, employment etc) and leads to the destruction of properties.

5.1.3 Trend of Involvement in Electoral Violence during Elections (2008-2016) The study sought to find out the trend of involvement in electoral violence during elections at flashpoints such as Asawase, Asunafo South and Krachi Nchumuru. It was revealed in the study that electoral violence is prominent in the selected areas of the study through 2008 to 2016 before, during and after elections.

It was also revealed that the trend of electoral violence at the selected study areas has been increasing over the years leading to death, loss of properties among others. The study however revealed that the year 2012 recorded the highest electoral violence in all the selected areas followed by 2016 with the least year of electoral violence being 2008.

5.1.4 Curbing Electoral Violence

According to Sadaro (2011) “politics is how people organise their communities for the purpose of collectively tackling problems confronting them and also how in the best of the circumstances, members of a community are able to define and accomplish their goals on the basis of co-operation”. To achieve this collective aim there is the need to curb electoral violence to ensure smooth democratic consolidation.

To minimize or curb electoral violence the study revealed the following; educating the general populace on political tolerance, more so state agencies such as the police, judiciary and the electoral commission should be resourced in order to handle elections and any form of violence that may occur. As stated by Ninsin (2010) who recommends that “building and strengthening of institutions of state in which there is independent judiciary,

liberalized mass media that operate without censorship, respect for all forms of the citizenry freedom, existence of impartial and independent Electoral Commission (EC), that will organise periodic free and fair elections must be resourced to handle all electoral issues before and after”.

Finally, the study revealed that state agencies such as the judiciary and police should be allowed to work without any interference so that they can effectively carry out their work to safe guard democratic consolidation in the country.

5.2 Conclusion

Academic scholars in democracy have varied opinions on what democracy is or ought to be.

However, one generally accepted element of democracy is free, fair and periodic elections. Elections can put into practice representative and popular participation in governance and provide a peaceful means for the exercise of political rights such as voting. Elections determine the allocation of economic resources in a country. It also helps promote peaceful transfer of political power. Yet, elections, by themselves may not necessarily promote democracy unless they are participatory, competitive and legitimate in nature. The link between elections and democracy can then be made with regards to its peace assurance nature.

The 2011 World Bank Report underscores the linkages between conflict, security and development. The report observes the negative effect of violence on economic progress and notes, that despite the history of political instability in most parts of Africa, a number of countries such as Ghana, South Africa and Mozambique have made significant progress towards eliminating the threat of violence to development (World Bank, 2011). Countries in which violence have been reduced substantially or non-existent usually have a higher

propensity to economic development. Electoral conflicts, which have become an undesired output of elections on the continent, are examples of such conflicts which have the tendency to derail the progress of democratization and development that has been achieved in Africa. Actions that will therefore lead to conflict and create instability must be prevented to avoid rolling back the gains of democracy made on the continent. This study on electoral violence and democratic consolidation in selected flashpoints in the country has revealed that much needs to be done to consolidate democracy in the country despite the numerous achievements in elections over the years.

It was realised that there are several motivating factors that predispose individuals or groups to get involved in electoral violence, among them was financial and materials rewards, offenders or perpetrators hopeful of being released once their politicians are in power among others. Moreover, the study revealed that ethnic marginalization, desire to amass wealth, inciting comments and the influence of the media is attributed to the causes of electoral violence in the study areas.

The study also showed that electoral violence is a big threat to democratic consolidation in the country and therefore needs to be prevented or minimized to safeguard the democracy of the country. Among such measures revealed by the study included resourcing state agencies, allowing the judiciary and police to work without any interference and educating the populace on political tolerance.

5.3 Recommendations

The following are recommended;

Firstly it is recommended that there should be establishment of preventive and early warning mechanisms to deal with electoral violence at community level to prevent escalation into regional and national level due to differences in resources needed to resolve

it. The country is characterised by several elections flashpoint where violence easily erupts like Asawase, Asunafo South and Krachi Nchumuru. The emergence of electoral conflict is always associated with agitations and disagreements on a small scale which later escalate to uncontrollable levels. The establishment of early warning mechanisms will aid experts to resolve such issues before they aggravate into large scale electoral violence.


Furthermore capacity building of Judicial Institutions should be entrenched: The Judiciary is important in elimination of culture of impunity through punishment of crimes. It also has an important part in adjudication of electoral disputes. Building their capacity through training and financial resourcing will ensure timely adjudication of electoral dispute which will reassure the citizenry of fairness in the delivery of justice. More so the judiciary should be allowed to work with fear or favour or any form of interference.

Restructuring and Capacity Building of Election Management Bodies and Governance Institutions: Most institutions of state responsible for elections and democracy lack the capacity to deliver effectively on their mandate. These institutions therefore need autonomy in terms of management and funding in order to deliver. In relation to this, staff remuneration is important to retain high caliber personnel and also reduce their propensity to corruption. This is needed in the case of Ghana where there were revealed deficiencies in the quality of ephemeral personnel used by the Electoral Commission during the 2012 General Elections.

It is also recommended that civic education should be intensified in the country: Democracy should not be seen as a mere event which is manifested in the conduct of elections, rather, it should be seen as an unending process. This calls for increased civic and voter education on the essence of democracy as well as the rights and civic responsibilities of the citizenry. When this is properly done, the citizenry will take ownership of the process and thereby lead to a reduction in electoral violence in Africa.

Ghana's Constitution has a mandated institution responsible for civic education which is the NCCE. The NCCE should therefore lead the way in Africa by adopting diplomatic efforts in reaching out to the citizenry to defend the constitution and the electoral process. Finally, the ratification of the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance must be upheld: The ratification of this Charter by African countries is "to ensure a uniformed legal regime on democracy on the continent. This will ensure that citizens can take their

Governments on and seek redress in courts, thereby reducing the propensity of government to perpetuate electoral violence". It is also instructive to note that out of 54 African Union (AU) members, Ghana is among the 46 signatories to the Charter and 23 countries that have both ratified and deposited their instrument of ratification. The NCCE can use this to inform electorates of their role in multiparty democracy and how governments should be held accountable for their actions.



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APPENDIX I
QUESTIONNAIRE

INTRODUCTION

This questionnaire is designed to explore the growing phenomena of electoral violence and democratic consolidation in the Fourth Republic of Ghana: Cases of Asawase, Asunafo South and Krachi Nchumuru Constituencies in Ghana are considered .Kindly complete this questionnaire as objectively as possible. The information given out is solely for academic purpose and would be treated as confidential.

Demographic Characteristics of Respondents

1. Sex: Male Female
2. Age : 15-20 21-25 26-30 31-35 36-40 Above 41
3. Educational Level: No Formal Education Basic Education Secondary
Tertiary Others (specify)
4. Religion: Christian Muslim Traditional
Others(specify).....
5. Occupation (please specify)

Section B: Motivating Factors of the Involvement in electoral Violence

Factors	Strongly Agree	Agree	Not Sure	Disagree	Strongly Disagree
1. The need to be recognized					
2. Money (financial rewards)					
3. Material rewards					
4. Political group association					
5. Influence of alcohol					
6. Influence of drugs					
7. Issue of 'macho' men					
8. Perpetrators of violence are hopeful of being released by politicians					

6. Can you identify cases of electoral violence in the Asawase, Asunafo South and Krachi Nchumuru Constituencies from 2008 elections to the 2016 elections?

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Section C: Causes of electoral Violence at Asawase, Asunafo South and Krachi Nchumuru Constituencies

Causes	Strongly Agree	Agree	Not Sure	Disagree	Strongly Disagree
1. Desire to amass wealth and power					
2. Lack of trust in governance and state institutions.eg. E.C					
3. Inciting comments					
4. Ethnic marginalization					
5. Accusation of rigging					
6. Verbal exchanges among political opponents					
7. Perpetrators of violence are not arrested and prosecuted					
8. Influence of electronic and print media					

Section D: Nature of Politically Motivated Violence at Asawase , Asunafo South and Krachi Nchumuru Constituencies

Nature of politically motivated violence	Strongly Agree	Agree	Not Sure	Disagree	Strongly Disagree
1. Fight among opposition parties					

2. Destruction of properties belonging to parties					
3. Assault on political opponents					

7. In your opinion what is the nature of politically motivated violence in your constituency?

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Section E: Effects of Politically Motivated Violence on Democratic Consolidation

Effects	Strongly Agree	Agree	Not Sure	Disagree	Strongly Disagree
1. Destruction of properties					
2. Undermines election results					
3. Underdevelopment					
4. human rights violations					
5. trauma of people					
6. injuries					
7. losses(life, employment, properties etc)					
8. leads to voter apathy					

8. Which election year had the most politically motivated violence?

A. 2008 B. 2012 C. 2016

9. Explain your answer

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Section F: Possibilities of addressing electoral Violence

	Strongly Agree	Agree	Not Sure	Disagree	Strongly Disagree
1. Education on political campaign tolerance					
2. The police and judiciary should be allowed to worked with interference					
3. Resourcing states agencies like E.C, Police and the Judiciary to properly handle electoral violence					

